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paragraphs should be indented. An abstract of not more than 100
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wide enough to facilitate editing and duplication. All pages, including footnote and references pages, should be serially numbered.
The cover sheet should state the title of paper, name(s) of
author(s), affiliation(s), and the appropriate address for further
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body of the manuscript. Authors sign a copyright release form
provided by the editors as a condition of publication.
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Authors are encouraged to supplement their submission of
manuscript copies in typescript with a 5¼ inch diskette prepared
in IBM compatible ASCII file format.
Authors are expected to r u n their materials on diskette
through a spellchecking software program or similar personal review before submitting either typescript or diskette materials.
Major headings within the manuscript should be centered,
underscored, and unnumbered with the first letter of major words
capitalized. Subheadings should be on a separate line beginning
flush with the left margin, and underscored with the first letter of
major words capitalized. Third-level headings should lead into the
paragraph, be underscored, and followed by a period; text should
immediately follow on the same line.
Tables, figures, and exhibits should be numbered (arabic),
titled, and, when appropriate, referenced. Limited use of original
documents, etc. can be accommodated in The Journal for authors
providing glossy black and white prints. Important textual materials may be presented in both the original language and the English translation.
Tables, and similar items must be discussed in the text and
are not to be included unless they lend support to the text. Materivi
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must be glossy black and white at least 5 x 7 inches.
The main text should be marked as to the approximate location of insertion and should be noted as follows, e.g.: [INSERT
TABLE 1]. The back of each table, etc. must indicate the related
final page number and title of the manuscript for insertion reference.
Illustrations, etc., must be prepared so that they can be understood standing alone. A line explaining the illustration should accompany such materials. The source citation for an illustration
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Footnotes. Footnotes should not be used for literature references. The work cited should be referenced using the author's
name and year of publication in the body of the text, inside square
brackets, e.g. [Garbutt, Spring 1984]; [Garner, 1954]. If the
author's name is mentioned in the text, it need not be repeated in
the reference, e.g. "Previts [Fall 1984] asserts . . . " If a reference
has more than three authors, only the first name and "et al"
should be used in the text citation. References to statutes, legal
treatises or court cases should follow the accepted form of legal
citation.
Textual footnotes may be used sparingly to expand and comment upon the text itself. These should be numbered consecutively
throughout the manuscript, using superscript arabic numerals.
List of References. References should be listed at the end of
the manuscript and contain full reference to all sources actually
cited. The list should be arranged in alphabetical order according
to the surname of the first author. Information about books and
journals should include the following: Books — name of author,
title underscored, place of publication, name of publisher, date of
publication; Journals — name of author, article title within quotation marks, journal title underscored, date of issue in parentheses,
page numbers. Multiple works by an author should be listed in
chronological order of publication, and when multiple works of an
author appear in a single year, the suffix a, b, etc. should be used
after the year.
As a helpful guide to questions of style not covered above,
refer to A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and
Dissertations (Fifth Edition) by Kate L. Turabian, published in
paperback by The University of Chicago Press.
Galley proofs will be sent to the a u t h o r s ) as permitted by
scheduling; however, additions of new material must be strictly
limited. The author(s) will be provided three copies of The Journal issue in which the manuscript is published.
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Geanie W. Margavio
SOUTHWEST MISSOURI STATE UNIVERSITY

THE SAVINGS AND LOAN DEBACLE:
THE CULMINATION OF THREE
DECADES OF CONFLICTING
REGULATION, DEREGULATION,
AND RE-REGULATION
Abstract: The role of the public accounting profession in the savings
and loan debacle of the 1980s has recently been the subject of Congressional inquiry and extensive litigation by government agencies,
and by angry stockholders and bondholders. These efforts suggest a
broad misunderstanding by the public of the causes of the disaster.
this paper illustrates that the difficulties which precipitated the crisis
were a result of the historical development of the regulatory environment of the savings and loan industry. Examining this regulatory
environment helps in understanding the current problems and crises
of savings and loans as well as the situation in which the accounting
profession now finds itself.
The paper illustrates that the manner in which the industry was
regulated, including piecemeal and often conflicting legislation,
locked the industry into long-term mortgage commitments and then
urged diversification from these commitments. The paper illustrates
that, over the years, industry responses to this legislation created a
net worth crisis. The extent of the crisis was obscured by accounting
principles developed by regulators, and which ran contrary to GAAP.
Finally, the paper discusses recent legislation designed to correct the
regulatory and accounting inconsistencies, and the anticipated effect
of this legislation on the future of the savings and loan industry.

The end of the 1980s decade was marred by the financial
collapse of many savings and loan institutions. Current estimates of federal expenditures necessary to bail out the savings
and loan industry from its financial debacle generally exceed
$100 billion and some estimates range as high as $300 billion
[Adams, 1990, p. 17; Pilzer, 1989, p. 233]. When interest costs
on 30 to 40 year debt used to finance the federal bailout are
included, cost estimates rise steeply to between $500 billion and
$1 trillion [Carlton, 1992]. The "true" cost of the bailout will not
be known for years to come, until all of the failing institutions
have been shut down, merged, and sold off; until the Resolution
Published by eGrove, 1993
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Trust Corporation liquidates its holdings; and until all of the tax
breaks and special portfolio performance guarantees granted to
acquiring institutions have expired. Meanwhile, the American
public is still asking: how the fiasco came about; who should be
blamed for it; and how the clean up should be financed.
These are questions of particular concern for accountants
for the following reason. While the responsibility for the widespread failure in the industry has not yet been fully determined,
the role of the public accounting profession as well as the accounting standards, principles, procedures, and rules for savings and loan financial reporting have been called into question.
Auditors of failed savings and loans have been shouldering part
of the blame for the fiasco and some of the financial responsibility for the clean up, as a result of various lawsuits by federal
agencies.1 In addition, auditors have been subjected to various
class action lawsuits brought by investors in failed savings and
loans.2 These lawsuits, whether justified or not, reflect a myopic
perspective of how the debacle occurred. The thrift debacle was
not simply the result of audit irregularities, Federal Home Loan
Bank Board forbearance in closing troubled institutions, or
fraud and mismanagement by thrift industry executives. Although each of these factors contributed substantially to the
crisis, the problem was also fundamentally rooted in the historical regulation of the industry.
This paper discusses, from a historical perspective, the
regulatory environment of the savings and loan industry. Examining this regulatory history helps in understanding the current
1
By April 1986, 38 investigations had been launched by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and $3,319,000 had been turned over to the FDIC
by various auditors [U.S. General Accounting Office, 1986]. The Resolution
Trust Corporation (the agency designated to dispose of the assets of failed savings and loans) has recently filed suits against the following CPA firms for their
roles in failed savings institutions: KPMG Peat Marwick, $154 million; Deloitte
and Touche, $444 million; Pannell Kerr Forster, $41 million [Pickering, 1992].
Ernst and Young agreed to a total comprehensive settlement of $400 million.
This agreement was reached with the federal thrift regulations to resolve all
"current and potential claims" against the firm for its role in audits of failed
depository institutions [Eldridge, 1992].
2
Recently Ernst and Young agreed to pay a total of $63 million to settle a
class action lawsuit related to failed Lincoln Savings and Loan [Stevens, 1992, p.
A3]. In addition to this settlement, Ernst and Young agreed to pay the Resolution Trust Corporation $41 million [Public Accounting Report, 1992]. Arthur
Andersen has also paid a total of $30 million to bondholders of Lincoln Savings
a n d Loan [Public Accounting Report, 1992].
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problems and crises of savings and loans as well as the situation
in which the accounting profession now finds itself. The paper
illustrates how changes in regulations and conflicting regulatory
intentions laid the framework for the savings and loan debacle.
Finally, this paper calls for greater coordination of Congressional goals for savings and loans, and the financial services
industry, as the only way to achieve a lasting resolution to thrift
industry problems. The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows: The Early Years; Post Depression Years Through the
1960s; The 1970s: Disintermediation and Consumerism; The
1980s: Deregulation, Expansion, Crisis, Re-regulation; and What
will the 1990s Bring?
THE EARLY YEARS
The first savings and loan institution was organized in
1831. Its primary purpose was to finance home ownership for
association members. At this time, commercial banks were not
filling this need because they perceived their role as financing
the capitalization of industry [Ewalt, 1962, p. 372]. With the
growing industrialization of the nation and the need for housing
for urban residents, savings and loans spread across the country
to serve savers and home mortgage borrowers. The spread of
the thrift industry spurred a tremendous growth in residential
construction across the nation. This construction boom became
a leading factor in the prosperity of the 1920s [Keith, 1973].
Throughout this developmental period from 1831 into the
1920s, the institutions were chartered by states and were regulated by laws which varied greatly between states. Many states
had no requirement for the establishment of reserves against
losses on loans; consequently, some institutions paid out essentially all profits in dividends to shareholders. In addition, mortgage repayment arrangements frequently failed to provide for
methodical reduction of the principal balance of loans. Mortgage financing arrangements too frequently involved first, second, and third mortgages financed over periods of 10 to 15
years. This was not a great problem while real estate prices were
stabilized or rising with the economic boom in the stock market. However, in 1929, the stock market crashed and real estate
prices plummeted.
Early in the 1930s, institutions found themselves with delinquent loans, foreclosures, and a bulk of repossessed real estate
assets. With so much repossessed property for sale, even at rePublished by eGrove, 1993
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duced prices, little property was changing hands because of a
lack of public confidence in the real estate market and the banking industry. Furthermore, with assets that were illiquid and
having paid out most of the profits in prior years as dividends,
the savings and loans were in deep financial difficulty. As part
of legislation to restore financial vitality and public confidence
in the banking system, Congress enacted several laws aimed at
promoting stability in the housing market and the savings and
loan industry. Among these laws were the Federal Home Loan
Bank Act (1932), the Home Owner's Loan Act (1933), and the
National Housing Act (1934). Some of the major provisions of
these laws were as follows.
First, the Federal Home Loan Bank Act established the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System operated by the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). The intent of the Act was to
help hard pressed homeowners who could not get mortgage
funding from banks to receive financing from a FHLB member.
Thus, the purpose of the Board and the system was primarily to
advance funds to Federal savings and loans so that they could
advance the funds to homeowners. Secondarily, the Board regulated those institutions participating in the funds advancement.
This latter purpose was largely implemented in two ways. First,
the Board took an active role in evaluating proposed laws to
determine their effect on the financial well-being of the industry, and then lobbied Congress on the thrifts' behalf. Second,
the Board assured "that regulated institutions adhered to written laws and regulations" [Strunk and Case, 1988, p. 109]. This
function was a very legalistic one, which did not necessarily
coincide with determining the financial soundness of individual
institutions. While these provisions of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Act served to stabilize the mortgage market by making
funds available on a regular basis, emergency funding was made
available by the Home Owners Loan Act.
The Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 provided emergency
mortgage funding to distressed home-owners by offering them
long-term mortgage loans (15 year periods), with fixed interest
rates capped at 5% initially. This Act further provided that Federal savings and loans could only lend their funds for home
mortgages and combinations of home and business property
mortgages; and these loans could only be made within 50 miles
of the association's home office. Finally, the Act specifically exempted Federal savings and loans from federal taxation and
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9
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from taxation by any state. This offered the institutions tax protection for the purpose of rebuilding their reserves.
The third major act, The National Housing Act, established
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to
insure depositors at the savings associations. It also established
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to insure savings associations against losses on mortgages and home improvement
loans and to regulate amortization of those loans. Additionally,
the Act established the Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA or Fannie Mae) to create a secondary market for mortgages. 3 Finally, the Act provided that each institution establish a
reserve of 5% of deposits. Institutions were given 10 years to
meet this goal. These three laws marked the first Federal involvement in the housing industry, and reflect the national recognition of the important role of savings and loans in home
ownership. This depression-era legislation set the framework for
the system of federally chartered savings and loans.
THE POST-DEPRESSION YEARS THROUGH THE 1960s
Under this regulatory framework, the savings and loan industry returned to prosperity in the late 1930s. From then until
the late 1960s, the institutions experienced increasing profit
margins. This prosperity was the result of several factors including the following. First, World War II promoted high long-term
mortgage rates and low short-term interest payments to depositors, with rates r e m a i n i n g relatively stable t h r o u g h o u t the
1940s, 1950s and early 1960s. Second, a tremendous post-war
prosperity was experienced across the nation. Third, the middle
class enlarged, a n d society began moving to the s u b u r b s .
Fourth, real estate prices escalated; and, fifth, the Federal government established a continuing concern for housing developm e n t [Ewalt, 1962, pp. 255-341]. This Federal concern for housing fueled savings and loan prosperity during the Post-Depression years; however, it also established the framework for the
difficulties the industry would encounter in the 1970s, and ultimately the 1980s, for the reasons detailed below.

3
Provisions of these Acts are summarized in U.S. Congress, Evolution of
[the] Role of the Federal Government in Housing and Community Development,
1975.
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Increasing Role of Federal Government in Setting Mortgage Terms
During the post-depression years, the availability of the secondary mortgage market (through Fannie Mae) enabled institutions with excess cash to participate in the prosperous mortgage
lending in booming housing markets. However, in order for institutions to sell mortgages through Fannie Mae, the mortgages
had to meet FHA criteria. These criteria related most notably to
the length of the loan repayment period, the percentage of appraised value eligible for loan financing (referred to as loan-tovalue ratios), and interest rate caps on the loans. Initial repayment periods were 15 to 20 years, with loan-to-value ratios of
80%. These values were changed almost annually through the
1940s and 1950s in various Housing Acts. One of these Acts, the
Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (the G.I. Bill of Rights),
established a program of government regulated, government insured loans especially for veterans. Provisions of these loans
were similar to FHA loan provisions. The loans were administered by the Veterans Administration (VA) and eventually became known as VA loans.
The VA and FHA loan terms at times had repayment periods extended to 40 years, and at times loan to value ratios were
as high as 97% [Mason, 1982, p. 64], The government rationale
for supporting such generous mortgage terms continued to be
that "housing is a segment of the economy demanding special
treatment to assure a flow of credit which it would not ordinarily attract" [Ewalt, 1962, p. 262]. This government philosophy was effective in attracting capital to the mortgage market,
primarily in the form of a growth in mortgage bankers. The
mortgage bankers aggressively marketed FHA and VA insured
loans with long maturities and low interest rates. They then sold
these loans to Fannie Mae. This fierce competition from the
mortgage bankers forced the savings and loans to make FHA
and VA qualified loans, or, alternatively, to make conventional
loans which closely paralleled the long repayment periods, low
interest rates and generous loan to value ratios of the FHA
loans. Thus, the FHA loan terms became the industry standard,
and savings and loans began to lock themselves into 20, 30, and
40 year loan commitments.
Fuelled by generous FHA and VA loan terms, and FSLIC
insurance guarantees, housing starts in the 1950s and 1960s
reached record levels; and the savings and loan industry continued to prosper. This prosperity led to the creation of new savhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9
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ings and loan institutions, and these associations were given up
to 20 years to meet the 5% reserve requirement established in
the National Housing Act. During this period of increasing prosperity for savings and loans, the institutions found their assets
expanding in geometric proportions. At the same time, commercial banks were experiencing only modest growth [Woerheide,
1984, p. 5]. The commercial banking industry attributed the
savings and loan prosperity to favorable tax treatment because,
during the World War II and Post-War Era, savings and loan
associations were not subject to federal income taxation. The
tax policy at that time (consistent with the regulatory policy)
was that these institutions served a vital role in financing the
development of residential housing, an important national goal
[Biederman and Tuccillo, 1976, p. 5]. In addition, since savings
and loans were traditionally mutually owned, they were viewed
as tax conduits for the depositors/owners. This preferential tax
treatment, not available to commercial banks, was a continual
irritant to the commercial banking industry which voiced complaints about this unfair tax treatment afforded savings and
loans.
The Revenue Act of 1951
Commercial banking arguments centered around the fact
that savings and loans were in direct competition with commercial banks for savings deposits; and that if savings and loans
were to be allowed to compete with banks for deposits, they
should be subject to equal taxation [U.S. Congress, 1951, p.
783]. In response to these and other persuasive arguments advanced by commercial banks, the Revenue Act of 1951 amended
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 to treat savings and loans as
regular corporations. 4 This Act set the framework for savings
and loan taxation. It was significant because it signalled a shift
in tax policy which lost some of its focus on protecting saving
and loans because of their commitment to housing finance, and
4
Several exceptions to this general rule of taxing savings and loans as regular corporations have developed over the years. Major exceptions include: the
percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction (discussed at length in the text
of this paper), ordinary loss treatment from the sale of corporate and government securities, deduction for interest incurred to carry tax-exempt bonds (preTax Reform Act of 1986) and a longer net operating loss carryback period (preTax Reform Act of 1986). These exceptions, as well as several less significant
ones, are explained more fully by Halperin [1971] and by Clark [1975].
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moved towards the concept of tax equality among thrifts and
banks competing for consumer deposits. This shift marked a
divergence in tax policy and FHLBB regulatory policy. Although
the tax policy shift at this time was major, the actual tax impact
was negligible for the following reason.
The Revenue Act of 1951, in addition to subjecting savings
and loans to taxation for the first time, provided them a choice
of methods for determining their allowance for bad debts. This
allowance then determined the bad debt deduction for tax purposes. Like other corporations, savings and loans could choose
to set up their allowance based on actual bad debt experience,
averaged over a specified period of years. In lieu of this experience method, they could choose the percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction.5 This method enabled the institutions
to write off as much as 100% of their taxable income to a reserve for bad debts. The balance of this reserve, together with
earned surplus and undivided profits, was limited to 12% of
total deposits. This limitation was, as a practical matter, seldom
a binding constraint [U.S. Congress, 1969, p. 3514]. Thus, while
savings and loans were nominally taxable entities, few paid any
income tax until the passage of the Revenue Act of 1962.
The Revenue Act of 1962
In 1962, Congress again devoted its attention to the issue of
savings and loan taxation. This reconsideration was initiated by
President Kennedy's demand for a review of the taxes of "private savings and lending institutions [that] are accorded tax deductible reserve provisions which substantially reduce or eliminate their Federal income tax liability" [U.S. Congress, 1961, p.
2]. As a result of the ensuing Congressional review, the Revenue
Act of 1962 reduced the percentage of taxable income bad debt
deduction rate to 60% of taxable income. Subsequent to this
change, effective tax rates of savings and loans rose (see Exhibit
5
Savings and loans could also choose a method known as the "3-percent
method" which allowed them to set up a reserve at three percent of eligible
loans (as defined in the Internal Revenue Code of 1939). This method became
known in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC) as the percentage of eligible
loans method. This method underwent few changes from 1954 to 1986 when it
was struck from the law in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. For this reason, and
since most of the controversy over bad debt deductions for savings and loans
focused on the percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction, this method is
not discussed further in this paper.
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1). The Act also added a restriction that savings and loans using
this deduction were required to hold at least 72% of their assets
in "qualified assets." Qualified assets included residential real
property loans; loans secured by members' deposits or by
church facilities; cash and U.S. government obligations; and
property used in conduct of the institution's business [Internal
Revenue Code (IRC) section 7701(a)(19)(C)]. This was the first
explicit linking in the tax law between the percentage of taxable
income bad debt deduction and an institution's investment in
mortgages. It also placed the tax law in the position of dictating
specific investments allowable for savings and loans. This introduced a conflict in allowable investments for tax and regulatory
purposes.
At this time, savings and loans had little choice but to accept their tax increase because the regulatory rules which specified permitted savings and loan investments were even more
stringent than the 72% investment in qualified assets required
for tax purposes.6 While the tax law did not specify how the
remaining 28% of assets had to be invested, regulatory rules
limited investments exclusively to: (1) residential mortgage
loans on one to four-family home types, (2) loans secured by
members' deposits, (3) cash, (4) government securities, (5) property used in conduct of the institution's business, (6) residential
property improvement loans (limited to 15% of total assets), or
(7) loans on the security of improved real estate other than one
to four-family home types (limited to 20% of total assets) [12
CFR 545.11]. Thus, for all practical purposes, regulatory investments, other than cash, government bonds, business property,
and loans secured by members' deposits, were committed to
residential mortgages and improvements to residential property.
Effectively only 20% of an institution's assets could be invested
in anything other than residential property and related loans.
Because of these constraints, savings and loans had to maintain
approximately 80% of their assets invested in qualified assets to
meet regulatory requirements.

6

Savings and loans could have expanded their investment in tax free government bonds in order to avoid incurring a greater tax burden. Baer [1983] illustrates the potential benefits of this strategy. Hendershott and Koch [1980], however, present contradictory evidence showing that relative before tax returns on
taxable and non-taxable investments would have to be in excess of their historic
relationship to make this strategy worthwhile.
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EXHIBIT 1
Aggregate Effective Tax Rates of
Savings and Loan Associations, 1960-1988
(Dollars in Millions)a

Year

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988

Net Income
Before Taxes
$

552

716
820
764
919
929
727
711
1,011
1,230
1,166
1,748
2,317
2,655
2,144
2,082
3,219
4,610
5,717
5,198
1,193
-6,148
-5,869
2,561
1,871
5,951
3,300
-4,100
-11,565

Taxes

$

4
3
3
93
131
134
97
95
148
194
241
434
630
758
661
634
969

Effective
Tax Rate
0.7%

0.4
0.4

409

12.2
14.3
14.4
13.3
13.2
14.7
15.8
20.7
24.8
27.2
28.5
30.8
30.5
30.1
30.6
31.5
30.4
34.3

-1,516
-1,598

N/A
N/A

593
770

23.2
41.2
35.5
N/Ab
N/Ab
N/Ab

1,412
1,799
1,578

2,112
3,100
2,700
1,874

a

Information obtained from U.S. League of Savings Institutions [1989, p. 50]
and U.S. Congress [1983, p. 286].
b
Industry-wide effective tax rates for these years are meaningless because they
reflect a growing disparity in income between profitable and unprofitable institutions.

Such an investment level was not a hardship for the institutions during this time period because, as discussed previously,
profit margins were relatively stable, demand was relatively
stable, and real estate prices were rising. This was the last time
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9
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the industry experienced such stability. In the years following
1961, further conflicts developed between allowable assets for
tax and regulatory purposes, thereby sending the industry a
mixed message on the role it was expected to play in home
financing. Tax burdens on the industry increased; and Regulation Q was imposed by regulators. The regulatory rationale for
the implementation of Regulation Q is explained in the following section.
Regulation Q Imposed
Beginning in the mid-1960s, inflation became a serious
problem. Fuelled by the Vietnam War, which the government
tried to finance without a major tax increase, inflation rates
became higher and more variable than in the past [Carron,
1982, p. 5]. The rampant inflation exerted upward pressure on
market interest rates, which were also being driven upwards by
competition among savings and loans in the western and eastern portions of the country, and between banks and savings and
loans.
By 1966, interest rates reached a 100 year high [Bowden
and Holbert, 1984, p. 28]. The Federal government became concerned about savings and loans' ability to pay these high interest
rates to depositors. Since their portfolios were tied up in longterm, fixed-rate residential mortgages, savings and loans were
unable to make rapid adjustments in their revenue base to offset
the rising cost of short-term borrowing (deposits). Thus, the
industry was trapped by fixed-yield, long-term investments financed by short-term borrowing at volatile interest rates. To
protect the savings and loan industry, in 1966 the Federal government imposed Regulation Q deposit rate ceilings on savings
and loans. This was viewed as a viable means of keeping down
savings and loans' cost of funds and protecting the industry
from competitive forces. Subsequent to imposition of Regulation Q, market rates dropped and some observers believed that
savings and loans were out of trouble. This belief may have
been at least partially responsible for the imposition of additional taxes on savings and loans in the Revenue Act of 1969.
The Revenue Act of 1969
The Revenue Act of 1969 increased savings and loan taxes
by reducing the percentage of taxable income limit for the bad
Published by eGrove, 1993
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debt deduction. During the hearings which preceded this act,
the savings and loan industry requested that the definition of
qualified assets be expanded to encompass new regulatory powers. 7 Regulators had expanded savings and loan allowable assets
to include certain education loans (up to five percent of total
assets), housing for the aging (up to five percent of total assets),
loans on improved real estate other than residential property,
and loans for the acquisition and development of land (raised
from 15% to 20% of total assets) [12 CFR 545.6-545.8]. However, the industry was unable to pursue these investments because of the stringent asset restrictions of Section 7701(a)(19) of
the Internal Revenue Code. Thus, the tax law and operating regulations were in conflict.
As a partial response to industry pleas, the 1969 Act expanded qualified assets to include: loans secured by commercial
property in certain u r b a n renewal areas; loans secured by
school, health, or welfare facilities; and student loans. However,
the qualified assets percentage was increased to 82%, and a
sliding scale implemented for investment levels from 82% to
60%. For every one percent of an institution's portfolio which
fell below 82%, the bad debt deduction was reduced by threefourths of one percent. Once the institution's portfolio fell to
less t h a n 60% investment in qualified assets, it could no longer
use the percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction.
This marked the widest divergence yet in tax and regulatory
policy. While regulators were becoming more lenient in allowing institutions some limited diversification out of residential
mortgages (up to 30% of the portfolio), the tax law was imposing a tax penalty for diversification in excess of 18%. In addition
to this constraint, the Act reduced the deduction rate from 60%
to 40%, phased in over a 10 year period. Thus, even those institutions not diversifying experienced a tax increase. 8 This tax
increase contributed to a severe financial crunch which gripped
the industry in the 1970s.

7
See testimony of William J. Hallahan, Consultant on Monetary Policy and
Economic Affairs, National League of Insured Savings Associations [U.S. Congress, 1969, p. 3524].
8
See Exhibit 1 for a summary of Savings and Loans effective tax rates following the 1969 Act.
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THE 1970s: DISINTERMEDIATION, CONSUMERISM AND
NET WORTH CRISIS
During the 1970s, a growing rate of inflation was experienced across the country. This was attributed in part to the
Federal government trying to finance the Vietnam War without
any major tax increase, and to the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) 100% increase in oil prices. In an
effort to curb the growing inflation problem, the Federal Reserve Bank increased its discount rate and its reserve requirements to record levels. It also implemented a new monetary
control policy which focused on regulation of the total reserves
of the banking system instead of regulation of short-term interest rates. Subsequent to announcement of this policy, shortterm market interest rates rose rapidly. This precipitated financial chaos in the savings and loan industry.
During the 1970s and early 1980s, savings and loans were
prevented by Regulation Q from passing these high short-term
market interest rates on to their depositors. This situation motivated depositors to withdraw funds from savings and loans in
order to invest in alternative, higher yielding investment vehicles (particularly money market mutual funds) offered by unregulated intermediaries. This disintermediation forced savings
and loans to enter the market as short-term borrowers, paying
very high interest rates on borrowed funds. Meanwhile, their
income-generating portfolios were tied up in long-term, low interest bearing, fixed-rate mortgages. This latter problem was
largely the result of years of savings and loan responses to the
trend in mortgage lending established by the FHA and VA, and
the portfolio restrictions established by Congress.
The institutions fought back against these regulations by
circumventing them to the extent possible. Since investment opportunities were still largely limited to mortgages by FHLBB
regulations, and by tax regulation, the savings and loans began
to enhance their services. The industry expanded operations
into costly branch networks (Exhibit 2) and other customer
amenities, thus causing operating costs to rise. Savings and
loans expected that these enhanced services would lure back
customer deposits. To further lure depositors, they began offering Negotiable Orders of Withdrawal (NOW accounts) which
were in substance interest-bearing checking accounts. This
strategy further increased operating costs and resulted in a severe profit squeeze for the industry.
Published by eGrove, 1993
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EXHIBIT 2
Number of Savings Institutions and Their Branch Offices,
1960-1987a
Savings Institutions Offices

a

Year-end

Main

Branch

Total

1960
1965
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

6,320
6,185
5,669
5,474
5,298
5,170
5,086
4,931
4,821
4,761
4,725
4,684
4,594
4,298
3,831
3,645
3,591
3,535
3,488
3,408

1,611
2,994
4,318
4,961
5,851
7,036
8,775
10,518
11,908
13,087
14,250
15,508
16,733
17,495
18,712
18,635
18,812
19,186
19,540
19,664

7,931
9,179
9,987
10,435
11,149
12,206
13,861
15,449
16,729
17,848
18,975
20,192
21,327
21,793
22,543
22,280
22,403
22,721
23,028
23,072

Source: U.S. League of Savings Institutions [1989, p. 56].

This profit squeeze was the beginning of the savings and
loan debacle of the 1980s. As profits plunged, the net worth, or
capital position, of the industry eroded making reserve requirements ever more difficult to maintain. This situation prompted
the industry to pressure the Bank Board into extending its deadline to meet the 5% reserve requirements. In 1972, the Board
responded by authorizing institutions to compute their reserves
as a percentage of savings deposits averaged over a five-year
period. As the earnings positions of the institutions continued to
weaken, the industry trade organization, the U.S. League of Savings Institutions, petitioned Congress to reduce the reserve requirements. Congress eventually did this in the Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980.
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THE 1980s: DEREGULATION, EXPANSION,
CRISIS, RE-REGULATION
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980 was the first in a series of ill
conceived regulation attempting to repair the regulatory induced damage done to the savings and loan industry in the
1970s. The regulation of the 1980s was ill conceived for several
reasons. First, deregulation of savings and loan liabilities (freeing interest rates on interest bearing deposits) preceded deregulation of investments, thus exacerbating an already volatile
earnings situation. Secondly, regulators authorized the use of
several accounting methods which obscured the true financial
condition of the industry. Finally, a lack of communication and
coordination among various government regulators created a
regulatory environment of uncertainty and confusion about the
role the institutions were to play as financial intermediaries.
Details of how this confusion developed follows in the discussion of the regulatory events that occurred during the 1980s.
DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain Act
The first of the regulatory changes in the 1980s, DIDMCA,
authorized a phase out of Regulation Q deposit rate ceilings,
thus allowing savings and loans to increase rates paid on deposits (liabilities). In addition, the law legitimized NOW accounts
nationwide. Both of these provisions caused an increase in the
institutions' cost of funds. Furthermore, the Act gave the Federal Home Loan Bank Board the authority to vary reserves (or
capital) requirements for individual institutions between 3 %
and 6% of deposits. The Act also granted savings and loans
some limited freedom to diversify asset holdings including the
ability to invest up to 3 % of assets in service corporations (i.e.,
subsidiary corporations allowed to participate in a wide range
of business activities). These asset diversification powers were
further expanded in 1982.
The 1982 Act, the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions
Act, allowed savings and loans to invest up to 30% of their assets in consumer loans and corporate debt, up to 40% in nonresidential real estate, and up to 10% in commercial loans. In
addition to these new investment powers, the Garn-St. Germain
Act eliminated loan to value ratios on all loans (thus permitting
100% financing of real estate projects); and, for the first time,
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permitted adjustable rate mortgages. Regulators believed that,
collectively, these 1980 and 1982 changes would enable savings
and loans to diversify some of their long-term lending and
short-term borrowing financial structure and better weather
changing economic conditions in the future.
This expectation may have proved true had the DIDMCA
and Garn-St. Germain asset reforms been enacted a decade earlier, before the devastating interest rate spread losses in the
1970s. As it happened, upon entering the 1980s, savings and
loan profits were at a historical low (Exhibit 1), and institutions
may have lacked the capital to acquire investment expertise in
many of the areas newly opened to them. Furthermore, reserves
for some institutions were below the 3% minimum mandated by
Congress in DIDMCA [Strunk and Case, 1988, p. 31]. Garn-St.
Germain provided a solution to problem in the form of net
worth certificates.
Beginning in September, 1982, the Garn-St. Germain Act
allowed a pseudo-capital infusion for under capitalized institutions in the form of net worth certificates which the institutions
purchased from the FSLIC. These certificates served to increase
an institution's assets and equity for regulatory purposes, and
basically provided for a semi-annual cash infusion to the institution by the FSLIC until such time as the institution returned
to profitability.9 These net worth certificates were not treated as
capital by generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).10
This became the first in a series of GAAP versus RAP (regulatory
accounting principles) differences which obfuscated analysis of
the financial condition of savings and loans. Other such differences were deferral of loan losses and appraised equity capital,
discussed below.

9

Net worth certificates were recorded as Notes Receivable-FSLIC and Capital. Under the arrangement the FSLIC paid interest on these notes semiannually
to the institution "at rates equal to the yield on FHLBB obligations plus 25 basis
points" [Peat Marwick Main & Co., 1988, Section 19.3.3]. The institution would
then reimburse the FSLIC at the same rate of interest, "but interest is not due
until the institution returns to profitability" [Peat Marwick Main & Co., 1988,
Section 19.3.2].
10
Per GAAP, the net worth certificates were treated as an off balance sheet
item which was to be disclosed in footnotes, although interest accruals were
made [Peat, Marwick, Main and Co., 1988, Section 19.3.3].
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GAAP versus RAP
In order to buy time for institutions to restructure their
portfolios in response to the new investment opportunities of
DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain, the FHLBB developed a series
of optional accounting rules designed to bolster the appearance
of net worth. The most prominent of these became the appraised equity capital provisions, and deferral of losses on the
sale of loans. 11 Appraised equity capital arose from institutions
recording the increase in the market value of the office buildings which they owned and occupied. During the 1970s, some
institutions began to build net worth by selling their buildings,
recording the gain, and leasing the facility back from the new
owners. From November, 1982, to December, 1986 the FHLBB
permitted all institutions to "book" this gain in market value,
without actually selling the premises, calling it "appraised equity capital." This non-consummated transaction was not recognized by GAAP.
In contrast to this GAAP violation, a second FHLBB regulation challenged GAAP by deferring recognition of transactions
that were consummated. This new provision allowed the deferral of losses on the sale of loans. By contrast, GAAP required
recognition of these losses. However, in order to encourage institutions to sell off low interest bearing loans, the Bank Board
allowed any such losses to be deferred and amortized over what
remained of the original life of the loan. This regulation was in
effect from October, 1981 to October, 1984. These two primary
regulatory accounting techniques constituted the most blatant
departures from GAAP; however, other differences also developed.
Other GAAP versus RAP differences developed because of
aggressive interpretation of existing GAAP rules, special institution specific decisions made by the Bank Board, and a delay in
the issuance of authoritative accounting literature by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Some of these included the following. First, RAP allowed recognition of gains
and losses on "wash sales" of securities sold and reacquired
within a short period of time, while GAAP did not allow such
recognition. Second, RAP allowed recognition of current income from loan origination and commitment fees up to 2% of
11

Several less significant differences in GAAP and RAP which existed at this
time are summarized in McEachern, 1986.
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loan value, while GAAP required recognition of these fees as an
adjustment to yield over the life of the loan using the interest
method of amortization.12 Third, RAP allowed use of real estate
appraisals to satisfy GAAP requirements of net present value
computations for valuation of real estate collateral on acquisition, development and construction loans. Fourth, for certain
mergers of troubled institutions, the FHLBB allowed goodwill
to be amortized over an extended period of time, while GAAP
allowed such extensions only when a substantial amount of liabilities acquired were long-term in nature. In addition, for certain mergers including FSLIC cash assistance, RAP treated this
as a contribution to capital, while GAAP generally treated this
as a deferred revenue or discount on the assets for which the
allowance was granted.13
Many of these GAAP verses RAP discrepancies were vehemently opposed by the accounting profession because of the
potential for creating misleading financial statements. Several
comment letters to this effect were written by the AICPA and
the FASB to the FHLBB, the Committee on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives, the
SEC, and various individual Congressmen.14 Some of the comment letters were written as early as January, 1981 when the
RAP rules were only at the proposal stage. Each letter detailed
differences between the RAP treatment and the GAAP treatment
(or proposed GAAP treatment), indicating the potential for distortion of an institution's capital position. The profession feared
such distortions would then mask the true financial condition of
the savings and loan industry.
These concerns from the accounting profession went largely
unheeded, as evidenced by regulators' decision to allow RAP for
reporting purposes. Furthermore, regulators allowed each institution to choose which set of accounting rules, GAAP or RAP, to
follow in preparing its financial statements to be filed with the
Bank Board. Not surprisingly, those institutions adopting RAP
12
This GAAP treatment was not promulgated until issuance of Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 19, Accounting for Nonrefundable Fees and
Costs associated with Originating or Acquiring Loans and Initial Direct Costs of
Leases, in December, 1986.
13
Details of these four GAAP verses RAP differences are described in
McEachern [1986, p. S-48, S-49] and Peat Marwick Main and Co. [1988, Chapter 30.2 and 21].
14
An extensive list of these communications is presented in Chenok, 1989,
pp. 150 and 154.
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were generally found to be the ones with lower capital ratios
[Hill and Ingram, 1989]. Since institutions with low capital ratios were in danger of violating minimum net worth requirements, they could have been forced to merge or liquidate. For
such institutions, the adoption of RAP served to postpone intervention by the FHLBB. This forbearance by the FHLBB has
been cited as one of the factors contributing to the savings and
loan debacle of the 1980s. 15
Forbearance by the FHLBB should not, however, have been
surprising, since the Board had behaved similarly in the crisis
of the 1970s (as discussed previously) by manipulating capital
standards. In doing this, the Board was conforming to its original legislative purpose established in the 1930s: to assure the
uninterrupted flow of funds to the savings and loan industry.
This original legislative intention assumed the primary purpose
of savings and loans to be the supply of funds for residential
mortgages. A broadening of the scope of the industry was, however, introduced in the new investment vehicles provided by
DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain legislation. The role of the
FHLBB following these changes was not updated. This was only
one of several conflicts in Congressional intent. Another conflict
was manifest in the tax law.
Tax Reforms in the 1980s
The specific tax law provisions related to savings and loans
remained virtually unchanged following DIDMCA and Garn-St.
Germain. Despite the investment flexibility permitted under
DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain, the tax law still required savings and loans to maintain between 82% and 60% of their assets
in qualified form (primarily residential mortgages). While still
demanding this large commitment to residential mortgages, and
even as industry profits sagged, tax changes made in 1982 and
1984 served to increase the tax burden placed upon the institutions. The tax changes increased the tax burden on savings and
loans by reducing the percentage of taxable income bad debt
deduction from 40% to 32% of taxable income. 16 This deduction
was further reduced to 8% in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
15

Pilzer, P., 1989; Pizzo, S., Flicker, M. and Muolo, P., 1989; and Adams, J.,
1990 each discuss this problem at length.
l6
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 added section 291,
which provided that the deduction for certain preference items, including the
bad debt reserves of savings and loans (to the extent they exceeded reserves
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The Tax Reform Act of 1986 made two major changes to
the percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction. First, the
Act eliminated the sliding scale between 82% and 60% investm e n t in qualified assets. This effectively reduced the minimum
required investment to 60%. This change brought tax qualified
assets into closer alignment with regulatory allowed assets for
the first time since 1969. The second change reduced the deduction percentage from 32% to 8% of taxable income. Prior to the
passage of this provision, Congress had contemplated the complete elimination of this deduction [U.S. Congress, 1983]. Thus,
the savings and loan institutions became aware that they were
losing their tax protection for performing their service to the
mortgage market. At the same time, they were allowed more
flexibility in structuring their portfolios. The message from Congress was consistent at this point: diversify and become fully
taxable financial intermediaries. Some institutions acted quickly
to diversify.
Expansion

and Crisis

Some savings and loans began using new investment powers granted to diversify out of residential mortgages. 17 However,
by the time these powers were granted in the 1980s, the industry had a severe net worth problem. The Bank Board, anxious to
encourage an influx of new capital into the industry, dropped a
long standing requirement that institutions have a m i n i m u m of
400 shareholders, with no one shareholder owning more t h a n
25% of the savings and loan. After this policy change, institutions were eligible for 100% ownership by a single individual
[Strunk and Case, 1988, p. 94]. This attracted a new type of
owner/manager to the savings and loan business: mortgage bro-

computed under the experience method), be reduced by 15% of the otherwise
allowable deduction. At the same time, the amount considered a preference for
the minimum tax computation was reduced to 71.6% of excess reserves [IRC
section 57(b)(1) and (2)]. Assuming that the entire percentage of taxable income
bad debt deduction addition to the reserve was in excess of the experience
method, the applicable rate for the deduction was reduced to 34%. Next, the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 reduced this deduction rate to 32% by increasing
the IRC section 291 rate to 20% and also reducing the amount included in the
minimum tax base to 59.833% of the excess. This reduced the bad debt deduction to 32% of taxable income.
17
For a summary of empirical research documenting this diversification and
its effects on profits, see Margavio, 1990.
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kers and land developers who saw the opportunity to capture a
source of financing for their investments and projects. "In both
cases, an association charter now provided them [the new owners] with a lower cost and more certain source of funds than
commercial bank borrowings" [Strunk and Case, 1988, p. 95].
In addition, the borrowings were federally insured by the
FSLIC.
Federal insurance of depositor accounts by the FSLIC was
the root of a risky investment strategy undertaken by many institutions that were desperate to build their net worth. If the big
risks paid off, then the institution and its shareholders would
benefit, but if risky investments did not pay off, the FSLIC
would share in the loss of a collapse of the association. Some
institutions invested extensively in junk bonds, and others increased interest rate hedging transactions to a level of gambling
on the direction of future interest rates. 18 Institutions began investing heavily in ADC (acquisition, development, and construction) loans to fund the commercial and residential real estate
development activity of the new owner. 19
In order to attract funds to finance this activity, some institutions began offering interest rate premiums to depositors.
This attracted a substantial amount of deposits from brokers
outside of the institution's geographic area. Savings and loans
were limited to obtaining 5% of deposits from this source. However, in March 1982, the restriction was removed by the Bank
Board and billions of dollars flowed out of money market funds
and into thrifts [Strunk and Case, p. 91, 92]. Institutions using
brokered deposits began to grow at a phenomenal pace, further
fuelling real estate development activity. 20
Some thrifts became so extensively involved in funding real
estate development activities of certain developers that the institutions became, in substance, equity partners. This was particularly true in the case of ADC loans. Accounting rules during this
time allowed such loans to be classified as loans rather than
direct investments, obscuring the true relationship between the

18
Pilzer [1989] describes this strategy in Chapter 5, "The Gamblers," pp.
123-135; and in chapter 6, "The Man With the Lucky Coin," pp. 136-149.
19
Pilzer [1989] describes this strategy in Chapter 4, "The Cowboys," pp. 80122.
20
Many institutions were growing at rates faster than 25% per year [Pilzer,
1989, p. 174].
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institution and the developer. 21 In addition, many fraudulent appraisals were obtained to value the collateral land. In the early
1980, this problem was not discovered because real estate prices
continued to rise. This spurred another problem. Some institutions became careless in granting credit to applicants under the
assumption that if the loan went bad, increasing property values
would cover the losses. Problems with these strategies surfaced
in the Southwest beginning in late 1985 and early 1986 when a
drop in oil prices caused a major economic recession. This was
followed by a substantial decline in real estate prices; a problem
which spread nationwide with the spread of the recession. In
a d d i t i o n , by 1985 m a n y m a r k e t s b e g a n t o show signs of
overbuilding as office vacancies rose. 22 This condition was aggravated by 1986 tax changes which eliminated many tax benefits for real estate ownership. 23 Consequently, the n u m b e r of
failing institutions began to rise (Exhibit 3).
Both the FHLBB and the FSLIC were aware of the problem.
They were, however, prevented from acting quickly to close the
institutions because of a severely outdated regulatory structure
and purpose. The historical purpose of the FHLBB examiners
was to check for compliance with government regulations. This
required little training since substantial regulatory changes were
not often made. Consequently, examiner positions were filled by
low level civil service employees. Examiners merely reported
their findings to the Washington Office of the FHLBB; the examiners could not require establishment of reserves for loan
losses, and had no other enforcement powers. Enforcement
powers rested with the supervisory branch of the Federal Home

21
Subsequent to the publicizing of some of the thrift industry problems, the
Accounting Standards Executive Committee of the AICPA issued (in February,
1986) a "Notice to Practitioners - ADC arrangements." This notice clarified stringent rules which must be met for classification of ADC loans as loans. Those
arrangements not meeting the rules were required to be shown as equity investments. [Peat Mar-wick Main and Co., 1988, Chapter 6].
22
The overbuilding was largely a result of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981 which gave special tax breaks for investing in real estate. Investors seeking
tax deductions formed highly leveraged tax shelter partnerships which overbuilt
the real estate market. The leverage used in these real estate partnerships came
in part from the savings and loan industry.
23
These tax changes include passive investment loss limitations for investments in real estate; change in depreciation computations; at risk rules applied
to real estate investment; investment interest limitations; and capital gains
changes.
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EXHIBIT 3
Failures of FSLIC-Insured Institutions a

a

Year

Number

Assets
(In Millions of Dollars)

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

11
28
74
55
27
49
85
71

$ 1,457.6
11,553.4
20,202.9
19,741.8
6,000.4
18,441.3
31,620.5
20,918.1

Source: Strunk and Case, 1988, pp. 8, 9.

Loan Bank which consisted of the president and a small staff at
the regional FHLB level. This structure created delays in communications of problems and further delay in corrective action.
Once c o m m u n i c a t i o n difficulties were overcome and a
problem institution identified, the first step in taking action was
for the regional FHLB to obtain a "consent decree." In this
agreement, the thrift management would voluntarily discontinue specified transactions. If this failed, "cease and desist" orders and management removal requests were sought. These
could only be issued by the Washington Office. They were difficult to obtain because they could be challenged in court, and
required additional evidence of wrongdoing. Despite these
shortcomings, the system worked until the deregulation of the
1980s added complexities to the business.
With the proliferation of new investments allowed in the
1980s, rapid market changes in the late 1970s, and the expansion of branch networks, the FHLBB examination staff was
overextended and undertrained as to potential problems. Examinations of the institutions took more time and were conducted less frequently as problems mounted. Then the stories of
the famous failures surfaced. 24 The FHLBB petitioned Congress
24

The Empire Savings and Loan of Mesquite, Texas scandal become public
information in 1983 when the owners became the subjects of an extensive FBI
investigation for fraud, conspiracy and racketeering in various land flip deals
[Pilzer, 1989, p . 115]. American Savings of Stockton, California received public
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to tighten the regulatory reins to give the FHLBB power to act
more quickly in "cease and desist" cases, and to provide funds
to the FSLIC so that it could absorb projected losses from closing problem institutions.
Re-regulation
Congress responded with the Competitive Equality Banking
Act (CEBA) of 1987, the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery
and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of
1991. These Acts provided a much needed infusion of funds
(approximately $177 billion) to the FSLIC; and established the
Resolution Trust Corporation, a temporary entity, to dispose of
the assets of failed institutions. The Acts also changed the savings and loan regulatory structure by abolishing the FHLBB
system. The FHLBB supervisory and examination functions
were turned over to the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) [Savings Institutions, 1989, p. 32]. Responsibilities of the OTS were
designed with greater emphasis on assessing the financial viability and asset quality of institutions. Thus, responsibilities
more closely paralleled those of the Office of Controller of the
Currency, the banking industry supervisory agency. The OTS
was also given greater autonomy in requiring operating changes
for, and ultimately, shutting down institutions judged to have
too many risky investments.
In order for the OTS to perform this function effectively,
objective measures of riskiness had to be established. A system
of risk determination was structured for both individual assets,
and for an institution's entire portfolio of assets. This system
recognizes a strong connection between the quality of an
institution's assets, individually and collectively, and how that
quality improves or deteriorates the institution's capital posiattention in 1984 when regulators forced out the CEO for betting wrong on
interest rate swings and masking bad real estate loans [Pilzer, 1989, p. 216-219].
Vernon Savings and Loan of Dallas, Texas entered receivership in 1987 when
96% of its real estate loans were deemed worthless [Adams, 1990, p. 47]. Lincoln Savings and Loan of Irvine, California became a much publicized scandal
in 1987 when news of its fraudulent real estate deals and ties to the "Keating
Five" were revealed [Adams, 1990, p. 252]. Columbia Savings and Loan of
Beverly Hills, California, and Franklin Savings Association of Ottawa, Kansas
were exposed in 1988 for their huge portfolios of junk bonds and their relationship with Michael Milken [Pilzer, 1989, p. 136-149].
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tion. Definitions of risk are, therefore, cast in terms of minim u m capital standards required to sustain the institution's investment in certain types of assets. The definitions and capital
requirements were borrowed largely from the three tier capital
standards system used by the Office of Controller of the Currency. A brief overview of the composition of these tiers is presented below.
Tier one, core capital (or leverage capital), is defined as the
sum of common stockholders' equity and noncumulative preferred stockholders' equity; plus identifiable intangibles (excluding goodwill and limited to 25% of total core capital); plus purchased mortgage servicing rights. Savings and loans must maintain this core capital at a level of 3 % of total assets. In addition,
a second tier, defined as tangible capital, must be maintained at
a level of 1.5% of total assets. Tangible capital is defined as core
capital (tier one) minus all intangible assets. Finally, tier three,
known as risk-based capital standards, requires institutions to
maintain reserves of 6% of risk-weighted assets and to increase
this percentage for interest rate fluctuations that adversely affect earnings [Savings Institutions, 1989, p. 32; 12CFR Ch.V Part
567]. Each major category of assets is given a risk weighting
factor which is multiplied by the dollar amount of assets in that
category. 25 These risk factors are changed as market conditions
dictate. There is a gradual phase in period until January 1, 1993
for the risk-based standards. As the standards are designed, savings and loans must meet the minimum capital criteria in each
of the three tiers.
These standards are monitored by the OTS as savings and
loans file the required quarterly financial statements. Effective
January 1, 1994, these statements must be stated on a GAAP
basis [Bush and Morrall, 1989, p. 30]. In addition to this return
to GAAP accounting, the independent auditor now has a greater
role in assessing institutional safety and soundness in the following ways. 26 First, institutions with over $150 million in assets
are required to obtain annual audits. Second, in addition to
traditional GAAP and GAAS (generally accepted auditing stan25

For example, Goodwill is generally given a 200% risk weight, thereby requiring a 12% reserve. Mortgage backed securities are given a 20% risk weight,
thereby requiring a 3 % reserve. Cash and federal government backed securities
have a 0% weight, thus requiring no reserves.
26
These provisions are summarized in Journal of Accountancy, March, 1992,
p. 17.
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dards) responsibilities, the audit report must comply with any
additional disclosures that regulations require. For example, a
separate report must be prepared attesting to management assertions that the institution is in compliance with regulations
related to safety and soundness. Third, outside auditors must
agree to provide workpapers to regulators upon request, and
must notify the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
if the auditor's services terminate. Finally, the FDIC may require
that an institution's quarterly financial statements be subject to
CPA review procedures. This authority of the FDIC stems from
its new responsibility as the insuring agency for savings and loans.
In a massive reorganization of the insurance system, FSLIC
merged into the FDIC, the insuring agency for commercial
banks. This facilitated coordination of insurance goals, rates,
and supervision philosophy between the thrift and banking industries. By shifting the insuring of savings and loans and by
the creation of the Office of Thrift Supervision, Congress implemented a policy of regulatory equality for savings and loans and
commercial banks.
As the recent restructuring of savings and loans suggests,
the banking industry has been successful in its long time urging
of parity between the banking and thrift industries. Since 1951,
the Commercial banking industry lobbied for tax equality between banks and savings institutions. 27 These arguments were
reiterated in hearings related to changes implemented in the
percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction in the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. Bankers perceived these 1986 changes to be
a move towards tax equality. In addition, arguments in the tax
hearings acknowledged that the deregulation Acts of 1980 and
1982 (DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain) were perceived by both
industries to be regulatory moves towards establishing investm e n t equalities. Thus, a trend had developed towards increasing
equality between banks and savings and loans. The regulatory
equalities implemented in CEBA, FIRREA, and FDICIA could be
viewed as the culmination of this equality movement, with one
27

Banks perceived the percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction to
be the single greatest advantage afforded by the tax law to savings and loans
over commercial banks. In virtually every major tax hearing that opened discussion of this deduction (see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and
Means, 1951, 1961, 1969, and 1986 and U.S. Congress, Senate, 1983), the banking industry lobbied for its elimination in order to allow more equitable competition between the two industries.
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major exception which now subjects savings and loans to investm e n t restrictions not required of banks.
The recent legislation implemented a new qualified thrift
lender (QTL) test which restricts savings and loans to investing
70% of their portfolio assets in qualified assets. The definition
of qualified assets is limited to mortgages and home equity
loans, mortgage backed securities, and construction loans. Up
to 15% of these qualified assets can include: investments in service corporations; loans to churches, schools, nursing homes
and hospitals; and consumer and education loans (limited to 5%
of portfolio assets) [Savings Institutions, 1989, p. 33]. Portfolio
assets are defined as total tangible assets reduced by fixed assets
and liquid assets. These definitions impose limitations on the
investment freedom of savings and loans which are even more
severe than the pre-1980 limitations. These restrictions have
been criticized by the industry as being almost vindictive [Wilson, 1990, p. 22].
This QTL test constituted a very significant change in the
three most recent laws which is contrary to the trend towards
equality among competing financial institutions. It serves to
force savings and loans to specialize in mortgages by restricting
other investment activity. At the same time, FHLB membership
was opened up to banks and credit unions; and commercial
banks obtained the authority to acquire savings institutions.
These latter regulatory changes further expanded the operating
capabilities of banks and credit unions by giving them greater
access to housing funds. These financial intermediaries can now
compete with savings and loans for mortgages, and obtain optimally diversified portfolios. However, savings and loans are now
statutorily prohibited from diversifying extensively. This situation may lead to a devaluation in the savings and loan charter in
the future.
WHAT WILL THE 1990s BRING?
This devaluation has been predicted by some experts
[McLean, 1991; Jacobe, 1990; Savings Institutions, 1990]. They
argue that as a result of the 1980s debacle, savings and loans
have a bad image problem to overcome. A viable way of overcoming this problem may be simply to change over from a savings and loan charter to a savings bank or commercial bank
charter. Such a trend has already been observed in California
savings and loans [Savings Institutions, 1990, p. 31] and instituPublished by eGrove, 1993
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tions formed after 1988 [Savings Institutions, 1990, p. 5]. This
leads some commentators to predict the demise of the traditional savings and loan institution.
The function of the traditional savings and loan, making
mortgage loans and holding them to maturity, is perhaps outdated. This conclusion rests primarily on the burgeoning secondary mortgage market which was developed and promoted by
government sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae. This
agency (and others like it) buys mortgages and repackages them
into mortgage backed securities which are sold on the open
market with varying maturities. Such securities are popular
with investors because of a perceived federal guarantee. This
has created an adequate supply of capital to the housing market
despite the savings and loan crisis (see comments by Alfred A.
Dellibova, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury in Mortgage Banking, 1991, p. 31). It has also served to integrate housing financing into the nation's overall capital market.
This development of the real estate loan marketplace may
eventually usurp the traditional function of the savings and loan
industry. However, some industry observers still see the need
for a strong consumer-oriented banking industry which would
include mortgage financing and some other types of consumer
financing. In addition, as the economy improves and investors
seek investment opportunities with higher returns, they may retreat from the mortgage backed security market. The savings
and loan industry then may acquire a new function in the capital market, that of buying and holding to maturity mortgage
backed securities.
A type of specialization strategy similar to this has been
observed by some empiricists [Kaplan, 1988; Rudolph, 1988].
However, its effect on profitability has not been demonstrated
consistently. Ultimately, carving out a market niche of some
kind may be the key to continued viability of savings and loans,
as well as other financial intermediaries. Thus, all financial intermediaries could focus on their managerial strengths in structuring a strategy anywhere from specializing in housing finance,
to consumer lending, to becoming a completely "diversified financial supermarket" [McLean, 1991]. Such specialization decisions would then rest with management instead of Congress,
and the industry as a whole could be more responsive to market
changes. This flexibility could be effected by regulatory changes
allowing a universal charter for financial intermediaries. This
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development, with corresponding adjustments in the tax law,
would be an appropriate culmination to the 1980s piecemeal
trend toward equality. It would also assist Congress in synchronizing its goals for the financial services industry.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Congress has made major progress in the
1980s in equalizing the regulatory structure of the financial services industry. The savings and loan industry benefited from
these changes by becoming better able to respond to changing
market conditions. Many of these changes were, however, overdue corrections of poor legislation in the 1950s, 1960s and
1970s. Those regulations (specifically the imposition of Regulation Q, tax and regulatory portfolio restrictions, and overly generous loan-to-value ratios and mortgage terms) set the stage for
the crisis the industry encountered in the late 1970s. The
disintermediation crisis of the 1970s led to a severe net worth
problem from which the industry was not given the opportunity
to recover until DIDMCA, Garn-St. Germain and the Tax Reform Act of 1986. This net worth problem was a driving force in
many of the irregularities that developed in the industry during
the 1980s. Better timing and coordination of the diversification
opportunities afforded by DIDMCA, Garn-St. Germain and the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, combined with the FIRREA structural
changes have reduced these irregularities. Attention to these
past policy changes, however, is only useful in understanding
the problems of today and for examining needed future policy
changes.
In planning for the future, Congress must recognize that
market conditions have integrated the housing finance function
into the overall capital market structure. Therefore, designing a
future for the savings and loan industry must involve a process
of setting policy goals for the entire financial services industry.
Legislation in the 1980s moved in the direction of equalizing
opportunities for the thrift and banking sectors of the financial
services industry. However, it stopped short of full equalization
and a definitive policy statement. Once an integrated policy goal
is established, legislators can then structure tax considerations,
supervisory functions and other regulations to achieve these
goals, while at the same time allowing the institutions the flexibility to respond to ever changing market conditions.
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THE "REVOLUTION" IN
FINANCIAL REPORTING THEORY:
A KUHNIAN INTERPRETATION
Abstract: A Kuhnian perspective is used to explain the transition in
financial reporting theory from an "economic income perspective" to
an "informational perspective" (a transition that Beaver refers to as a
"revolution"), and to examine the subsequent development of the latter. The demise of the economic income perspective (represented by
the normative a priorists) is attributed to the lack of a paradigm
which could serve to identify research problems and provide methodological guidance. The success of the informational paradigm, on the
other hand, is attributed to the fact that it was, in essence, a subparadigm of the broader and well-established market economics
paradigm. The study concludes, however, with a discussion of two
types of persistent anomalous findings (the first with respect to the
EMH and the second with respect to the CAPM) that have the potential to generate a crisis for the informational paradigm.

The 1960s was a decade of turmoil in financial accounting
theory and research. Post-1960s financial accounting research is
radically different in method, theoretical content, and philosophical thrust than pre-1960s research. Wells [1976] has suggested that the turmoil signified the beginning of a Kuhnian
revolution. Beaver [19891 characterizes the outcome as "an accounting revolution"; a revolution whereby an "economic income" approach was replaced by an "informational perspective"
[Beaver, p. 18]. Although there is no indication that Beaver is
using the term revolution in a Kuhnian sense, the implication is
that the changes were internally generated, an overthrow that
was initiated by developments in accounting theory. This paper
offers a significantly different interpretation. A Kuhnian perspective is employed to argue that the new view of financial
reporting theory described by Beaver can be seen as a "normal
science" expansion of the economics paradigm.
This approach holds the potential of a new explanation for
the failure of the normative a priori research movement and the
success of the new informational research movement. The
Kuhnian perspective also provides a unique vehicle for analyzPublished by eGrove, 1993
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ing the potential significance of challenges to the validity of the
efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) and the capital asset pricing
model (CAPM) which have long served as cornerstones for the
informational perspective. First, however, it will be useful to
locate the present study within the context of existing Kuhnian
analyses in the accounting literature.
KUHNIAN ANALYSIS OF ACCOUNTING THOUGHT
C u s h i n g [1989] h a s p r o v i d e d an excellent review of
Kuhnian references in the accounting literature and there is no
need to repeat that process. This section, accordingly, shall be
limited to locating the present study with respect to the more
prominent and comprehensive applications of Kuhnian ideas
that can, in turn, be related to the accounting debates of the
1960s and 1970s
In the mid-1970s, there were suggestions that accounting
was in the midst of a Kuhnian crisis characterized by paradigm
debate [Wells, 1976; The AAA's Statement on Accounting Theory
and Theory Acceptance, 1977]. Peasnell [1981] and Laughlin
[1981] challenged the applicability of Kuhn's ideas to accounting. Kuhn's theory, according to Peasnell, applies only to sciences, and since accounting is not a science, Kuhnian analysis
of accounting thought is inappropriate. Cushing, on the other
hand, presents a case for the applicability of Kuhn's ideas to
intellectual disciplines other than the sciences. His analysis is
more elaborate than previous studies and provides useful background for the present study.
With respect to accounting, Cushing argues that since the
traditional concerns of accounting (making sense of the economic performance of business enterprises) share significant
c o m m o n ground with the concerns of science (making sense of
reality), "Kuhn's theories may be pertinent to an understanding
of t h e h i s t o r i c a l evolution of the a c c o u n t i n g discipline"
[Cushing, p. 11]. He maintains that "the double-entry bookkeeping model has the features of an accounting paradigm, as that
term is used by Kuhn, and that the historical evolution of accounting from approximately the Sixteenth century until about
1960 resembles the normal science of Kuhn's theory" [p. 20].
The advent of governmental regulation of accounting practice and reporting in the Twentieth century led to a search for
u n i f o r m a c c o u n t i n g principles and resulted, according to
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Cushing, in the first stage of crisis for the double-entry paradigm. "The combination of government regulation and the commitment to uniformity has led to a buildup of unresolved accounting issues that perhaps more closely resemble the anomalies of Kuhn's theory" [Cushing, p. 23].
A second stage of accounting's crisis was triggered, Cushing
suggests, when the search for a scientific foundation for financial accounting theory — a search which reached its most fervent pitch in the 1960s — produced instead a widespread conviction that "accounting was inherently arbitrary" [Cushing, p.
27]. The sense of crisis was further deepened by the growing
conviction that even if a scientific theory of financial accounting
could be found, it could never be implemented because of the
extent to which the rule-making process had been politicized.
"In essence, the further development of accounting thought
along traditional lines was now irreconcilable with the ideals of
science that accounting scholars had fervently e m b r a c e d "
[Cushing, p. 27]. Many academic accountants responded to this
situation, Cushing argues, not by abandoning science, but by
abandoning accounting. "Accounting scholars have committed
themselves to science, but having come to realize that accounting has no scientifically valid paradigm to provide a basis for
scientific research, have chosen to practice other sciences that
do have such paradigms" [Cushing, p. 29].
This author agrees with Cushing that the 1960s ushered in
a wholesale concern with scientific accounting research, but attributes this concern more to outside social, political, and technological factors than to crisis in a Kuhnian-type paradigm.
Similarly, this author tends to share Peasnell's skepticism about
the applicability of Kuhn's ideas to traditional (pre-1960s) accounting thought, but views the alternative proposals for scientific accounting practice which were put forth by the so-called
normative a priori theorists of the 1960s as manifestations of
pre-paradigm struggle. There is also agreement with Cushing's
view that, since the 1960s, there has been a wholesale abandonment (by academic accountants) of the traditional concerns of
accounting and a corresponding wholesale acceptance of other
disciplines (especially economics) which are considered to be
scientific.
In short, the 1960s marked the beginning of the applicability of Kuhn's ideas to accounting thought in correspondence
with the development of widespread concern about being scienPublished by eGrove, 1993
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tific. In the context of Kuhn's ideas, the 1960s academic accounting literature was dominated by the search for a paradigm.
THE "SCIENTIFIC TURN" AND
THE SEARCH FOR A PARADIGM
On all fronts, the 1960s were, in the words of Dyckman and
Zeff, "a pivotal decade" for accounting research: "In the literature of accounting research, the 1960s was the Decade of Awakening" [Dyckman and Zeff, p. 233]. A unique congruence of
social, political and technological developments had produced a
shared commitment to the pursuit of scientific research in accounting. By the mid-1970s, however, it was obvious that the
"decade of awakening" had produced nothing remotely resembling a consensus view of financial accounting and reporting
theory. In fact, a study commissioned by the American Accounting Association concluded that, "a multiplicity of theories has
been — and continues to be — proposed" [AAA, 1977, p. 1]. The
AAA committee further characterized the current theoretical debate as "virtually endless argumentation and inability to resolve
issues that are raised" [AAA, 1977, p. 1]. In Kuhnian terms, the
committee suggested that accounting theorists were involved in
paradigm competition [p. 43].
The AAA's study, published under the title Statement on Accounting Theory and Theory Acceptance (SATTA), classified the
diverse perspectives on accounting theory into three categories:
"classical approaches to theory development" [p. 5]; "the decision usefulness approach" [p. 10]; and "information economics"
[p. 21]. SATTA's classification scheme, however, is deficient on
two counts. In the first place, it does not differentiate the pre1960s theorists from the science-oriented theorists of the 1960s.
Secondly, it lumps empirical capital markets researchers such
as Gonedes, Beaver, Ball and Brown together with normative,
apriorists such as Chambers and Sterling in the "decision usefulness" category. As Peasnell points out, this categorization is at
odds with other classifications in the accounting literature. He
(Peasnell) charges that "the committee's classification seems to
border at times on the artificial" [p. 70]. This charge is further
borne out by the fact that Beaver, in 1981, presented very cogently the interrelationship of information economics theory
and empirical capital markets research: schools of thought
which the AAA committee had treated as separate "paradigms".
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This brings up another problem with the AAA's SATTA; a
problem with respect to the committee's use of Kuhnian terminology. SATTA included an argument that, "[t]here are a number of people offering different paradigms" [p. 45], thus suggesting that Kuhn's description of paradigm competition was applicable to the (then) current state of accounting theory. As
Peasnell has pointed out, however, this is indicative of a misunderstanding of Kuhn's theory. A given way of looking at the
world, including theoretical orientation, becomes paradigmatic
after it has found a certain level of acceptance. Theories may be
offered by individual theorists, but paradigms are not put forth
by individuals. The perspective suggested by an individual may
eventually become paradigmatic, but it is not paradigmatic at
the time it is put forth. Such considerations led Peasnell to pose
the following question: "Do the variety of accounting theory approaches identified by the committee really constitute competing paradigms (or pre-paradigm 'schools of thought', for that
matter)?" [p. 69]. The present study argues that, with respect to
the various normative apriorists, the 1960s and early 1970s cannot be appropriately characterized by Kuhn's notion of paradigm competition.
Kuhn [1970b] points out that the discourse of philosophy,
as well as many of the social sciences, is characterized by
"claims, counter-claims, and debates over fundamentals" [p. 6].
According to Kuhn, debate over fundamentals was also characteristic of many fields that subsequently developed into sciences:
. . . there are many fields — I shall call them protosciences — in which practice does generate testable
conclusions but which nonetheless resemble philosophy and the arts rather than the established sciences in
their developmental patterns. I think, for example, of
fields like chemistry and electricity before the mid-eighteenth century, of the study of heredity and phylogeny
before the mid-nineteenth, or of many of the social sciences today. In these fields . . . incessant criticism and
continual striving for a fresh start are primary forces
. . . [Kuhn, 1970c, p. 244]
It is the contention here that the debates among the normative
apriorists of the 1960s and early 1970s can be m u c h more aptly
characterized as pre-paradigm debate [Kuhn, 1970a, p. 160], or
alternatively as proto-science debate, than as paradigm competition.
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With respect to the situation faced by the information economics and the capital market researchers, however, the AAA
committee erred in a different direction. After noting that, in
the absence of an accepted body of thought, each theorist must
"provide his own foundation for the field" [AAA, 1977, p. 43],
the committee asserts that, "Theorizing from efficient markets
research has proceeded in a similar vein" [p. 43]. With respect
to the informational perspective (information economics and
capital markets research), the contrary was actually the case.
Instead, accounting theorists in the informational perspective
were, in fact, "jumping onto the bandwagon" of a very solidly
established paradigm — the economics paradigm.
Thus, with respect to Kuhnian thought, accounting in the
1960s and early 1970s was the site of two distinct, yet interacting, Kuhnian processes. From the perspective of the traditional
concerns of accounting, i.e., concern with the measurement of
economic performance of business enterprises, the efforts of
theorists such as Chambers, Edwards and Bell, Mattessich, and
Sterling (so-called normative apriorists are viewed as pre—paradigm debate. The normative apriorists were attempting to establish a solid scientific foundation for the pursuit of the traditional concerns of accounting.
At the same time, another Kuhnian process was in operation. From the perspective of economics (a discipline which can
be considered to be appropriately characterized as a full-fledged
scientific paradigm), the "normal science" process appropriately
includes attempts to expand the explanatory power of the paradigm. During the 1960s theoretical developments such as the
E M H and the CAPM held the promise of extending the explanatory power of the basic economics paradigm to encompass first
business finance, and subsequently, financial accounting, while
developments in information economics served to locate the
emerging new perspective on financial reporting theory within
the broader theoretical framework of economic thought.
In sum, accounting in the 1960s and early 1970s is viewed
as the site of competition between the normative apriorists (who
were engaged in pre-paradigm debate with each other) and the
proponents of the newly formed financial economics paradigm
(an economics sub-paradigm which was engaged in normal science expansionary efforts). The remainder of this paper presents: a Kuhnian interpretation of competition between the normative apriorists and proponents of the financial economics
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paradigm; an overview of the subsequent normal science-type
development of the "informational perspective" of financial reporting theory; and an exploration (in terms of Kuhnian crisis
theory) of the significance of challenges to the EMH and the
CAPM.
THE FAILURE OF THE NORMATIVE
A PRIORI RESEARCH MOVEMENT
It has been noted that the decade of the 1960s witnessed
tremendous pressures for "scientific" accounting research. But
the 1960s also saw a major increase in the pressure for more
research. The American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business (the primary accrediting organization for academic schools
of business in the U.S.) instituted the doctorate as the terminal
degree for academic accountants in 1967 and began placing
greater and greater emphasis on research productivity in the
accreditation process. This emphasis, together with the social
and political pressures noted earlier, resulted in a major push
for more accounting research that was also scientific.
However, research never happens in isolation from a network of beliefs, attitudes and theories. This was one of the most
salient features of Kuhn's exposition of normal scientific practice: ". . . in the absence of at least some implicit body of intertwined theoretical and methodological belief that permits selection, evaluation, and criticism . . . it must be supplied, perhaps
by a current metaphysic, by another science, or by personal and
historical accident" [Kuhn, 1970a, pp. 16-17]. From a Kuhnian
perspective the body of intertwined theoretical and methodological belief provided by a paradigm is what gives researchers
the confidence that their work will find acceptance. With respect to the situation faced by new PhDs in accounting in the
1960s, a research paradigm was needed to provide confidence
that their research would "pay off", that it would lead to success
and recognition in the form of tenure.
This sort of consideration is a major reason that "normal
science . . . [is] firmly based upon one or more past scientific
achievements, achievements t h a t some particular scientific
community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice" [Kuhn, 1970a, p. 10]. More precisely, "When the individual scientist can take a paradigm for
granted, he need no longer, in his major works, attempts to
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build his field anew, starting from first principles and justifying
the use of each concept introduced" [Kuhn, 1970a, pp. 19-20].
An accepted paradigm ends "the constant reiteration of fundamentals" [Kuhn, 1970a, p. 18]; it provides "confidence that they
[are] on the right track . . . [and encourages] scientists to undertake more precise, esoteric, and consuming sorts of work"
[Kuhn, 1970a, p. 18].
According to the AAA's SATTA, the normative apriorists of
the 1960s were not operating from any generally accepted paradigm. Various theoretical perspectives were put forth by individual researchers, but no single perspective found widespread
acceptance. The most notable proposals tended to disagree on
one or more fundamental issues. The situation is stated quite
succinctly by Mattessich in his personal account of the "golden
age" of a priori research: "It is characteristic of my approach
that in contrast to others (e.g. to Alexander who used present
values, Edwards and Bell who stressed replacement values,
Chambers who championed exit market values, Ijiri who defended acquisition cost values), I introduced a general valuation
assumption, thus tolerating all specific valuation hypotheses . .."
[Mattessich, 1984, p. 34].
Mutual criticism among the leading apriorists was also
highly visible. Perhaps the most notable example was the exchange between Chambers and Mattessich. Chambers published
a critical review of Mattessich's Accounting and Analytical Methods (AAM) in the Journal of Accounting Research [1966b] suggesting, according to Gaffikin, that "the work suffers from being
'forced' to fit methodological requirements at the expense of
more fundamental, substantive analysis" [Gaffikin, 1988, p. 21].
Mattessich has subsequently referred to Chambers' review as a
"wholesale rejection" of his work [Mattessich, 1984, p. 32]. With
respect to Chambers' Accounting, Evaluation and Economic Behavior, Mattessich has asserted that, "Chambers started from a
preconceived, and to my mind, dogmatic objective" [Mattessich,
1984, p. 33].
Mattessich was also involved in another notable exchange,
this one with Sterling. Mattessich had published a critical review of Sterling's The Theory of the Measurement of Enterprise
Income in Abacus in 1971. Sterling's reply, the following year,
concluded that Mattessich had criticized his (Sterling's) book
for:

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9

50

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1993, Vol. 20, no. 1
Mouck: The "Revolution" in Financial Reporting Theory

41

1. not taking an approach (teleological) that it in fact
took;
2. not considering three users (creditors and stockholders, taxing authorities, and managers) that it in fact
considered;
3. not drawing a conclusion (different-incomes-for-different-purposes) that was identical to its statement
of the problem;
4. placing boundaries (to serve only stockholders) on
the theory of accounting that it did not place;
5. drawing a conclusion (exclusive market values) that
it did not draw; and
6. not being a general theory of accounting when it
was explicitly stated to be (and entitled) a theory of
income measurement. [Sterling, 1972, p. 101]
Sterling closed his reply with the assertion that Mattessich's critique was "amorphous" and "without foundation" [p. 101].
In such an environment, in which even the theoretical leaders cannot seem to gain any substantial degree of acceptance,
and at times display open contempt for each other's work, is it
any wonder that young new PhDs under pressure to publish
would tend to look for a safer, more promising research perspective? Mattessich attributes the "reorientation of m a n y
young scholars, away from the a priori approach, towards empirical research" [1984, p. 36] to a "reaction of the dialectical
process of academic fashion . . ." [1984, p. 35]. From a Kuhnian
perspective, however, a different explanation is compelling.
That explanation is that many young accounting academics
tended to gravitate toward a budding new research paradigm
which provided clear-cut research problems and examples of
acceptable research methods. Many young new PhDs tended to
gravitate toward a new accounting research paradigm which
can be considered to be a sub-paradigm of economics.
THE ECONOMICS PARADIGM AND THE RISE OF
MARKET-BASED ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
In contrast to the debates which dominate pre-science, the
practice of normal science is characterized by the lack of debate
over fundamentals. In fact, normal science is what Kuhn terms
paradigm-based research, where the term paradigm, in the
broad sense "stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given
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community" [Kuhn, 1970a, p. 175]. According to Kuhn, the accepted framework provided by a paradigm serves as a foundation for the articulation of problems that must be solved if the
range of explanatory power is to be extended: " . . . normalscientific research is directed to the articulation of those phen o m e n a and theories t h a t the p a r a d i g m already supplies"
[1970a, p. 24]. As indicated earlier, ". . . in the absence of at
least some implicit body of intertwined theoretical and methodological belief that permits selection, evaluation, and criticism
. . . it must be supplied, perhaps by a current metaphysic, by
another science, or by personal and historical accident" [Kuhn,
1970a, pp. 16-17]. This provides a major clue to the success of
the informational perspective in financial reporting theory.
Three related theoretical developments in the 1950s and
1960s — the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), the capital
assets pricing model (CAPM), and modern portfolio theory
(MPT) — had served to transform business finance into financial economics [Whitley, 1986]; they all three extended the "rationality assumption" and the "basic maximizing model" of economics to securities price research. These developments, in conjunction with the theoretical framework of information economics, created the opportunity for accounting researchers who
were trained in economics to import the constructs and methods of economics into financial accounting research.
The spectacular "scientific" developments in finance in the
1960s were followed closely by academic accountants (especially at the University of Chicago) who were anxious to find a
theoretical foundation for the development of "scientific" research in accounting. The University of Chicago began its annual Conference on Empirical Accounting Research in 1966
with the leadership and participation of academics trained in
the theory and methodology of financial economics.
In 1967, Ball and Brown presented their paper ("An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers") at the conference; a paper that would later be recognized as having a formative influence on the emerging new research paradigm. Brown,
in his recently published reflections on the paper, attributes
their (Ball and Brown's) success to their Chicago-style training
in economics and finance. Brown notes that he had already
studied the accounting classics at the University of New South
Wales before going to Chicago for graduate study in 1963. "So
on my arrival at Chicago I was exempted from all accounting
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courses other than the doctoral seminar . . . I was, however,
programmed into a full complement of courses in Chicago-style
economics and finance" [p. 203]. The strong empirical impetus
in finance research at Chicago was supported by the data base
made available by the University's Center of Research into Security Prices, and scholars such as Merton Miller and Eugene
F a m a provided the intellectual leadership. "It did not take long",
Brown notes, "for me to be completely seduced by the sheer
vitality of the Chicago finance group which, at that time, was
rapidly developing lines of research fundamentally at odds with
m u c h of the accounting literature to which I had been exposed"
[Brown, p. 203], Developments in finance, however, were
closely related to the spirit of Chicago economics which, as
Brown implies, provided the theoretical underpinning of the entire financial economics paradigm.
The second part to this 'formative' story is the role of
Chicago's Economics Department. I and many of my
doctoral program classmates chose Economics as our
basic discipline . . . We then trotted off to the Economics Department where we inevitably were schooled in
applied microeconomics and given a heavy dose of socalled positive economics, often t a u g h t by Milton
Friedman himself. The empirical mindset was so dominant in the 1960s that it influenced almost all of the
doctoral students' choices of research topics for a generation or more. [Brown, p. 203]
In any case, the publication of Ball and Brown's article in
1968 provided the real breakthrough for the aspiring new accounting research movement. Watts and Zimmerman [1986, p.
5] cite this article as the one having the biggest impact on the
evolution of securities price research in accounting. This was
borne out by an earlier report by Dyckman and Zeff of an informal survey of their research-oriented colleagues regarding the
most important contributions to accounting literature between
1960 and 1980. Their survey resulted in 56 votes for articles
published in The Journal of Accounting Research (JAR) versus 44
for articles published in the Accounting Review, but fully onehalf of the votes for JAR were votes for the 1968 Ball and Brown
article [Dyckman and Zeff, p. 254]. It was an article that "stirred
widespread interest in efficient markets research in accounting"
[Dyckman and Zeff, p. 242].
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The Ball and Brown study was essentially an extension of
the financial economics paradigm. Using the CAPM as a tool for
relating accounting numbers to securities prices, they investigated the relationship between unexpected earnings and abnormal rates of return for 261 New York Stock Exchange firms
during the nine years from 1957 to 1965. The results, interpreted in light of the efficient markets hypothesis, indicated that
stock price changes do reflect earnings changes, but that most
of the change in stock prices occurs prior to the report of annual earnings.
The Ball and Brown article was so different from traditional accounting literature that "it was rejected [by the Accounting Review] on the reviewer's contention that 'it was not an
Accounting manuscript'" [Dyckman and Zeff, p. 242]. From a
Kuhnian perspective, it is not surprising that a study that was
so radically different from the traditional approach to accounting research should become the exemplary study for future research. The "scientific achievements" that become the exemplars for a new paradigm must be "sufficiently unprecedented
to attract a n enduring group of adherents away from competing
modes of scientific activity" [Kuhn, 1970a, p. 10]. From a
Kuhnian perspective, the Ball and Brown study can be seen as a
demonstration of how accounting researchers could harness the
productive potential of the financial economics paradigm. For
the growing number of young accounting academics who were
under pressure to publish "scientific" research, the prospect of
having an intellectual foundation (a paradigm) with established
respectability must have been quite compelling; especially when
compared with the tumultuous pre-paradigm debate among the
normative apriorists.
This consideration (the pressure to publish) leads to Kuhn's
second characteristic of exemplary "scientific achievements" —
they m u s t be "sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve" [Kuhn,
1970a, p. 10]. If there was nothing left to be done, no unsolved
problems or nagging questions, researchers would have to look
for different areas in which to practice their skills of inquiry.
The "success of a paradigm", Kuhn points out, ". . . is at the
start largely a promise of success discoverable in selected and
still incomplete examples" [1970a, pp. 23-24]. When paradigms
cease to be problematic (as very few have), they cease "to yield
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research problems at all and . . . become tools for engineering"
[Kuhn, 1970a, p. 79].
The Ball and Brown [1968] article was a success in the
sense suggested by Kuhn. It held the promise of successfully
extending the financial economics paradigm to accounting. Ball
a n d Brown established that, within the financial economics
paradigm, accounting earnings are empirically related to stock
prices, but they studied only a limited set of accounting earnings (annual) and established only a gross relationship between
earnings and stock prices. Left unanswered were such questions
as the following. Could their results be duplicated for other sets
of accounting earnings (such as quarterly earnings)? To what
extent does the market anticipate changes in earnings? To what
extent do accounting earnings announcements convey information to market participants? Are investors misled by earnings
changes that result solely from changes in accounting procedures? The Ball and Brown article stimulated a number of studies a i m e d at a n s w e r i n g s u c h q u e s t i o n s . As W a t t s a n d
Z i m m e r m a n pointed out, "A reasonable characterization of the
objective of the economics-based empirical literature t h a t
evolved in the 10 years following Ball and Brown (1968) . . . is
that it sought to investigate the implications of the EMH and
the CAPM for the role of accounting numbers in supplying information to the capital markets for valuation purposes" [pp.
15-16].
MARKET-BASED ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
AS NORMAL SCIENCE
Most of the empirical work stimulated by Ball and Brown
fits Kuhn's characterization of normal science; it was work
aimed at articulating and fleshing out the financial economics
paradigm with respect to accounting numbers. It consisted
mainly of "mopping-up operations" which could be classified
into Kuhn's three categories of normal scientific problems —
" d e t e r m i n a t i o n of significant fact, m a t c h i n g of facts with
theory, and articulation of theory . . ." [Kuhn, 1970a, p. 34].
By demonstrating that a certain class of facts is "particularly revealing of the nature of things . . . the paradigm has
made them worth determining both with more precision and in
a larger variety of situations" [Kuhn, 1970a, p. 25]. Much normal scientific research, accordingly, aims at more clearly delinPublished by eGrove, 1993
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eating the boundaries of this "class of facts". Such work can be
demonstrated quite clearly with respect to the extension of the
financial economics paradigm to financial reporting theory.
Whereas Ball and Brown had demonstrated the relationship between annual earnings and stock prices for NYSE firms, an obvious approach for further research was to determine whether
the same relationship existed for other securities. As Watts and
Zimmerman note, "The Ball and Brown study has been replicated for annual earnings announcements by firms traded in
U.S. markets other than the NYSE . . . It also has been replicated for annual earnings announcements for firms traded in
other countries" [p. 47]. Other "mopping-up" work by researchers in the new accounting paradigm established that the class of
significant facts included the relationship between interim earnings and securities prices.
A second category of normal scientific problems arises as a
result of difficulties involved in matching theory with factual
observations. "Improving that agreement or finding new areas
in which agreement can be demonstrated at all presents a constant challenge to the skill and imagination of the experimentalist and observer" [Kuhn, 1970a, p. 26]. In the natural sciences,
for instance, special equipment must be developed to measure
results that are not observable to the naked eye, and the use of
such special equipment usually requires theoretical justification
and adaptation. This type of problem was very pointed for researchers in the new accounting paradigm. The underlying
theory of financial economics specified a certain relationship
between expected future cash flows and securities prices. Accounting researchers, on the other hand, were primarily concerned with the relationship between earnings and securities
prices; and in any case, expectations about the future are not
directly observable. The development of the new accounting
paradigm, therefore, left much scope for work regarding the fit
between fact and theory.
Ball and Brown assumed that accounting earnings could be
used as a surrogate for cash flows, thus allowing them to use
the CAPM to make predictions about the response of securities
prices to earnings announcements. Due to the fact that expectations are not directly observable, Ball and Brown chose to proceed as follows: " . . . we construct two alternative models of
what the market expects income to be and then investigate the
market's reactions when its expectations prove false" [p. 161].
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9
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They further used market models to differentiate the market
response in terms of normal versus abnormal rates of return. In
short, the actually observed data was compared with theoretical
models which were, in turn, (theoretically) linked with the underlying theories of financial economics. Such investigative procedures obviously left considerable scope for further moppingup work aimed at improving the fit between fact and theory.
And indeed, many of the studies stimulated by Ball and Brown
experimented with alternative models for measuring market expectations and abnormal returns.
Finally, the third type of normal scientific problem noted by
Kuhn can be illustrated with respect to the new accounting
paradigm; that is, "work undertaken to articulate the paradigm
theory, resolving some of its residual ambiguities and permitting the solution of problems to which it had previously only
drawn attention" [Kuhn, 1970a, p. 27]. As noted earlier, the Ball
and Brown study established that securities price changes are
related to accounting earnings changes, but it also found that
m u c h of the price changes occur prior to the annual earnings
announcements. This gave rise to what was perhaps the most
interesting question for subsequent researchers seeking further
articulation of the basic theory — how much information content do accounting earnings actually convey? Ball and Brown
concluded that annual earnings announcements do contain useful information, but that only 10-15 percent of the potential
information is conveyed in the month of announcement. The
limitations of their study raised a number of questions about
the validity of their conclusions with respect to information
content of earnings announcements, and especially with respect
to the role played by interim announcements. Many subsequent
studies which addressed these issues can be viewed as attempts
to refine and further articulate the paradigm theory.
Using Kuhn's terminology, then, much of the accounting
research stimulated by Ball and Brown can be aptly characterized as Kuhnian "puzzle-solving". The paradigm both generates
(acceptable) research problems and supplies criteria for acceptable solutions, in much the same way that game-type puzzles
specify problems and stipulate the rules for solving them. Thus,
when engaged with a normal research problem, the scientist must premise current theory as the rules of his
game. His object is to solve a puzzle . . . and current
theory is required to define that puzzle and to guaranPublished by eGrove, 1993
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tee that, given sufficient brilliance, it can be solved.
[Kuhn, 1970b, pp. 4-5]
Kuhn employs the puzzle metaphor to emphasize that normal
science research is not carried out as a test of the paradigm
theory. Quite the contrary, it is the skill of the researcher that is
at risk: "I use the term 'puzzle' in order to emphasize that the
difficulties which ordinarily confront even the very best scientists are, like crossword puzzles or chess puzzles, challenges
only to his ingenuity. He is in difficulty, not current theory"
[Kuhn, 1970b, p. 5, n. 1].
The upshot of this is that the puzzle-solving activity of the
normal science researcher is frequently aimed at establishing
predictable or unsurprising results. Consider, for instance, the
studies which applied Ball and Brown's methods to stock markets other than the NYSE. It surely was no surprise to find, as
Watts and Zimmerman note, that "The replications suggest that
the results are not unique to the NYSE" [p. 47]. Or consider the
research on interim earnings, when Ball and Brown provided
evidence that most of the price adjustments related to earnings
changes took place prior to the month of annual earnings announcements, the obvious explanation was that most of the information reported was not new. It had previously been reported in interim announcements. So, it was no surprise when
Foster [1977] reported a study using quarterly earnings which
found evidence "consistent with the hypothesis that quarterly
earnings convey information to the capital markets" [Watts and
Zimmerman, p. 51]. Such examples are consistent with Kuhn's
contention that normal science does not "aim to produce major
novelties" [1970a, p. 35].
This raises questions about why so much accounting research effort and so much journal space has been devoted to
issues that are merely "mopping-up" or "puzzle-solving" issues.
The answers Kuhn suggests are as follows. In a general sense,
such studies increase the paradigm's claim to legitimacy by increasing the scope and precision of its application [Kuhn,
1970a, p. 36]. As for the motivation of the individual researcher,
personal satisfaction and professional recognition are associated with demonstrations of ingenuity in "puzzle-solving."
Bringing a normal research problem to a conclusion is
achieving the anticipated in a new way, and it requires
the solution of all sorts of complex instrumental, conceptual and mathematical puzzles. The man who suchttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9
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ceeds proves himself an expert puzzle-solver, and the
challenge of the puzzle is an important part of what
drives him on. [Kuhn, 1970a, p. 36]
ANOMALY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
POSITIVE ACCOUNTING THEORY
The foregoing discussion is not intended to imply that normal science proceeds in a perfectly straight line with no unexpected turns or new directions. "Normal science does not aim at
novelties of fact or theory . . . New and unsuspected phenomena
are . . . repeatedly uncovered by scientific research, and radical
new theories have again and again been invented by scientists"
[Kuhn, 1970a, p. 52]. Indeed, anomalies — findings that seem
contradictory to the paradigm theory — are ever present. They
provide many of the puzzles that drive the normal scientific
researcher. If solutions prove to be too elusive the paradigm
theory may be adjusted to incorporate the anomaly. One of the
most visible extensions of the dominant financial reporting
p a r a d i g m can be attributed to the process of dealing with
anomalous observations, such as the development of positive
accounting theory.
Watts and Zimmerman note that "by the mid-1970s accounting researchers had observed . . . whole industries changing from one method of accounting to another at one point in
time (e.g., the switch by the steel industry from accelerated depreciation to straight line in 1968)" [p. 6]. Such observations
seemed consistent with the view that the stock market can be
misled by earnings changes that result solely from changes in
accounting procedures; a view that was widely held in the
1960s. However, as Watts and Zimmerman point out, this view
contradicts the EMH which implies that the stock market will
not be misled by such changes [p. 108]. From the perspective of
financial economics, these observations represented anomalies.
These anomalous observations were dealt with by positive
accounting theorists by adjusting the paradigm theory. Early
research within the paradigm had applied the EMH with the
assumption of no information or transaction costs. The anomalous observations of entire industries making costly changes in
accounting procedures "led some researchers to drop the zero
information and transaction assumptions . . . " [Watts and
Zimmerman, pp. 109-110]. This created an opening for introPublished by eGrove, 1993
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ducing the contracting theory that had developed from the
"property rights" version of economic theory. With the addition
of sophisticated contracting models the paradigm theory was
modified to provide answers to the following question: "If an
accounting change that does not affect taxes is costly and has
no other effect on firm value, why do managers make those
changes?" [Watts and Zimmerman, p. 173]. A very simplified
version of the answer proposed by positive accounting theorists
can be gleaned from the following examples.
For firm's with restrictive debt contracts that tie dividend
payments to the level of reported earnings, a change in accounting procedures that causes an increase in earnings can cause a
change in the cash flows to various contracting parties. This led
to the formulation of the "debt/equity hypothesis" which Watts
and Zimmerman state as follows: "Ceteris paribus, the larger a
firm's debt/equity ratio, the more likely the firm's manager is to
select accounting procedures that shift reported earnings from
future periods to the current period" [p. 216]. Similarly, for
firm's with contracts that tie management compensation to the
level of reported earnings, management may have some incentive to change accounting procedures. Consideration of various
compensation contracts thus led to the formulation of the "bonus plan hypothesis" which Watts and Zimmerman formulate
as follows: "Ceteris paribus, managers of firms with bonus plans
are more likely to choose accounting procedures that shift reported earnings from future periods to the current period" [p.
208]. Finally, for firms concerned about attracting regulatory
attention with the reporting of large earnings, there may be an
incentive to change accounting methods to reduce reported
earnings. This consideration led to the formulation of another
testable hypothesis that has been dubbed the "size hypothesis"
— "Ceteris paribus, the larger the firm, the more likely the manager is to choose accounting procedures that defer reported
earnings from current to future periods" [Watts and Zimmerman, p. 235].
In summary, the anomalies encountered by the economicsbased empirical research paradigm were dealt with by adopting
various changes in the theoretical framework. What emerged
was a dramatic new extension of the informational view of financial reporting theory; an extension that explains previously
anomalous changes in accounting procedures by attributing
them to the existence of contracting, information, and political
costs.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9
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ANOMALY AND CRISIS: IS THE INFORMATIONAL
PARADIGM IN DANGER?
Anomaly, on the other hand, can generate a crisis. If solutions prove to be elusive and the theory cannot be adjusted —
because the contradiction is too destructive of the paradigm
theory — then the paradigm may be thrown into a "crisis"
which, in the extreme case, may make it susceptible to a scientific "revolution" and replacement by an alternative paradigm.
To generate a crisis, an anomaly must be seen as "more than
just another puzzle of normal science . . ." [Kuhn, 1970a, p. 82].
This could be the case for an anomaly that "clearly califs] into
question explicit and fundamental generalizations of the paradigm . . ." [Kuhn, 1970a, p. 82]. The informational paradigm has
encountered two types of anomalous findings that clearly hold
the potential for generating a crisis — findings that call into
question the validity of the EMH and the CAPM. The crisis potential of such anomalies can be gleaned from a brief overview
of the paradigm.
The informational paradigm can be described as a coherent
program for financial accounting research which seeks to describe the role of accounting information in the operation of
capital markets. Capital markets are presumed to provide for
the efficient allocation of resources. Modern portfolio theory is
presumed to describe the way rational investors make decisions
which optimize lifetime consumption possibilities. The CAPM is
presumed to describe the efficient allocation of risk in capital
asset pricing. The EMH presumes that securities markets function to eliminate economic profits with respect to information.
Within this theoretical context, the linkage between accounting
information and capital market theories has been succinctly described by Lev and Ohlson [1982] as follows:
The link provided by capital market theories connects
the accounting information system to its function in
capital markets. Information has a dual role in these
markets. First, it aids in establishing a set of equilibrium security prices that affects the allocation of 'real'
resources and the productive decisions implemented by
firms. Second, it enables individuals to exchange claims
to present and future consumption across different
states, thereby attaining both preferred patterns of lifetime consumption and the sharing of societal risks.
This explicit conceptualization of the role of informaPublished by eGrove, 1993

61

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 20 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 9
52

The Accounting Historians Journal, June 1993

tion in capital markets appears to provide the elusive
operational framework for the systematic analysis of
alternative accounting information systems. The outcome of the economic system, as a function of the information system, can now be analyzed. [p. 252]
In short, the EMH and the CAPM provide linkages between
information, securities prices, and expected utility in a way that
allows for a coherent financial reporting theory that is an integral part of a broader theory of market economics. "Such integration pointed to a well-specified and operational agenda for
financial accounting research" [Lev and Ohlson, p. 252]. If the
validity of the EMH and/or the CAPM is rejected, then the integral relationship between financial reporting theory and the
theory of market economics is called into question. From this
perspective, there is good reason to suspect that the informational perspective may be entering a state of crisis.
With respect to the EMH, researchers have long been aware
of anomalous findings. In 1978, the Journal of Financial Economics published a special issue dealing with findings anomalous to the EMH. In an editorial introduction to that issue,
Jensen states succinctly the need for special consideration of the
anomalous findings.
I believe there is no other proposition in economics
which has more solid empirical evidence supporting it
than the Efficient Market Hypothesis . . . Yet, in a manner remarkably similar to that described by Thomas
Kuhn in his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, we seem to be entering a stage where widely scattered and as yet incohesive evidence is arising which
seems to be inconsistent with the theory. As better data
become available (e.g., daily stock price data) and as
our econometric sophistication increases, we are beginning to find inconsistencies that our cruder data and
techniques missed in the past. It is evidence which we
will not be able to ignore. [Jensen, p. 95]
Jensen expressed optimism that future research would explain the anomalies without sacrificing the underlying theory of
market efficiency [p. 100]. Over a decade later, however, Brown
commented with respect to market efficiency that, "There are so
many 'anomalies' around nowadays that I sometimes wonder if
there are more anomalies than instances of efficiency" [p. 215].
Nevertheless, Brown asserts his allegiance to market efficiency
in no uncertain terms: " . . . I am afraid my Chicago training has
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9
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left m e too skeptical to believe that competitive capital markets
could remain so obviously inefficient for so long" [p. 216].
The increasingly widespread awareness of findings anomalous to the EMH, however, are not being ignored or pushed
aside with mere reiterations of belief in market efficiency. A
recent issue of The Accounting Review, for example, published a
series of articles dealing with the functional fixation hypothesis
(FFH) which is directly contradictory to the EMH. Whereas the
E M H assumes that investors are sophisticated enough to sort
out the effects of reported accounting numbers and rationally
assess future cash flow potentials, the FFH assumes that investors are fixated on accounting numbers "and, therefore, fail to
unscramble the true cash flow implications of accounting data"
[Hand, p. 740]. The article by Hand (which was one of two
articles awarded the AAA's Competitive Manuscript Award for
1989), reported evidence which was inconsistent with the EMH,
but consistent with a modified version of the FFH. In another
study, Harris and Ohlson reported results (based on the application of trading rules to oil and gas firms) which supported neither the E M H nor the FFH. In a discussion of these papers,
Tinic concluded that, "The studies by Hand and Harris and
Ohlson are useful first steps in developing alternative testable
hypotheses to the EMH. They offer thought-provoking illustrations of the type of problems that should be included in the
agenda for future research" [p. 795].
Functional fixation clearly represents an anomaly with respect to the informational paradigm; an anomaly that calls into
question one of the cornerstones of the informational perspective (the EMH). If enough researchers become convinced that
investors are functionally fixated, it could generate a crisis for
the paradigm.
When . . . an anomaly comes to seem more than just
another puzzle of normal science, the transition to crisis a n d t o e x t r a o r d i n a r y science h a s b e g u n . The
anomaly itself now comes to be more generally recognized as such by the profession. More and more attention is devoted to it by more and more of the field's
most eminent men. [Kuhn, 1970a p. 82]
While there is no indication that the FFH is widely accepted at
this time, the prominent display of a series of FFH articles in
one of the leading academic accounting journals indicates how
seriously functional fixation is taken by some highly respected
Published by eGrove, 1993
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academics. If the concern increases, it will trigger more and
more research that is characteristic of extraordinary science
rather t h a n normal science.
As indicated above, anomalous findings with respect to the
CAPM also have the potential to generate crisis for the informational paradigm. In 1982, Lev and Ohlson noted that, "Disenchantment with the CAPM is widespread on both conceptual
and empirical grounds" [p. 287]. The grounds for disenchantment continued to grow during the 1980s. In a new study of the
CAPM, Fama and French [1992] discuss several studies published in the 1980s which reported evidence that average returns on stocks may be related to market size, leverage, book-tomarket equity, and/or earnings-price ratios. Since the CAPM
purports to explain the variability of returns solely on the basis
of market beta's, the evidence reported by these various studies
is clearly anomalous with respect to the CAPM.
The new study by Fama and French, however, appears to be
m u c h more damaging to the validity of the CAPM than the previous studies. They (Fama and French) sought to evaluate the
joint roles of the above mentioned variables (including beta)
with respect to average returns. Their study included non-financial stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ and covered the years 1963-1990. Their abstract conveys the results succinctly:
Two easily measured variables, size and book-to-market equity, combine to capture the cross-sectional
variation in average stock returns associated with market [beta], size, leverage, book-to-market equity and
earnings-price ratios. Moreover, when the tests allow
for variation in [beta] that is unrelated to size, the relation between market [beta] and average return is flat,
even w h e n [beta] is the only explanatory variable.
[Fama and French, 1992, p. 427]
In short, market beta's, according Fama and French, are not
related to average returns; market beta's have no explanatory
power with respect to systematic risk.
So, what are the implications of these findings for the informational paradigm of financial reporting theory? First, as noted
above, the CAPM has served the role of connecting accounting
information to the efficient functioning of a market economy. A
quote from Markowitz will highlight the importance of the
CAPM in this regard: "My work on portfolio theory considers
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9
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how an optimizing investor would behave, whereas the work by
Sharpe and Lintner on the Capital Asset Pricing Model . . . is
concerned with economic equilibrium assuming all investors
optimize in the particular manner I proposed" [1991, p. 469]. In
short, if the CAPM is not valid, then the rationality of capital
asset pricing may be in doubt. At the very least, if the CAPM is
rejected, then another theory of rational asset pricing is called
for, and a new theory of asset pricing opens space for paradigm
debate.
Second, if the findings of Fama and French gain widespread acceptance, then the validity of many of the classic articles in the informational paradigm are placed in doubt because of the widespread reliance, directly or indirectly, on the
CAPM in estimating abnormal returns or in controlling for systematic risk. In any case, the Fama and French study holds the
potential for a very substantial blurring of the paradigm, and in
Kuhn's words, "All crises begin with the blurring of a paradigm
and the consequent loosening of the rules for normal research"
[1970a, p. 84].
CONCLUSIONS
The decade of the 1960s has been widely recognized as a
watershed decade in accounting thought. Most notably, it was
the decade which initiated the transition from the "economic
income perspective" to the "informational perspective" in financial reporting theory. Kuhnian analysis yields some unique insights into both the transition itself and the subsequent development of the informational perspective.
One of the major conclusions of the present study is that
the informational perspective predominated precisely because it
provided the support of a widely accepted paradigm, while the
proponents of the "economic income perspective" could not offer paradigm support. The informational perspective, as an extension of the financial economics paradigm, provided researchers with well-defined normal science problems together with
exemplars that served as guides regarding acceptable research
methods, while the economic income theorists (the so-called
normative apriorists) could offer neither a generally accepted
theoretical perspective, nor exemplars for the pursuit of research problems.
As with the development of any scientific paradigm, the
informational paradigm has encountered anomalous evidence,
Published by eGrove, 1993

65

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 20 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 9
56

The Accounting Historians Journal, June 1993

most of which could be ignored, explained away, or incorporated into the paradigm by theoretical adjustments. The informational paradigm has also encountered more troublesome
anomalies that hold the potential of throwing the paradigm into
a Kuhnian-type crisis. Perhaps the most notable anomalous
findings are those reported in a dramatic new study by Fama
and French; a study which flatly contradicts the validity of the
CAPM and the explanatory power of market beta's. Because the
E M H and the CAPM have served as cornerstones for so many of
the classic studies in the informational paradigm, the spreading
awareness of challenges to their validity are prompting more
and more attention. There is reason to believe that increasingly
widespread attention to the persistence of such fundamental
anomalies is beginning to blur the paradigm and loosen the
rules for normal science research, thus creating intellectual
space for the consideration of alternative paradigms.
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EVOLUTION OF CONCEPTS OF
MINORITY INTEREST
Abstract: The FASB is currently addressing issues related to accounting for minority interest as a part of the "entity project". Decisions
regarding the measurement and financial statement presentation depend upon the determination of the fundamental nature of minority
interest. Alternative views describing the nature of minority interest
rely u p o n alternative equity theories of consolidation. This paper
traces the evolution of concepts of minority interest from the early
1900s to the present. The evolution is placed in perspective vis-a-vis
the development of relevant corporate theories of equity.

The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is currently evaluating consolidation accounting methods under the
agenda project — Consolidations and Related Matters [FASB,
Highlights, 1991]. The first phase is completed and resulted in
the issuance of SFAS No. 94, Consolidation of All Majority-owned
Subsidiaries. The second phase is under way; and on September
10, 1991, the FASB issued a discussion memorandum (DM), An
Analysis of Issues Related to Consolidation Policy and Procedures,
which "is intended to cover all aspects of accounting for affiliations between entities . . ." [FASB, 1991, par. 4].
The DM addresses a number of procedural and theoretical
issues wherein a parent company has a controlling interest in a
subsidiary entity. In those cases where there is less than 100
percent ownership, the appropriateness of a particular accounting approach (e.g., the measurement of goodwill or the treatment of unrealized profit arising from intercompany transactions) hinges upon the nature of noncontrolling "minority" interest, which in turn relies upon the nature of the reporting
entity.1 Thus, a concept of minority interest is important to the
1

The DM and authors in the literature refer to the two prominent theories of
equity — parent company theory and entity theory (discussed later in the paper)
— to support positions taken on the nature of minority interest and to relate
those positions to various accounting procedures and policies. The following
example illustrates the importance of a concept of minority interest to consolidation principles and procedures. When published financial statements are pre-
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development and implementation of consolidation policies and
procedures.
Minority interest has not received a great deal of attention
in the accounting literature. The question of the fundamental
nature of minority interest has been linked to the question of
whether the appropriate basis of accounting should rely upon
the entity concept or the parent company concept. That is, the
two prominent equity theories of consolidation — entity theory 2
and parent company theory — typically appear as a basis of
support for discussions pertaining to minority interest. Under
the entity theory, corporate assets are independent of capital
structure, and majority and minority stockholders provide alternative sources of corporate resources. Parent company theorists
perceive parent company investors as the primary benefactors
of the consolidated group, and minority stockholdings as outside interests.
There is little official guidance on how to account for minority interest or how to handle matters which rely upon a concept of minority interest. "ARB No. 51, Consolidated Financial
Statements and FASB Statement No. 94 . . . are the prevailing
authoritative literature on accounting and reporting standards
for consolidated financial statements" [FASB, 1991, par. 14].
Neither pronouncement offers a definition of minority interest
nor prescribes how to treat or measure minority interest in published financial statements. 3 Minority interest has appeared as a
liability, between liabilities and stockholders' equity, and in
stockholders' equity. Before accountants can determine how to
measure and present minority interest, a consensus on the nature of minority interest is needed. Is it debt or equity, or perhaps neither?

pared from the perspective of the parent company, minority interest is considered an outside interest. Under this view, when an interest in a subsidiary is
purchased, goodwill is equal to cost minus the fair value of the proportion of
identifiable net assets acquired. Conversely, when the business entity is considered to be independent of its capital providers (entity theory), minority stockholders are viewed as having an equity interest. In this case, goodwill would be
recorded at its total fair value, imputed from the cost of the acquisition to the
parent.
2
In the DM, the FASB referred to entity theory as the "economic unit" theory.
3
ARB No. 51 does not expressly define a concept of reporting entity, a
concept of consolidated financial statements, or a concept of minority interest
[See for example FASB, 1991, par 20]. According to the DM, ARB No. 51 expressed some preferences, but set forth few hard and fast rules.
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This paper traces the evolution of concepts of minority interest from the early 1900s to the present. The developments are
placed in perspective relative to the evolution of the entity and
parent company theories. The nature of minority interest, but
not its measurement, is discussed. No attempt is made to critically evaluate the theoretical merits of minority interest concepts or related consolidation theories.
EARLY VIEWS OF MINORITY INTEREST
Minority interest has been referred to as a liability, equity,
or neither. References describing the placement of minority interest in corporate balance sheets began appearing in text books
and journal articles in the early 1900s. 4 Differences of opinion
were evident from the start. Newlowe [1948] examined 150 journal articles and books from 1908 through 1945. He determined
that 84 references proposed that minority interest be listed, but
either preferred no classification or did not mention where minority interest should be placed. Four authors preferred that
minority interest be placed among liabilities, and 28 preferred
to classify minority interest as an element of stockholders' equity. The other 34 sources cited did not address the nature of
minority interest.
Early references proffered their views of what minority interest is but did not offer theoretical defenses for particular positions taken. Moreover, proponents of one view did not typically refer to alternative accounting treatments. For example,
when referring to matters " . . . appertaining to minority shareholders . . . ," Dickinson [1918] stated
The proper practice is to take up as a liability the par
value of the outstanding stock, together with its relative
share of surplus, but when the a m o u n t involved is

4

The earliest reference is a presentation made by William M. Lybrand at the
annual meeting of the American Association of Public Accountants in October
1908 which was published in two parts in The Journal of Accountancy in November 1908 and December 1908. Lybrand depicted "Common Stock of Subsidiary
Companies Not Owned by the Holding Corp." under a general heading of "Liabilities," following "Common Stock of the Holding Corp." [November 1908, p.
40]. In Part II, Lybrand stated that "Under capital stocks will be included the
stock issues of the holding company and separately stated, such part of the
stocks of the subsidiary companies as are not owned by the holding company"
[December 1908, p. 120].
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small, the proportion of surplus is not always set aside
[1918, p. 183].
Finney described minority interest as a "capital liability to outsiders", stating
If there is a minority interest, it would be wrong to
eliminate the capital stock and surplus or deficit accounts of the subsidiary entirely, because they represent two things: (1) The capital liability to the holding
company, which is an inter-company relation and is
therefore eliminated; and (2) the capital liability to the
minority stockholders, which is an outside relation and
must therefore be shown in the consolidated balance
sheet [1922, p. 20].
Newlowe referred to minority interest as "proprietors," noting
From the point of view of the majority interests, the
algebraic sum of the capital stock, surplus, deficit, and
proprietorship reserves belonging to minority interests
is a liability. However, the minority stockholders rank
as proprietors rather than creditors. The minority interest, therefore should be shown on the consolidated balance sheet as a special net worth account [1926, p. 6].
And, Rorem wrote
In cases where the parent company owns most, but not
all, of the stock of the subsidiary, the interest of minority stockholders should be shown separately as a special proprietary item on the consolidated balance sheet
[1928, p. 440].
In all four cases, no more was said about the nature of minority
interest.
During the 1940s, authors began to offer theoretical arguments to support a favored position. For example, Sunley and
Carter argued
This interest of the minority is thus somewhat similar
to the interest of a creditor. The creditor hopes for the
prosperity of his customer so that he may receive some
share in that property; but, on the other hand, the
creditor does not wish his customer's prosperity to be
m a d e at the expense of the creditor's own profits [1944,
p. 361].
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In addition, the pros and cons of alternative accounting treatments for minority interest began to be compared and contrasted. Childs wrote
It would seem that a minority interest should not be
looked upon as a liability unless it represents recalcitrant stockholders whom the majority is trying to buy
out or a capital consumed by losses which, nevertheless, has a "nuisance" value. It does not have a lien on
any assets; it does have a proprietary equity in certain
assets and is a part of the capital of the enterprise. To
deny a minority interest co-ordinate status with the
majority because it does not represent an equity in the
assets of more than one legal entity is no more logical
t h a n to deny a liability a co-ordinate position with
other consolidated liabilities for the same reason [1949,
p. 55].
Minority Interest As a Liability — AAA
The initial position of the American Accounting Association
(AAA) was that minority stockholdings are outside interests.
Kohler presented a paper at the 1929 annual meeting of the
AAA which was later published in The Accounting Review. The
paper represented "the main opinion" of the Executive Committee regarding the topic of consolidated reports [Kohler, 1938, p.
63]. The Committee determined that "outside stockholders" possess attributes of creditors because "their interests do not parallel those of the controlling entity" [Kohler, 1938, p. 67]. Consistent with others writing on the topic of minority interest during
this period, no theoretical support was given for this statement.
In 1955, the AAA Committee on Concepts and Standards
issued Supplementary Statement No. 7, "Consolidated Financial
Statements." Consistent with the 1929 Executive Committee's
position, minority interest was referred to as an "outside financial interest" along with preferred stock and debt instruments
[AAA, 1955, p. 194]. However, the 1955 Committee did not mention where minority interest should be shown in published financial statements, nor did the Committee offer a definition of
what minority interest is.
The thrust of the 1955 Statement was to set forth basic
principles of consolidated financial statements. One of those
principles was that: "In so far as practicable, the consolidated
data should reflect the underlying assumption that they reprehttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9
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sent the operations, resources, and equities of a single entity"
[AAA, 1955, p. 194]. A subsequent Statement, "Accounting and
Reporting Standards for Corporate Financial Statements: 1957 Revision, " expanded and clarified the principle of the consolidated
entity, but again was silent on the subject of the nature of minority interest [AAA, 1957].
Proponents of the entity concept argue that classifying minority interest as a liability is inconsistent with the view that
consolidated financial statements are prepared for a single entity. Thus, the 1957 AAA Committee's silence on this point may
be interpreted as indicating a shift from the 1929 Executive
Committee's position as described by Kohler.
Minority Interest As Equity
The view which holds that minority interest is an equity
interest is rooted in the development of the entity theory. Paton
described the essence of the entity theory. Paton [1922] proposed that the accounting equation is properly depicted as "Assets = Equities". Equities were described as " . . . a marvelous
diffusion of all aspects of ownership — control, income, risk,
etc. — among a host of investors" [Paton, 1922, p. 73]. Accordingly, all types of corporate securities represent equity in corporate assets. Paton argued that a mere change in the source of
corporate capital does not affect the cost of factors of production. It follows that the corporate entity is independent of its
capital structure. Assets are corporate assets, and income is corporate income until distributed as returns to the various capital
providers. 5 Under this scenario, consolidated financial statements would be prepared for the entity, rather than being extensions of the separate financial statements of the parent company.
Moonitz [1942] pointed out that because there was no generally accepted theory of consolidation, a n u m b e r of confusing
alternative and sometimes contradictory practices coexisted. He
extended the discussion of the entity theory to consolidated financial statements and argued that the entity concept provides
an appropriate theoretical base. Moonitz viewed the consolidated balance sheet as a depiction of assets and liabilities asso5

In his theory book Paton did not describe minority interest nor did he
address any consolidation issues vis-a-vis the entity theory. His ideas were extended to consolidation policies by Moonitz [1942].
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ciated with an affiliated group as though they belonged to a
single operating unit. Following Paton's argument, Moonitz
stated
In accordance with our fundamental premise, a consolidated balance sheet contains a list of the assets and
liabilities assignable to an affiliated group treated as a
single operating unit. The net worth or capital is therefore the net worth or capital of the whole group [1942,
pp. 241-2].
That is, the minority interest, like the controlling interest, provides net worth which is utilized to carry on the operating activities of the consolidated group. According to Moonitz, "minority interest serves as a reminder that complete community of
interest in the affiliated companies does not exist, and the divergence of interest must be recognized" [1942, p. 241]. Thus, net
worth should be divided between controlling and minority interest in order not to exaggerate the extent of the equity of the
controlling interest.
Position of the Committee on Accounting

Procedure

Although the AICPA has not taken an official stand on the
nature of minority interest, ARB 43 [1953] does provide support
for the entity concept. In Chapter 7, the following statement is
made: "The income of the corporation is determined as that of a
separate entity without regard to the equity of the respective
shareholders in such income" [Section B, par. 6]. This statem e n t is consistent with the entity theory position taken by
Paton and Littleton in 1940. Specifically, the corporation can be
viewed as "an institution separate and distinct from the parties
who furnish funds" [Paton and Littleton, 1940, p. 8].
On the other hand, ARB 51 states
The purpose of consolidated statements is to present, primarily for the benefit of the shareholders and creditors of
the parent company, the results of operations and the
financial position of a parent company and its subsidiaries essentially as if the group were a single company with
one or more branches or divisions" [par. 1].
No mention is made of where to place outside interests on the
balance sheet, but the above statement could provide support
for the "parent company" theory of equity which has been utilized to justify placement of minority interest outside of owners'
equity. If consolidated financial statements are prepared to benhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9
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efit parent company capital providers, then the consolidation
process merely sets forth the details of parent company investments. From the parent company perspective, consolidations
transform parent company financial statements and do not provide information which is relevant for minority interest decision-making.
The Origin of Parent Company

Theory

The parent company theory has evolved from the proprietary theory of equity, which in the corporate context has been
referred to as an association, or representative viewpoint. Husband described the corporation as " . . . a group of individuals
associated for the purpose of business enterprise, so organized
that its affairs are conducted through representatives" [1938, p.
242]. He argued that although stockholders do not have legal
title to corporate assets, they are proprietors because their equity changes in response to the incurrence of corporate income.
Consequently, stockholders are proprietors. They possess title in
equity. In a later paper, Husband expanded his arguments and
referred to the corporation as an agency organization which
operates for the benefit of the common stockholder entrepreneur [Husband, 1954]. Although Husband referred to his theory
as an association, or representative viewpoint, it is consistent
with the proprietary theory of equity in which the corporation is
seen as an association of entrepreneurs [Li, 1960, p. 258].
Husband did not address the issue of the nature of minority
interest. Although he referred to consolidated statements, no
attempt was made to link the development of the proprietary
theory to the early propositions that minority interest is not
appropriately considered a part of owners' equity. As a result,
the early concepts of "outside interests" and the proprietary
theory were developed independently of each other. Conversely,
early concepts of minority interest as owners' equity were linked
to the entity concept and arguments of proponents have relied
upon the development of and implications inherent in the entity
concept.
POSITIONS TAKEN IN THE 1960s
Those Based on the Entity Theory
During the 1960s, the entity concept was expanded upon,
b u t little new was said about implications for minority interest.
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Moonitz continued to defend the entity concept and argued that
minority interest clearly reflects proprietary ownership because
there is no obligation to pay anything to minority shareholders
[1960, p. 46]. Sapienza [1960] agreed and proposed that minority interest be presented in the balance sheet as a special class
of stockholders.
In 1964, an AAA Committee was charged to explore the
depth and significance of the entity concept. The ensuing AAA
report concluded that the role of the entity concept should be to
serve as a guide for determining what information should be
reported to users [AAA, 1965, p. 358]. The report stated that
consolidated financial statements are prepared primarily for
parent company stockholders (a position which is consistent
with that taken by the AICPA in ARB 51). Those stockholders
are interested in information about investments in subsidiary
companies. However, because the essence of the reporting entity is that its existence is separable from any view on how to
report, "the concept does not dictate solutions to the valuation
and disclosure problems arising from business combinations"
[AAA, 1965, p. 367].
On the surface, the 1965 AAA report appeared to support
the entity concept, but narrowed it from that envisioned by
Moonitz and Paton and Littleton. Instead of the economic unit
being regarded as the corporation itself, the emphasis that consolidated statements are prepared primarily for the p a r e n t
company's stockholders appeared to redefine the entity concept
in terms of the primary user of published financial statements.
In essence, this new definition could be seen as a relabeling of
Husband's proprietary theory, and as such could be interpreted
as providing support for the 1938 AAA "outside interests" position. However, like its predecessor committees, the 1965 AAA
committee report did not specifically address minority interest.
Minority Interest, As a Separate and Distinct

Equity

Writing prior to the 1965 AAA report, Smolinski [1963] described minority interest as a "unique" interest. He said that it is
neither a liability nor an item of owners' equity. Rather, minority interest "is an interest in only one unit of the consolidated
entity, and any rights which it has, are rights to the net assets of
this unit" [Smolinski, 1963, p. 167]. In other words, majority
stockholders, not minority stockholders have a claim to the total
consolidated net assets. This view has apparently been shared
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9
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by a large number of consolidated entities, because historically,
a majority of companies have reported minority interest between debt and stockholders' equity [See for example,
Campbell, 1962, p. 99 and FASB, 1991, p. 21].
POSITIONS TAKEN IN THE 1970s
Expansion of the Entity Concept
Hendriksen [1970] favored a return of the entity concept to
encompass like consideration of all equity providers as envisioned by Paton and Littleton and Moonitz. He pointed out that
the stated objective of ARB 51 was to view the reporting enterprise as a single economic unit, but at the same time emphasized the interests of the parent company's shareholders.
Hendriksen stated
If the entire enterprise is really one economic unit, all
interested parties should be given equal consideration,
as in the enterprise theory; or the entity theory should
be expanded to include the entire economic entity
rather than merely the legal entity of the parent corporation [1970, p. 515].
Stated differently, Hendriksen felt that the entity concept as
described in official pronouncements was too narrowly defined
to encompass the true nature of economic entity. Limiting the
reporting entity to the parent company has resulted in treating
minority shareholders as outsiders, in the same manner as liabilities. Nevertheless, both majority and minority stockholders
provide equity capital to the entire enterprise. Hence, minority
interest should be accorded treatment similar to that of the parent company's stockholders.
International Accounting Standards
In 1972, the Accountants International Study Group, which
was associated with the AICPA and similar bodies in other
countries, reported on the results of a study regarding the nature of consolidated financial statements. The report favored the
"parent company" concept which it described as one which
views consolidated financial statements as an extension of the
parent company statements. As such, the consolidation process
simply replaces the parent company's investment account with
the individual assets and liabilities underlying that investment.
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W h e n this occurs, minority shareholders are considered an outside group.
The study group report stated that the predominant practice in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom is to
show the minority interest as a separate item outside stockholders' equity. The report concluded that this practice is appropriate. It did not state whether minority interest should be reported as a liability or be placed in a separate category between
liabilities and stockholders' equity. However, to state that it
should be reported as a separate item could be interpreted as
supporting the latter position. The subsequent pronouncement
(International Accounting Standard No. 3) officially affirmed the
position taken by the study group. That is, minority interest is
not an element of stockholders' equity and should be shown as a
separate item.
Minority Interest As a Standing Source of Capital
Scott [1979] was critical of placing minority interest in a
separate category. He described placement of items such as minority interest between liabilities and stockholders' equity as
"items, seemingly adrift in a 'no man's l a n d ' " [Scott, 1979, p.
758].
Instead, Scott proposed that the classification of equities
should depend on whether or not they provide p e r m a n e n t
sources of capital. He argued that the going concern assumption negates the relevance of dividing equities between liabilities
and owners' equity. Accordingly, such a division is based upon
legal claims which are not resorted to under normal circumstances [Scott, 1979, p. 759]. Scott stated that sources of capital
should be divided between transitory sources and standing
sources. Because contributions of majority and minority stockholders are relatively permanent, both should be classified as
standing sources of capital.
RECENT VIEWS
No Reporting of Minority

Interest

A recent argument holds that because there is no consensus
on the nature of minority interest, parent company stockholders
would be better served if no minority interest was reported at
all. Rosenfield and Rubin [1985] commented that minority interest does not fit neatly into any balance sheet category. Prohttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9
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portional consolidation, in which the parent company reports
only its proportionate share of the items reported by a subsidi a r y , w a s d e s c r i b e d as h a v i n g a p p e a l i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
[Rosenfield and Rubin, 1985, p. 95]. Although both authors appear to believe that minority interest should not be reported in
consolidated financial statements, their 1986 article presented
opposing views on how not to do so.
According to Rosenfield, a new view of equity is needed. He
argued that consolidated financial statements should continue
to reflect the total assets and liabilities of the parent and subsidiary. But, the residual represents the combined interest of majority and minority stockholders in the consolidated reporting
entity itself and is therefore, the entity's equity in its own assets.
The implication is that consolidated entities should report only
one a m o u n t — the residual [Rosenfield and Rubin, 1986, p. 84].
This view is consistent with Husband's description of the entity
concept as providing a rationale for disclosing stockholder
claims as equity [1954, p. 556]. Another name given to the
Rosenfield view is contemporary theory (see Beams below).
Rubin countered, stating that Rosenfield's approach would
still include minority interest in stockholders' equity. Hence it
would still be disclosed, but camouflaged. He proposed that "the
only sound way to exclude amounts that relate to minority
stockholdings from the numbers column is to exclude all such
amounts, and the only way to do that is through proportional
consolidation" [Rosenfield and Rubin, 1986, p. 88]. The contention is that when a subsidiary's voting stock is acquired, the
parent obtains the right to receive a pro-rata share of dividends,
w h e n declared. This pro-rata claim implies t h a t only the
parent's pro-rata share of the subsidiary's assets and liabilities is
relevant information to parent company stockholders. Hence,
proportional consolidation provides relevant information to the
primary users of consolidated statements, present and prospective parent company investors.
The FASB's View
Like its predecessors, the Committee on Accounting Procedure and the Accounting Principles Board, the FASB has yet to
take an official stand on the nature of minority interest. Nevertheless, the Board has described minority interest as an example
of a financial statement item which fits the definition of equi-
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ties, rather than liabilities. Reflecting the view of Moonitz, SFAC
No. 6 [1985] states
Minority interests in net assets of consolidated subsidiaries do not represent present obligations of the enterprise to pay cash or distribute other assets to minority
stockholders. Rather, these stockholders have ownership or residual interests in a consolidated enterprise
[par. 254].
In the recent Discussion Memorandum, Distinguishing between Liability and Equity Instruments and Accounting for Instruments with Characteristics of Both, the FASB reiterated the
position that minority interest does not meet current definitions
of liabilities and thus must be an equity interest [FASB, 1990,
par. 16]. The Board acknowledged that "Advocates of the parent
company concept, however, generally take the position that a
minority interest is a liability or perhaps that it is neither a
liability nor equity" [FASB, 1990, par. 16]. The Discussion
Memorandum went on to say that the issue of the nature of
minority interest is being addressed as a part of the entity
project.
SFAS No. 94 determined that, unless control was clearly
lacking, all majority owned subsidiaries should be consolidated.
The standard amends ARB 51, but does not change the stated
objective of consolidated financial statements. When discussing
the basis for its conclusions, the Board stated that "Those who
invest in the parent company of an affiliated group of corporations invest in the whole group, which constitutes the enterprise
that is a potential source of cash flows to them as a result of
their investment" [SFAS No. 94, Appendix B, 1987, par. 34].
This means that consolidated financial statements provide relevant information to parent company investors in accordance
with the objectives of financial reporting as outlined in SFAC
No. I [SFAS No. 94, Appendix B, 1987, par. 35]. At the same
time, the reference to investing in "the whole group" could be
interpreted as implying that parent company stockholders provide capital for the economic entity, an entity concept perspective.
The FASB's 1991 consolidation procedures DM presented
and discussed the pros and cons of alternative views of consolidation theory and the nature of minority interest. Based on
paragraph 1 of ARB 51, the Board defined consolidated financial statements as
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9
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A set of financial statements that presents, primarily
for the benefit of the shareholders and creditors of the
parent company, the combined assets, liabilities, revenues, expenses, gains, losses, and cash flows of a parent and those of its subsidiaries that satisfy the criteria
established for consolidation [1991, par. 61].
The wording of the definition retains the parent company focus
of ARB 51 while allowing the flexibility to include alternative
consolidation criteria. The Board acknowledged that issues being addressed and those to be addressed in subsequent FASB
releases may result in redefinitions or even new categories of
the elements of financial statements. Hence, it is unclear just
what position, if any, will emerge.
Legal Claims
According to SFAC No. 6, "liabilities and equities are mutually exclusive claims to or interests in the enterprise's assets by
entities other than the enterprise, and liabilities take precedence
over ownership interests" [1985, par. 54]. This statement implies that the classification of minority interest should be unambiguous. Minority interest is either an equity or a liability interest. Classification between liabilities and stockholders' equity
does not qualify as an element of financial statements.
The FASB determined that equity is an "ownership interest"
which is "enhanced or burdened by increases and decreases in
net assets from nonowner sources as well as investments by
owners and distributions to owners" [SFAC No. 6, 1985, par 62].
Assets and liabilities can be independently defined and measured [Hendriksen, 1970, p. 495]. But, the value of equity is
affected by operations and the income of the enterprise. Unlike
liabilities, "no class of equity carries an unconditional right to
receive future transfers of assets from the enterprise except in
liquidation, and then only after liabilities have been satisfied"
[SFAC No. 6, 1985, par. 62].
There is no question that majority stockholdings fit the
definition of equity. A strong case can be made that minority
stockholdings do also. Minority interest is affected by investments, dividends and earnings of the subsidiary entity. Their
only claim to corporate assets is residual in nature. Like the
majority, minority interest does not represent a present obligation to distribute corporate resources. Future receipt of corpoPublished by eGrove, 1993
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rate assets is contingent upon the declaration of dividends or
liquidation.
Nevertheless, while majority stockholders control and have
an ownership interest in the combined entity, the minority
interest's residual claim is limited to the net assets of the
subsidiary's segment of the combined entity. Moreover, their
segment of the consolidated group is controlled by the parent
company. They may participate in policy decisions of the subsidiary, but cannot control them. Hence, from the minority
stockholders' perspective, a noncontrolling interest in the consolidated entity is unlike that of the majority.
Positions Taken in Recent Text Books
The inability of official bodies to decide what to do with
minority interest is reflected in current advanced accounting
text books. Like their early counterparts, some textbooks classify minority interest as a liability, some as a part of stockholders' equity, and some as neither. Others present alternative
views but express no preference. 6
Fischer, Taylor and Leer [1990] stress entity theory. They
define and measure minority interest as an equity interest and
include it in stockholders' equity. Heufner and Largay concur,
stating
We believe that the minority interest problem is one of
disclosure of the fact that not all of S's shares are held
internally. Since the resources controlled by the consolidated entity relate to both the majority and minority stockholders, in consolidation both sets of interests
m u s t be treated consistently. In our view, minority
shareholders may be viewed as shareholders in the consolidated entity even though their interest is limited to
part of the consolidated entity. Therefore it is our view
t h a t the a m o u n t assigned to the minority interest
should be included as a separate item within consolidated stockholders' equity [1992, p. 181].
Larsen [1991] takes the opposite view. He argues that minority shareholders are a special class of creditors. This position
6
For example, Hoyle [1991] and Griffin, Williams, Boatsman, and Vickrey,
[1991] do not express a preference for a particular consolidation approach, nor
do they appear to prefer any one method of presenting minority interest in
consolidated financial statements.
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is buttressed by the argument that minority shareholders typically do not exercise ownership control whatsoever.
Pahler and Mori [1991] assert that the consolidation process has no impact upon the reporting entity. Therefore, " . . .
consolidated financial statements are usually of no benefit
whatsoever to the minority shareholders" [Pahler and Mori,
1991, p. 212], and minority interest should not be a part of
stockholders' equity. At the same time, reporting minority interest as a liability has little or no theoretical support. Rather,
minority interest ". . . is an equity interest, but not of the parent
company, which is the reporting entity" [Pahler and Mori, 1991,
p. 211]. Pahler and Mori conclude that reporting minority interest between liabilities and stockholders' equity reflects its
unique nature.
Beams [1991] states that neither entity theory nor parent
company theory are consistently followed in practice. He describes a third theory which he calls contemporary theory [pp.
437-439]. Contemporary theory is described as a merging of the
two equity theories. Like parent company theory, contemporary
theory identifies the primary user as common stockholders of
the parent company. At the same time, the financial statements
present the financial position and results of operations of a
single business entity. Minority interest is reported as a part of
stockholders' equity but is not reported as a separate amount.
Contemporary theory is consistent with the position taken by
Rosenfield [Rosenfield and Rubin, 1986]; with the 1965 AAA
Committee's definition of the entity concept; and with the purpose of consolidated financial statements set forth in ARB 51
(which was reaffirmed in the appendix to SFAS No. 94).
Current Accounting

Practice

Lack of agreement on a theory of consolidation and a consistent treatment of the nature of minority interest is reflected
in current accounting practice. A sample of 100 industrial companies which reported minority interest in their balance sheets
in 1990 was drawn from Compustat. Company balance sheets
on Compustat Corporate Text were scanned for the placement
of minority interest. Of the 100 companies, only 11 reported
minority interest as an element of stockholders' equity. Twentyone companies added minority interest to liabilities. Twenty-five
companies placed minority interest between stockholders' equity and a subtotal for liabilities. The remaining 43 companies
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listed minority interest above stockholders' equity, but did not
subtotal the preceding liabilities. In this context, minority interest appears to be indistinguishable from liabilities. It appears
that the preparer is content to allow the user to decide whether
to include minority interest with liabilities when conducting financial statement analyses. It is clear that practice has not conformed to the FASB's definition of minority interest in SFAC
No. 6. However, it is not clear whether practitioners view minority interest as a liability or a separate unclassified item.
SUMMARY
This paper traced the development and discussion of concepts regarding the nature of minority interest from the views
which appeared in the literature during the early 1900s through
1991. Current views which have appeared in recent journal articles and text books and in current accounting practice were
also examined.
Concepts of minority interest are tied directly to the evolution of theories of corporate equity. The review has shown that
entity theorists originally perceived corporate reporting as reflecting the legal entity of the corporate enterprise. It follows
that all claims to corporate assets should receive the same treatment. Under this concept, minority interests would be treated in
a m a n n e r similar to majority stockholdings.
As the entity theory evolved, its definition was narrowed to
take a user oriented approach which is consistent with the contemporary theory as described by Beams. Accordingly, consolidated financial statements are prepared primarily for the parent
company's stockholders, but because they report the consolidated companies as a single economic entity, the residual equity
includes both minority and majority interest in the consolidated
net assets.
The parent company concept evolved from the representative viewpoint proposed by Husband. The parent company concept is consistent with the proprietary theory of equity which
holds that a corporation's primary responsibility is to provide a
return to its common stockholders — the corporate entrepreneurs. For the consolidated entity, corporate entrepreneurs are
t h e p a r e n t company's c o m m o n stockholders, not minority
stockholders. Hence, minority interest is an outside interest and
should not be reported as an element of stockholders' equity.
Proponents have used this theory to argue that minority interest
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is a liability, and that it should be presented in its own special
category, even for proportional reporting wherein no minority
interest is reported at all.
The evolution has led to no conclusion on the issue of the
nature of minority interest. The FASB has taken no stand. Nor
is there any consensus in the literature on the appropriateness
of any one position.
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INTERNAL CONTROL: HOW IT
EVOLVED IN FOUR ENGLISHSPEAKING COUNTRIES
Abstract: The concept of internal control, as embodied in auditing
standards and other statements by professional accounting bodies,
has varied over time and geographically. There are, however, a number of similarities in the events that shaped professional statements
concerned with internal control in the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.
The evolution of internal control has been influenced by increasing
public expectations of auditing standards. Another influence was a
trend in the evolution of management control concepts towards recognizing a broader range of influences on the control of organizations: These trends have been opposed by auditors, who wished to
avoid increasing their responsibilities.

Recent discussions of internal control in accounting and
management literature have concerned aspects of control that
go beyond simple checking procedures. For example, Thompson
[1967], Ouchi and Maguire [1975], Ouchi [1977, 1979, 1980,
1981], Boland and Pondy [1983], Mintzberg [1983], and Macintosh [1985] discuss complex models of control that consider
h u m a n factors. The history of the changes in models of control
was described by Parker [1986a, 1986b, 1986c]. A similar trend
towards recognizing a wider view of control has also developed
in auditing. This trend is reflected in professional auditing standards, for example, in the development of terms such as "control environment".
This paper presents the results of a study that examines and
compares the evolution of internal control in statements by professional accountancy bodies in the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. Internal control, as embodied
in auditing standards and other statements by professional acAn earlier version of part of this paper was presented at the conference of
Accounting Association of Australia and New Zealand, Perth, Western Australia,
in 1990. The author appreciated the direction and support given by Roger
Juchau and the professional guidance of Dave Goodwin.
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counting bodies, has varied from country to country, and has
been modified at different times, but has resulted in professional statements that are all quite similar. This study looks at
why changes in the professional promulgations concerning internal control occurred. The origin of these professional statements, and the causes of changes to them are examined by referring to professional journals and other materials published at
the time these changes took place.
The statements about internal control by professional bodies are of particular relevance now, since further changes are
being considered, particularly in the United States. Following a
recommendation by the Treadway Commission, the Committee
of Sponsoring Organizations of the Commission is examining
the issue of internal control and developing new definitions
[COSO, 1991]. It is likely that these new standards will influence
those adopted in other English-speaking countries, as U.S. auditing pronouncements have previously influenced the developments in other countries. That influence is discussed later in the
paper.
The professional statements of the American Institute of
Accountants and its successor, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, are examined in this study, because the
accounting profession in the United States was influential in the
evolution of internal control. The United Kingdom, Australia
and New Zealand are also included in this study because the
auditing profession is well-established there. These countries
adopted auditing statements concerning internal control later
t h a n in the U.S. In addition, influence of statements by the International Auditing Practices Committee of the International
Federation of Accountants, and the status of internal control in
other select countries are examined briefly in this study.
Internal control was first included in professional statements in the 1920s and 1930s, but most of the developments
have taken place in the 1950s and later. As a result, the paper
examines the period from 1949 (when the American Institute of
Accountants issued its definition of internal control) to 1988,
w h e n the 1949 definition was superseded. However, earlier
sources are considered where appropriate.
The research question, "how did internal control evolve?" is
applied to auditing promulgations in each country by analyzing
it into the following sub-points:
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How was internal control defined in professional statements?
How did it change during the period [1949-1988]?
What influences on the professional statements about internal control were reported?
Information about each sub-point is examined with respect
to the major changes in professional statements concerning internal control for each country. Used in this study are the professional accounting journals of each country along with other
sources, such as auditing textbooks, which have been used by
previous studies of auditing history [e.g. Brown, 1962; Hackett
and Mobley, 1976; Myers, 1985].
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Previous studies of the history of internal control include
Hackett and Mobley [1976] and Bintinger [1986]. These studies
were concerned with developments within the United States.
They concentrated on developments following the promulgation
of the definition set out in 1949 [AIA, 1949], and the subsequent
"clarification of the previous definition" which divided internal
control into accounting controls and administrative controls.
Trends identified by previous studies of auditing history in
general are also relevant. Dirsmith and McAllister [1982, p. 218]
noted that changes in published auditing doctrines were frequently related to action external to the profession, which in
t u r n reflected changes in society's expectations concerning the
profession. The history of auditing was depicted by Lee [1988,
p. xxiii] as taking place against a background of constant resistance by audit practitioners to expanding the auditor's duty of
care and skill. A long-standing trend for auditors to reduce emphasis on fraud detection, established since the 1890s, was also
identified by Lee [1988, p. xxvi], and Moyer [1951, p. 7]. Myers
[1985] perceived that audit procedures developed in a pattern
which he called "spiralling upwards". He suggested that there is
a general trend whereby auditing procedures apparently repeat
earlier stages of their development. This pattern does not, however, represent a simple reversal of earlier changes, since at
each stage of the cycle a more sophisticated approach is taken.
Changes in management theories of control have also indirectly influenced the evolution of internal control. The broad
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definition of internal control discussed below [AIA, 1949] was
consistent with the classical model of management control that
was then current. In 1949, the authoritative literature on management principles was largely based on "scientific management" and the work of Fayol [1916] and Taylor [1916] (according to Parker [1986a, p. 77]). Parker [1986a] noted that the control models of Taylor and Fayol "have little regard to the h u m a n
dimension of control". As a reaction to scientific management
and the classical model, the "behavioral model" developed
[Parker, 1986a]. The recent definition of "internal control structure" appears to reflect the view that other factors (such as management philosophy) influence the control of an organization,
in addition to management's system of authority. This is in accordance with the behavioral model of management control
[e.g. Ouchi, 1980; Mintzberg, 1983; Macintosh, 1985].
THE UNITED STATES
The United States was the first country to introduce professional guidance on internal control. Internal control started to
become significant to auditors in the United States early in the
twentieth century [Staub, 1904, p. 98; Vincent, 1952, p. 3;
Brown, 1962, p. 699; Myers, 1985, p. 69]. Its importance was
associated with American audit procedures, which were beginning to develop independently from those used by the British
profession. In particular, procedures became oriented to financial reporting rather than to fraud detection [Moyer, 1951, p. 7;
Brown, 1962].
In 1936, the American Institute of Accountants defined "internal check and control" as:
Those measures and methods adopted within the organization itself to safeguard the cash and other assets of
the company as well as to check the clerical aspects of
the book-keeping [AIA, 1951].
The statement which included this definition was a formulation of what was generally accepted in 1936, and was not an
attempt to change existing procedures, according to the expert
witnesses in the SEC's hearings into the McKesson and Robbins
case [Edwards, 1960, p. 165].
The Institute subsequently published more authoritative auditing standards, partly as a result of the Securities and Exchange Commission's report into the McKesson and Robbins
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case [AIA, 1951, p. 4; Berryman, 1960, p. 76; Hackett and
Mobley, 1976, p. 4]. These were published as a tentative statement in 1947 and "lost their tentative status" after a vote of
Institute members in 1948. The standards included a requirement for a "proper study and evaluation of internal control"
[AIA, 1947, p. 16].
This requirement in the standards was then supplemented
by a definition from the AIA's Committee on Auditing Procedure. The Committee's definition of internal control, (which
stood for another 39 years) was:
Internal control comprises the plan of organization and
all of the co-ordinate methods and measures adopted
within a business to safeguard its assets, check the accuracy and reliability of its accounting data, promote
operational efficiency, and encourage adherence to prescribed managerial policies [AIA, 1949, p. 6].
The 1949 definition extended internal control to include the
objectives concerned with operational efficiency and with prescribed managerial policies. It represented a concept of control
which was considerably broader than the previous professional
statement.
The 1949 statement coincided with an upsurge in accountants' interest in internal control which resulted from both economic developments and changes in audit techniques. Previous
studies of the history of auditing reported that internal control
had become important as a result of failures and flaws in auditing procedures which were revealed by the McKesson and
Robbins case [Berryman, 1960; Hackett and Mobley, 1976]. A
m u c h wider range of other causes was indicated by a review of
c o n t e m p o r a r y sources. Internal control was described as a
means of assisting auditors [AIA, 1949, p. 6; Jennings, 1953, p.
38; Bevis, 1955, p. 46]. It was recognized that the "detailed audit" — a test of all transactions — was no longer cost-effective
[Cranstoun, 1948, p. 274; Sprague, 1956, p. 55]. Reliance on
internal control was now possible because systems of internal
control were now generally more effective [Jennings, 1953, p.
38] because business organizations had recently become larger
[Jennings, 1950, p. 192] and more complex [Cobb, 1952, p. 341].
Bevis [1955, p. 46] attributed the increased concern with internal control to the change in the objective of auditing from detection of fraud and error to reporting on the overall reliability
of the financial statements. World War II was also an influence,
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since it led to a shortage of audit personnel to do detailed testing [AIA, 1942, p. 119].
The internal control definition published in 1949 was criticized later by Byrne [1957] and Levy [1957] who suggested that
it caused misunderstanding about the extent of auditor responsibility and that it could increase the legal liability of auditors.
Grady [1957], (chairman of the Committee on Auditing Procedure when the statement Internal Control was published in
1949), responded in support of the definition. In 1958, the definition was narrowed; another statement divided internal control
into two parts: accounting controls and administrative controls.
The Committee on Auditing Procedure went on to state that an
auditor is primarily concerned with accounting controls, "because they bear directly on the reliability of the financial data,"
[AICPA, 1958, p. 67]. The objectives that had been added in
1949 to the early definition ("to promote operational efficiency"
and "to encourage adherence to prescribed managerial policies") were reclassified as administrative controls, which were
not seen as part of an auditor's primary responsibility.
The "clarification" was a reaction to the new, broad definition published in 1949. When AIA members had adopted auditing standards in 1948, and included a requirement for a "proper
study and evaluation of internal control," internal control was
narrowly defined. When the later broad definition was added in
1949, the standard resulted in an expansion of auditors' duties.
The 1958 clarification restored the status quo. It also appears
that evaluation of internal control in accordance with the broad
definition had not been applied in practice (according to a survey of auditing firms [Vincent, 1952]).
The definition was modified again in 1973. The AICPA revised the distinction between accounting control and administrative control (singular, not "controls" as in the earlier version).
One objective of internal control, the "safeguarding of assets,"
was narrowed to "the procedures and records that are concerned with safeguarding assets". Mautz and Winjum [1981, pp.
9-11] suggested that the AICPA's main intention was to reduce
further the scope of internal control. Other authorities emphasized the new definition's broadening effects. Loebbecke [1975,
p. 83] suggested that all controls need to be examined to determine whether they have an impact on the financial statements.
In 1977, a requirement for corporations to comply with the
AICPA's [1973] definition of internal accounting control was
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passed into law. There had been a public outcry over findings
(first identified by the Watergate special prosecutor's office) that
more t h a n 400 companies had made questionable or illegal payments totalling more than $300 million. The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act was intended to use accepted accounting terminology in a requirement that would prevent "off-the-books slush
funds and bribes" [SEC, 1979, p. 610].
This development was followed by a report, from an advisory committee of the AICPA, which revived the broader concept of internal control. The report of the Special Advisory Committee on Internal Accounting Control used the term "internal
accounting control environment" [AICPA, 1979, p. 2]. This included factors such as organizational structure and leadership
from top management, both believed to lead to appropriate
"control consciousness" [AICPA, 1979, p. 2, Cook and Kelley
1979, p . 62].
The 1980s led to further changes in the AICPA's requirements for internal control evaluation, including explicit broadening of the definition of internal control. The changes were,
again, partly due to public concern about auditing standards.
The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
(Treadway Commission) was set up in 1985 by the AICPA and
other accounting organizations. The Commission commented
that some instances of fraudulent financial reporting involved
transactions "under management's direct control and not part
of the system of internal accounting controls" [National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 1987, pp. 29-30].
In 1988, the AICPA replaced the definition of internal control with a new, broader description of "internal control structure." This was defined (in Statement on Auditing Standards 55)
as "the policies and procedures established to provide reasonable assurance that specific entity objectives will be achieved."
[AICPA, 1988, p. 4].
The statement also changed the generally accepted auditing
standard concerning internal control. The previous requirement
for "a proper study and evaluation" of internal control was replaced with "a sufficient understanding of the internal control
structure" [AICPA, 1988, p. 3].
The change from using the expression "a proper study and
evaluation" to "a sufficient understanding" was not intended to
imply that a reduced scope was now required. The rationale for
t h e changes was explained by AICPA office-holders as "to
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broaden the auditor's responsibility to consider internal control
when planning" [Guy and Sullivan, 1988, p. 38], and as "expanding the auditor's responsibility for determining how internal control works" [Temkin and Winters, 1988, p. 86].
Developments are still taking place. The accounting institutions which sponsored the Treadway report recently issued a
draft report that provides "integrated guidance" on internal control [Committee of Sponsoring Organizations, 1991; Journal of
Accountancy 1991].
To summarize, the United States was the first country in
which the audit profession developed a definition of internal
control and a standard regarding auditors' examination of it.
Developments in the United States were distinctive because
more statements concerned with internal control were issued,
and there were more changes of approach. Initially, in 1936, a
narrow definition of internal control, consistent with existing
practice, was adopted. It was replaced by a broad definition, in
1949, that was more consistent with a management definition of
"control". After resistance by the profession, the scope of internal control as it concerned auditors was narrowed again in
1958. A revision in 1973 is regarded somewhat equivocally.
More recent pronouncements, including the changes to the auditing standards in 1988 and the continuing work of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations, are seen by AICPA officials
as broadening the definition of internal control once more.
THE UNITED KINGDOM
Auditing procedures evolved differently in the United Kingd o m from the developments in the United States. Under the
companies legislation in the United Kingdom, auditors did not
report on the profit and loss account until 1948 [Chastney,
1975, p. 12; Briston and Perks, 1977, p. 59]. As a result, there
appears to have been less concern with internal control [Lee,
1988, p. xix].
References to internal control in British professional journals were relatively infrequent before the 1960s, and were not
based on binding professional standards. Lawson [1951] and
Taylor [1954], however, indicated that some British auditors did
rely on internal control. In 1953, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) published a statement discussing internal audit, which included references to internal control and internal check [ICAEW, 1953]. It included a
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broad definition of internal control, which was later developed
further by the British profession:
Internal control is best regarded as including the whole
system of controls, financial and otherwise, established
by the management in the conduct of the business, including internal audit, internal check and other forms
of control.
Although the terminology used was different from the AIA
[1949] definition, it was a broad definition with a similar meaning. There was still no binding audit standard requiring audit
examination of internal control.
In 1961, the ICAEW issued a more general Statement on
Auditing [ICAEW, 1961]. This statement was issued "for guidance" and did not claim to be an authoritative auditing standard. The statement recommended that auditors "make a critical review of the system of book-keeping, accounting and internal control." The definition of internal control appeared to be a
combination of the previous ICAEW definition and the American Institute's [ 1949] definition:
By "internal control" is meant not only internal check
and internal audit but the whole system of controls,
financial and otherwise, established by the management in order to carry on the business of the company
in an orderly manner, safeguard its assets and secure as
far as possible the accuracy and reliability of its records
[ICAEW, 1961, p. 242].
Internal control was an innovation for some British auditors. Waldron [1961, p. 718] suggested that some practitioners
"may be regretfully shaking their heads" because the statement's
advice on audit procedures was not appropriate for them.
In 1964, the ICAEW issued a further Statement on Auditing
[ICAEW, 1965] which dealt specifically with internal control. It
repeated the earlier [ICAEW, 1961] definition of internal control. The statement was described as primarily concerned with
financial and accounting control:
That is, those matters which relate to the custody and
control of the company's assets and the recording of its
transactions [ICAEW, 1965, p. 234].
This concept of control approximated that covered by "accounting controls" in the AICPA's [1958] clarification of the
definition.
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The subsequent adoption of auditing standards in the UK
was preceded by public concern about auditing procedures. In
1976 and 1977, there was severe criticism of auditors and audit
procedures in news reports and Parliamentary proceedings, following company failures such as the collapse of London and
County Securities Limited in 1976 [Hay Davison, 1977, p. 84;
Briston and Perks, 1977, p. 59]. As Hay Davison put it, the UK
was "the last among the great accounting countries of the world
to introduce auditing standards." [Hay Davison, 1977, p. 91]. (A
p a r t n e r in a major audit firm advised Stamp and Moonitz
[1978, p. 67] that the international accounting firms already
sought to follow the auditing standards of the AICPA.)
Subsequently, the Consultative Committee of Accountancy
Bodies (CCAB) published a set of auditing standards, after extensive consultation [The Accountant, 1980, p. 592]. The CCAB
included the three Institutes of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, Scotland and Ireland, together with other bodies such as the Association of Certified Accountants.
The draft of the standard included a requirement for the
auditor to "ascertain, evaluate and test the operation of any
internal control on which he wishes to place reliance". According to Woolf [1980, p. 63], this paragraph caused problems for
practicing auditors. He suggested that its tone and position in
the standards indicated to auditors that internal control was
being given more emphasis than audit evidence, and that "systems-based auditing" was to be a requirement. After submissions by a u d i t practitioners, the s t a n d a r d s were modified
slightly to imply a less demanding requirement:
If the auditor wishes to place any reliance on internal
controls, he should ascertain and evaluate those controls and perform compliance tests on their operation
[CCAB, 1980, p. 3.101].
Detailed auditing guidelines were published at the same
time as the auditing standards. The guidelines included a definition of an internal control system and internal controls:
An internal control system is defined as being the
whole system of controls, financial and otherwise, established by the management in order to carry on the
business of the enterprise in an orderly and efficient
m a n n e r , ensure adherence to management policies,
safeguard the assets and secure as far as possible the
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completeness and accuracy of the records [CCAB, 1980,
p. 3.204].
This definition was similar to the ICAEW's 1961 definition.
It was no longer considered necessary to include a reference to
"internal check and internal audit" being included as part of
internal control. The remaining objective, efficiency, was added
after being used in the American standard [AIA, 1949].
Although the United Kingdom developed its own definition
of i n t e r n a l control, this b e c a m e increasingly close to the
AICPA's 1949 definition. Auditing standards were not adopted
until later than in the other three countries. When standards
were adopted, the standard concerned with internal control was
modified after the original proposal was criticized. The new requirement implied that less emphasis on evaluation of internal
control was required. This change appears to have allowed the
British profession to avoid the pressure to narrow the definition
of internal control that was present in the United States.
AUSTRALIA
Australia was the second of the four countries to issue a
professional promulgation requiring evaluation of internal control. However, the recommendation was, according to its author, based on practice in the United Kingdom, not on the
American auditing promulgations; yet, it did not follow any
British professional statement, and was to some extent at least
an indigenous development. Australia subsequently turned to
following the United States as its model.
The Australian Institute's first recommendation on auditing
practice was issued in 1951, and revised in 1954 and 1969
[Robertson, 1974, p. 4]. Gibson and Arnold [1981, pp. 53-60]
reported that professional auditing statements in Australia were
initially influenced by one person, Mr. F. E. Trigg (a partner in
Price Waterhouse). In 1942, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia asked him to prepare a paper including recommendations on auditing standards and practices. The recommendations in Trigg's paper eventually were adopted as standards by the Institute [ICAA, 1951]. The recommendation was
based on Trigg's understanding of English auditing procedures
(which had not yet been documented by the British professional
accountancy bodies). Trigg advised Gibson and Arnold [1981]
that the recommendation was "in no way" influenced by American auditing.
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The recommendation, published in 1951, required that "appraisal of the soundness of the accounting methods employed
and the effectiveness of the system of internal control" was an
essential duty, "which the auditor cannot escape" [ICAA, 1951,
p. 10]. No definition of internal control was provided; a narrow
approach was implied by references to internal control as the
"internal checking system." In addition, the purpose of internal
control was described as detecting fraud.
In 1954, a revised "Statement on General Professional Auditing Practice" was published [ICAA, 1954]. The requirements
concerned with internal control contained minor changes. The
statement now required that appraisal of internal control was
"essential to enable the auditor effectively to plan his work"
[ICAA, 1954, p. 10]. The reference to "the internal checking system" was replaced by "the system of internal control" [ICAA,
1954, p. 10], and there was still no definition of internal control.
At that time, the broader concept of internal control was
not shared by managers and practicing accountants. A study
conducted in 1953 [Savage, 1955, p. 363-4] found that Australian managers and accountants held a narrow view of internal
control. They associated it with checking of records, not with
the AIA's broad definition. The narrow view was consistent with
the ICAA's statements.
In 1969, a statement with only minor changes, again prepared by Trigg, was published [ICAA, 1969]. It was soon replaced, in 1974, by a completely new set of standards, this time
based on the AICPA's statements. Gibson and Arnold [1981] explained that this change from following a British to an American model was due to changes in trade and investment. The
United States had become a more important influence on the
Australian economy. In addition, existing standards of audit
practice had been criticized by the judge in the Pacific Acceptance case in 1969 [Chartered Accountant in Australia, 1974;
Robertson, 1974, p. 4]. Kenley [1975], however, described the
Australian statement as promulgating standards that already existed but which had not been codified.
The standards included a requirement for auditors to evaluate internal control:
An auditor must systematically evaluate the nature of
the client's business and system of internal control to
determine the nature, scope and timing of audit procedures to be used [ICAA, 1974, p. 5].
Published by eGrove, 1993

99

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 20 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 9

Hay: Internal Control: How It Evolved

91

The statement also made a distinction between accounting
controls a n d administrative controls, quoting the AICPA's
[1973] SAP 54.
The Australian Auditing Standards Committee, a joint body
supported by the Australian Society of Accountants as well as
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, reviewed
auditing standards again. This was done to satisfy the judge's
comments in the Pacific Acceptance case [Gibson and Arnold,
1981, p. 60], and because the public had higher, and increasing,
expectations of auditors [Kenley, 1977, p. 35]. The new standards [ICAA/ASA, 1977] again included a standard requiring
evaluation of internal control.
Subsequently, new standards were adopted based on international guidelines. Australian Auditing Standards now require
that:
Auditors shall gain an understanding of the accounting
system and related internal controls and shall study
and evaluate the operation of those internal controls
upon which they wish to rely in determining the nature, timing and extent of other audit procedures [Auditing S t a n d a r d s Board/Australian Accounting Research Foundation, 1983, p. 2012].
This standard resembles previous Australian statements in
its requirement that auditors must examine internal control; its
restriction to "the accounting system and related internal controls" provided a limitation to this requirement.
NEW ZEALAND
New Zealand, like Australia, based its internal control promulgations on oversea models. Again, the British profession
was initially the source of the professional pronouncements;
subsequently, United States promulgations were drawn on. The
influence from the United Kingdom was more direct than it had
been in Australia. Instead of describing English practice,
ICAEW statements were adapted. Later, AICPA auditing standards served as the model in New Zealand.
Evaluation of internal control and reliance on it, together
with a number of other modern developments in auditing practice, were recommended to New Zealand auditors at the New
Zealand Society of Accountants convention by Chapman [1950].
Comments from New Zealand auditors recorded with his published paper indicated that, at that time, some auditors did not
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accept that reliance on internal control would be feasible in the
smaller businesses found in New Zealand. Subsequent references to evaluation of internal control as a recommendation for
a u d i t o r s b e c a m e increasingly frequent in the 1950s [e.g.
Perkins, 1950; Dixon, 1950; Parry, 1952; NZSA, 1953; Stewart,
1954; Perkins, 1956; McCaw, 1958; Gilkison, 1959].
New Zealand auditing in the 1950s and 1960s followed the
approach that had been taken in the United Kingdom, both in
the statutory requirements for auditing, and professional recommendations. A requirement to audit the profit and loss account was not introduced until the Companies Act 1955 (modelled on the 1948 British Act) [Gilkison, 1962]. In 1962, the
ICAEW [1961] Statement on Auditing was reprinted in the Accountants' Journal, and this was followed by the publication of a
New Zealand Society of Accountants "Tentative Statement on
Auditing Practice" [NZSA, 1964]. The statement, "General Principles of Auditing", was based on the previous English statement, and included an identical definition of internal control.
In the 1960s, internal control seemed to be accepted by
some New Zealand auditors [e.g. Gilkison, 1962]. However,
Martin [1963, p. 218] noted that internal control questionnaires,
a n d other m e t h o d s of documenting controls, were not yet
widely used in New Zealand. Titter [1967a, p. 311] identified a
need for auditing standards to be codified because there was an
inconsistent pattern of auditing procedures. He also asked
"How many auditors today do not make an annual systematic
review and evaluation of internal control?" [Titter, 1967b, p.
350]. Titter implied that there were still many auditors who did
not conduct these procedures.
Subsequently, New Zealand auditing was influenced by its
American counterpart. Auditing Standards were adopted in
1973 [New Zealand Society of Accountants, 1973]; upon issuing
the standards, the Society expressed appreciation to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants for assistance that
had been provided by SAP 33 (a codification of AICPA Statements on Auditing Procedure). New Zealand Auditing Standards
required that:
There must be a proper study and evaluation of the
existing internal control procedures as a basis for determining the extent of tests to which auditing procedures
are to be restricted [NZSA, 1973, p. 354].
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This standard was a shortened version of the AIA [1947]
standard used in the United States. The standard [NZSA, 1973,
p. 356] also included a definition which was identical with the
American definition adopted in 1949 [AIA, 1949]. The distinction between "accounting controls" and "administrative controls" t h a t had been added to the U.S. definition in 1958
[AICPA, 1958] was not included in the New Zealand standard.
In 1974, the Society issued a Tentative Recommendation
on
Auditing Practice dealing specifically with internal control. The
recommendation [NZSA, 1974] acknowledged American, Canadian and British statements, but it included terms not included
in the professional promulgations of the other countries discussed previously. For example, it distinguished between two
levels of internal control. "First level" controls included authorization and personnel quality; "second level" controls included
the plan of organization and managerial supervision. These innovations never made it into the final pronouncement by the
Society. Statement RAP-7, Internal Control and the Nature and
Extent of Audit Tests was issued in December 1977 [NZSA,
1977]. The new recommendation was, again, based closely on
an overseas auditing statement: it repeated the American [AIA,
1949] definition of internal control.
Another set of New Zealand auditing standards was introduced as an exposure draft in 1984, and adopted in 1986. The
requirement concerning internal control [NZSA, 1986a, p. 22]
was drawn from International Auditing Guideline No. 3 [IAPC,
1980]. No definition of internal control was included in the
Standard, and concurrently the Society withdrew the previous
statement [NZSA, 1977], which had contained a definition. A
commentary [NZSA, 1986b] advised that a new guideline to replace the material on the nature of internal control in general
would be issued. This guideline has not yet been issued, and the
definition included in International Auditing Guideline No. 6 has
not yet been adopted by the NZSA either.
The New Zealand profession appears to have developed its
auditing standards (including its requirement regarding internal
control) out of a desire to ensure consistency with auditors elsewhere in the world. C h a p m a n [1950] suggested t h a t New
Zealand auditors should follow generally accepted auditing
standards based on overseas standards. Martin [1963] commented that speedier communications and the spread of inter-
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national groups of companies had caused an awareness among
New Zealand auditors that the New Zealand standards for auditing must be equal those of the United States, Great Britain
and Australia.
OTHER COUNTRIES
Although the four countries selected have had variations in
their auditing histories, they have a common language and
somewhat similar accounting professions. What of other countries? Information from other countries does not indicate that
the evolution of internal control has been substantially different. In non English-speaking countries, the AICPA (and later the
IAPC) has been the predominant influence on the development
of auditing standards and other professional pronouncements
[Stamp and Moonitz, 1978; Creamer, 1987]. In Canada, the remaining country with a large and influential auditing profession, the professional body's auditing statements are similar to
those in the countries examined above [CICA, 1979, p. 5200.05;
Etherington and Gordon, 1985].
According to Stamp and Moonitz [1978], the international
accounting firms were also influential in encouraging the use of
AICPA s t a n d a r d s in other countries. They noted t h a t the
AICPA's statements (or a literal translation of them) were in use
in Brazil as well as most other Latin American countries, and in
Israel and the Philippines; in addition, the international accounting firms in Japan practiced in accordance with U.S. standards [Stamp and Moonitz, 1978, p. 110].
International Auditing Guidelines were introduced in 1979,
after Stamp and Moonitz [1978, p. 145] had previously recommended the adoption of a set of international auditing standards under the auspices of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). IFAC announced that the guidelines were to
be promulgated by the International Auditing Practices Committee. The statement concerned with internal control, International Auditing Guideline No. 3, Basic Principles Governing an
Audit [IAPC, 1980], included similar material to the AICPA's
auditing standards. As discussed above, it has directly influenced auditing statements in Australia and New Zealand.
Creamer [1987, p. 92] reported that International Auditing
Guidelines h a d now been adopted by most other countries.

Published by eGrove, 1993

103

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 20 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 9
Hay: Internal Control: How It Evolved

95

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This analysis showed that, during the period 1947 to 1980,
auditing standards were established in each of the four countries selected; and, in each case, a standard concerning internal
control was included. Definitions of internal control were published before and after the relevant standards. The evolution of
internal control followed a distinctive pattern in each country;
but there were also extensive similarities.
Similarities among the four countries included developments in the evolution of internal control that were preceded by
public criticism of existing auditing procedures, resistance by
the members of the profession to expansion of their duties concerned with internal control, and the increasing similarity of the
definitions. These similarities are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
The first similarity was the association between public criticism and change. The adoption of a standard concerning the
examination of internal control, or a change in its definition,
was frequently preceded by public criticism of auditing procedures. Developments in standards and definitions concerned
with internal control often took place after there had been public criticism of audit procedures and concern about corporate
management. This was the case in the United States in 1949 and
1988, the United Kingdom in 1980 and Australia in 1974. The
pattern was consistent with other studies of auditing history,
including Dirsmith and McAllister [1982] and Lee [1988].
Second, in three of the countries, the breadth of the definition was important. The profession appears to have resisted expanding its duties. Whether internal control should be defined
narrowly or broadly was an important issue when changes to
the American definition took place in 1949, 1957 and 1988. A
broad definition was promulgated in 1949; this was narrowed in
1957 as a result of concern about increased liability for practitioners. Subsequently, a broad definition was introduced in
1988 as one of a number of measures to make auditing more
effective. The issue of broad or narrow internal control has been
dealt with in different ways outside the United States. Practitioners in the United Kingdom ensured that they adopted auditing
standards which avoided implying a requirement for auditors to
examine internal control [Woolf, 1980, p. 62]. Thus, a broad
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definition of internal control was not a problem for them. Australian auditing statements since 1951 suggested that evaluation
was necessary, yet the statements did not have the status of
auditing standards, and internal control was not defined. Later,
when an auditing standard requiring internal control evaluation
was introduced, this requirement was moderated by adding the
AICPA's narrow definition. This issue does not appear to have
been important in New Zealand.
This recurring issue indicates that a strict requirement to
evaluate internal control, together with a broad definition of
internal control, is associated with resistance by auditors. This
can be addressed either by narrowing the definition (as was
done in the United States and later in Australia) or by reducing
the emphasis of the auditing standard concerned with evaluation (as in the United Kingdom, and in Australia during the
early period of professional guidance on auditing).
The third similarity is in the terminology used. Standards
and definitions in each of the countries resemble each other.
The similarities have increased over the period examined. This
is partly because professional bodies used statements that apply
in other countries as precedents. Because the AICPA was the
first organization to establish auditing standards, the U.S. profession has been the most influential. While the accounting professions in each of the three other countries all developed at
least one statement that was indigenous, the AICPA's pronouncements have become increasingly dominant. American influence on the economies of other countries and the spread of
the international audit firms have also been cited as reasons for
this trend.
The frequent changes to the definition of internal control,
and to auditing standards concerned with it, reflect the presence
of conflicting pressures. On the one hand, the definition of
"control" in other literature is a broad one, and becoming increasingly so. In addition, when auditing procedures are criticized due to apparent faults, then changes that broaden the
definition of internal control frequently take place. On the other
hand, auditors are concerned to minimize the extent of their
duties, and of their liability. As a result, they favor a narrow
definition.
The changes in internal control also reflect the changing
emphasis of auditing, away from the objective of detecting
fraud. The AIA's 1936 definition described "internal check and
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control" as concerned first with safeguarding cash and other
assets. Since then, the changes in the definitions of internal
control, (including the recent AICPA statement [1988]) have
continually reduced the emphasis given to safeguarding assets,
and indicated that the auditor's prime concern is the reliability
of the data used to prepare the financial statements.
The evolution of internal control was consistent with the
models of auditing history presented by Dirsmith and McAllister
[1982] and Lee [1988]. External events (such as economic developments and the McKesson and Robbins case in the U.S., and
other cases involving auditors in the UK and Australia) preceded the adoption of auditing standards requiring examination
of internal control. Internal pressures (partly in response to an
external influence, the increasing legal liability of auditors) were
responded to by a narrowing of the definition in the U.S., and
by a rephrasing of the proposed standard for evaluation of internal control in the UK. Subsequently, further external events in
the U.S. (such as scandals about corrupt practices by corporations) led to a broader definition of internal control.
Earlier in this paper, the research question was identified
as "how did internal control evolve?" This question was then
analyzed into three sub-questions, each of which has been discussed above. In brief, the definition of internal control has
become broader and closer to a definition of management control in all the countries examined. This change has been in response to external pressures, sometimes with resistance from
auditors.
In general, the evolution of internal control demonstrates
the influence of a number of trends in auditing history. These
include the internationalization of auditing, and the extent to
which developments in the United States have become important; the pressure from external sources for the area of auditors'
responsibility to be increased; and the resistance by auditors to
such an increase in their duties. The general trend in each of the
four countries has been towards a "broader" view of internal
control, a trend consistent with other control literature.
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1992 ACCOUNTING HALL
OF FAME INDUCTION:
DAVID SOLOMONS
INTRODUCTION
by
Stephen A. Zeff
Herbert S. Autrey Professor
Jones Graduate School of Administration
Rice University
David Solomons has brought a kind of sanity to the accounting literature and to policy deliberations.
While always faithful to his principles, which he expounds
with admirable clarity and persuasiveness, he has consistently
had regard for their operational feasibility.
The historical evolution of ideas, policies and practices has
always occupied an important place in David's writings. Moreover, few authors can match the ease with which he draws out
the essence of ideas and experiences from different national cultures.
He is a master craftsman of the English language, with a
penchant for argument by metaphor. "Accounting is financial
map-making" has been his metaphor of choice.
David provides the reader with a broad perspective for
whatever he is discussing, and the reader is invited to follow his
inexorable logic in full knowledge of all that he considers relevant to the debate. In his writings, he is, above all, a scholar
and a teacher. Even if one does not accept his conclusions and
recommendations, he/she nonetheless acquires a precious insight into the issues, the arguments, and the forces driving the
controversy. There is always wisdom in what David writes.
David's academic career has been at three universities: the
London School of Economics (LSE), from 1946 to 1955; the
University of Bristol, from 1955 to 1959; and the Wharton
School of the University of Pennsylvania from 1959 to his retirement in 1983.
His earliest work dealt with management accounting, accounting theory, and accounting education. He was much influhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9
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enced by Ronald S. Edwards, a LSE industrial economist who
had a large interest in accounting. In the late 1930s, Edwards
had written a series of memorable articles in The Accountant, in
which he dealt with costing history and, in a 13-part article
written in 1938, produced perhaps the first treatise on asset
valuation and income determination in the British literature, in
which he defended the increased-net-worth concept of income,
taking into account Bonbright's notion of "value to the owner."
David has called Edwards "one of my principal mentors during
my LSE period."
David's first major article, in 1953, was a pioneering essay
on costing history, and during the 1950s he revised Sidney
Alexander's famous tract, "Income Measurement in a Dynamic
Economy," which, like Edwards's work, was an argument for
the increased-net-worth concept of income. However, David's
pivotal works, in my view, came after his move to the U.S. in
1959.
In 1961, David concluded, ruefully, that it was not operationally feasible to isolate changes in expectations from
Alexander's "economic income," thus rendering it of little use as
a satisfactory measure of enterprise performance. He thereupon
issued his famous prediction that "so far as the history of accounting is concerned, the next twenty-five years may subsequently be seen to have been the twilight of income measurement." Twenty-five years later, he acknowledged that his prediction had not been fulfilled, and that perhaps his forte was not as
a seer, In 1966, he published a major paper on Bonbright's
"value to the owner" formulation for valuing property, and gave
it impetus in the debates over current value accounting by restating it in an inequality notation. David's paper, which was
published in the second edition of Morton Backer's Modern Accounting Theory, directly or indirectly influenced the Sandilands
Committee, the FASB, and the standard-setting bodies in Australia and New Zealand, all of which, in one form or another,
embraced "value to the owner" (also known as "value to the
business" or "deprival value") in their dicta on current cost accounting issued during the 1970s.
In 1965, at the request of the Financial Executives Research
Foundation, David wrote his first book, Divisional Performance:
Measurement and Control, in which he reported on a survey of
25 major companies and presented his own recommendations
on how best to evaluate and control decentralized operations. It
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was a path-breaking study, and it earned him the AICPA's Notable Contribution to Accounting Literature Award.
On accounting education, David argued in his inaugural address at the University of Bristol, in 1955, that all entrants into
the accounting profession should be required to take three years
of university study in accounting, economics and law—a radical
view in an era when most entrants came straight into the profession from high school, and took evening courses in correspondence schools! He has always championed a large role for
universities in the preparation of entrants into the profession.
When, in 1961, the Parker Committee on Education and Training reported to the English Institute that the status quo, with
only minor changes, should be preserved in preparing prospective Chartered Accountants, he wrote a scathing criticism of the
report in the Institute's journal, which the late Eddie Stamp has
called "one of the most critical [articles] ever to appear in the
literature of the British profession".
However, in the 1970s, David emerged from the academic
literature to become an architect of change. In the waning days
of the Accounting Principles Board, during the fractious debate
over business combinations and intangibles, AAA President Don
Edwards invited David to chair a blue-ribbon committee to reco m m e n d whether a change in the standard-setting system was
needed, and if so, how to go about it. The very existence of such
a committee caused consternation within the AICPA, which saw
itself as the sole guardian of accounting principles, and once
David's committee had reported, Don was asked to nominate an
AAA representative on the newly formed Wheat Study, which
had been charged by the Institute to conduct a full-scale enquiry
into standard setting. Don nominated David, and David eventually became an influential member of the Wheat Study and, in
fact, was given the task of writing the first draft of its report. As
we know, that report led to the establishment of the FASB.
Then, in 1978, he was a consultant to the special Institute committee looking into a restructuring of the Auditing Standards
Executive Committee, which led to the formation of the Auditing Standards Board.
As is well known, David was the principal draftsman of the
FASB's Concepts Statement No. 2 on qualitative characteristics,
which was adopted or adapted by standard setters in Canada
(both the CICA and the CGA), the UK, Australia and New
Zealand in the formulation of their own conceptual frameworks.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9
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In 1986, David wrote his valedictory on standard setting
and the conceptual framework, a 261-page book entitled Making
Accounting Policy: The Quest for Credibility in Financial Reporting, which is a model of thoroughness, careful scholarship, and
persuasive writing in a field that has been marked by intemperate advocacy and bombast. He argued in favor of Current Cost
Constant Purchasing Power Accounting with financial capital
maintenance. Finally, in 1989, at the request of the Research
Board of the English Institute, he drafted a concise conceptual
framework for consideration by the UK's Accounting Standards
Committee.
In accounting education, David was invited by the six accountancy bodies in the British Isles to do a major long-range
study of accounting education and training, which he completed in 1974. That some of its far-reaching recommendations
are only now seeming to find favor in the UK has given "longrange" a new meaning. In the 1970s and 1980s, he also advised
the Canadians on their Uniform Final Examination for accounting entrants.
In sum, David has left a large and salutary mark on the
literature, but he has been equally active as a highly soughtafter consultant to policy makers. Few academics can be said to
have played both roles so well.
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INDUCTION CITATION
by
Thomas J. Burns
Professor and Chairman,
Committee on Accounting Hall of Fame,
College of Business, The Ohio State University
An exemplary model of a global professor, he has published
and taught in numerous countries, and has former students everywhere. His research and writing have had a major impact on
the profession in several countries. Truly one of a kind, he is an
international professor of accounting.
His career can be dichotomized into two stages, one English and the other American. Born to a man who ran a London
pub, he was one of four children in a family that never was
poor, perhaps because his father was something of an entrepreneur—later running a bus company and still later a dirt track
(for motorcycle races). The son attended a boy's school, Hackney Downs, for eight years, and at age 16 he received advanced
placement at the London School of Economics. Taking an optional extra year, he received a University degree, the only one
of his family to do so. Following graduation, he was articled to a
Dickensian firm (to which his father paid a fee of three hundred
guineas) in order to become a Chartered Accountant, a three
year ordeal which he barely survived.
He became a CA (1936) and practiced in a firm until the
War started (1939). He immediately enlisted in the Royal Army
Service Corps as a private, and was commissioned the following
year. He served in the North Africa campaign. At the fall of
Tobruk (in June 1942), he was taken prisoner together with
30,000 other Allied soldiers, and was interned first in Italy and
then in Germany. To relieve the monotony of camp, he began to
teach accounting and economics to his fellow prisoners. Finally
liberated (1945), he left the Army as a Captain and returned to
his London firm, and the following year he became a part-time
lecturer at his alma mater, the London School of Economics
(where he subsequently earned his doctorate). Thanks to his
experience during almost three years as a POW, he had become
an academic. At the London School, he was assigned to assist
the only full-time accounting faculty member, who suddenly
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took ill and died at the beginning of the fall term, 1 leaving his
assistant as the only accounting teacher at the school for the
rest of his first year (1946-47). (In 1946, there were no full-time
professors in accounting in all of the British Isles). In 1949, he
was promoted to reader, two years after W. T. Baxter was appointed professor of accounting at the LSE. In 1955, he left to
become the inaugural professor of accounting at the University
of Bristol, becoming the third full-time accounting professor in
all of Britain. 2
Love conquered him at the first dance he attended. In six
weeks he was engaged, and he was married six weeks later.
Now, nearly fifty years later, he and his wife, Miriam, still like
to dance. They have a son and daughter and three grandchildren. Fond of Mozart, opera, theatre and films, he once rowed
for the Thames Rowing Club, but never at Henley. His favorite
quotation is from a comedian, Sam Levenson, a one-time high
school teacher. "It was on my fifth birthday," Levenson said,
"that my father put his hand on my shoulder and said, 'Remember, my son, if you ever need a helping hand, you'll find one at
the end of your arm.' "
He is the only professor ever to have headed the two leading
academic accounting organizations on both sides of the Atlantic, the one in the U.K. and the one in the U.S. He served as
chairman of the Association of University Teachers of Accounting between 1955 and 1958, the forerunner of the British Accounting Association. He crossed the Atlantic in 1959 to accept
a professorship at the Wharton School, and he was designated
as the Arthur Young Professor in 1974. He became an American
citizen in 1976, and the next year he served as president of The
American Accounting Association. 3
A frequent author of professional books and articles, he is
widely known for his classic Divisional Performance: Measurement and Control.4 He also was the principal draftsman of the
Wheat Report which proposed the establishment of the Finan1

Stanley Rowlands was a partner and F.C.A. with Sellars, Dicksee & Co.
who died in 1946. For many years, a lecturer in accounting at the London
School, he was the author or editor of ten textbooks.
2
Donald Cousins at Birmingham was the second.
3
He had been Director of Research for the AAA in 1968-70. He was president in 1977-78. He was also the AUTA's secretary from its inception in 1947
until 1950.
4
He received the AICPA's Notable Contribution to the Accounting Literature
Award for this book in 1969.
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cial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and of the FASB's
Concepts Statement No. 2 on the qualitative characteristics of
accounting information.
He has been a consultant to the FASB, the SEC, the IASC,
the CICA, the AICPA, numerous companies and the accountancy bodies in the U.K.5 His visiting university appointments
have been extensive (fourteen in ten countries).6 He holds two
honorary doctorates, the AAA chose him as an Outstanding Accounting Educator (1980), and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales gave him its International
Award (1989).
A world leader of accounting research and education, he is
the 52nd Accounting Hall of Fame inductee, DAVID
SOLOMONS.

5

In the UK, he directed the "Long Range Enquiry into Education and Training for the Accountancy Profession" in 1972-74.
6
Including service as the Lee Kuan Yew Distinguished Visitor in Singapore
in 1986.
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RESPONSE
by
David Solomons
Ernst & Young Professor Emeritus
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
1992 Accounting Hall of Fame Inductee
As those who have preceded me into the Accounting Hall of
Fame in recent years will know, one's first intimation of the
conferment of this high honor comes in the form of a telephone
call from Tom Burns. As I have told him, I rank that call with
only two others in my professional career. The first was a telephone call from Bob Anthony early in 1963, inviting me to
spend the year 1963-64 in Switzerland with my family, teaching
at IMEDE. It turned out to be a fabulous year. The other was a
call from Charlie Zlatkovich in 1976, saying that I had been
nominated as president-elect of the American Accounting Association. Other nice things have happened over the years by mail,
or by cable (as in the case of the invitation in 1959 to join the
Wharton faculty). But by telephone, these are the three occasions I shall remember.
First, let me acknowledge some debts. It is true, as Chuck
Horngren recognized two years ago on a similar occasion, that
in naming specific individuals one runs the risk of omitting
some deserving names. But I am going to accept that risk.
My greatest debt, of course, is to my wife, Miriam. She has
been by my side now for almost 50 years, and no other influence can compare with hers.
However, there have been other influences. One was a certain teacher of English in my London secondary school, so
many years ago, who almost brutally instilled some rules that
have helped me to write better English than I might otherwise
have done. He had a number of "forbidden words," the use of
which automatically earned you a zero for an essay. His forbidden words included "very," "extremely," "former" and "latter";
and there were others. During the intervening 65 years, I have
often broken his rules, but always to the detriment of my writing.
Another debt of the same kind that I acknowledge is to
Reed Storey, whose editing of my drafts when we were working
together on the FASB's Concepts Statement No. 2 on Qualitative
Characteristics greatly improved that document and my writing
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generally. I a m m u c h more sensitive to dangling participles, the
c o m m o n misuse of "this" when one means "that," the misuse of
"which" instead of "that," and other linguistic blunders than I
was previously.
My main debt, of an academic nature, is undoubtedly to the
faculty of the London School of Economics, both in the classroom when I was a student, and later as colleagues when I went
back to teach there for almost a decade after World War II. To
have rubbed shoulders with men like Arnold Plant and Ronnie
E d w a r d s (both later knighted), Lionel Robbins (later Lord
Robbins), my immediate colleagues William Baxter and Harold
Edey, Basil Yamey (that fine accounting historian for whom I
accepted the Hourglass award here on Sunday evening), and no
fewer t h a n four Nobel prize winners in economics (John Hicks,
James Meade, Friedrick Hayek, and Ronald Coase), was a rare
privilege. This must sound like name-dropping; but these men
really have exerted a lasting influence on me. Life at LSE during
my years there was life in an intellectual powerhouse.
Most American academics start their careers by writing a
dissertation for their Ph.D., mining one or two papers out of it,
and then going on from there. My start was different, and I was
reminded of it recently when my wife and I were in London,
riding down Oxford Street in a bus, past D. H. Evans, a department store. D. H. Evans, in 1947 or thereabouts, gave me the
idea for my first serious paper. I was having lunch there one day
and I noticed that the dining room was divided into two sections by moveable screens. On one side of the screens, the space
was devoted to a self-service cafeteria, while the other side was
devoted to waitress service. This led me to think how I would
position the screens if I were the restaurant manager. Cost allocation was clearly not the answer. Cost allocation would have to
follow the space allocation decision, not precede it. The result
was a paper entitled "Cost Accounting and the Use of Space and
Equipment," which gave me my start. Of course, I had not
heard of linear programming in those days.
Perhaps it was the heady atmosphere of LSE that gave me a
somewhat lofty view of the nature of accounting, but also kept
my estimate of its importance within reasonable bounds. During my year as president of the American Accounting Association, a committee of the Association produced a report that was
published, entitled Accounting Education and the Third World. I
was asked to write a forward to that report, and I should like to
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9
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quote from it here, because it expresses my assessment of accounting as well as I know how, and it is as relevant now as it
was in 1978.
In any ranking of the needs of the developing countries
of the world to help them improve the quality of life of
their peoples, there are undoubtedly some that would
rank ahead of improved accounting and accounting
education. The eradication of disease, the elimination
of hunger . . ., improved standards of literacy, the
spread of political freedom and the rule of law—these
are the foremost advances that must be made before
the distinction between "developing" and "developed"
nations can be discarded.
The report that I am introducing does not deal with
these great themes. Accounting itself cannot feed the
hungry or cure the sick or bring enlightenment to the
illiterate. Yet, it has a part to play in all these advances.
Wherever scarce resources need to be economized,
there is work for the accountant to do; and the scarcer
the resources are, the more important it is that they
should not be misdirected or misappropriated.
Accountants can take a good deal of satisfaction in the role
that they play in making our free enterprise system work. But
we have no reason to be complacent. As I look back over more
than 50 years in the profession and compare the progress we
have made with the progress made in fields like medicine, electronics, physics and chemistry, transportation, and even economics, our showing is not impressive. Bob Elliott, of KPMG
Peat Marwick, had something of interest to say on this subject
in a paper recently. He first quotes the complaint of a CEO of a
successful software company, who told him that:
trying to run my organization with the output of our
accounting department is like trying to fly an airplane
that has only one dial—a dial that shows the sum of
airspeed and altitude. If it's low, I'm in trouble, but I
don't even know why. 1
Then turning later to financial reporting, Elliott says:
O n e of t h e few t h i n g s t h a t f i n a n c i a l s t a t e m e n t
preparers agree upon is that the scoring rules should
1
Robert K. Elliott, "The Third Wave Breaks on the Shores of Accounting,"
Accounting Horizons (June, 1992): 69.
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not be changed in the middle of the game. Thus, there
is a powerful constituency in favor of the status quo.
Add the attesters—who are dissuaded from change by
unknown, but probably unbearable, legal liabilities—
and you have an implacably conservative environment.
The same managements that complain that they can't
run the business with today's accounting information
are the ones who make pilgrimages to Norwalk to
lobby against changes. 2
I do not find Elliott's "implacably conservative environment" at all congenial. It is not peculiar to the United States.
One finds it throughout the English-speaking world and beyond.
I wish that I could have been more persuasive in my own writing and more successful in helping to change that environment.
It is a task that my generation must leave to our successors.

2

Ibid, p. 75.
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THE ACCOUNTING HALL OF FAME MEMBERSHIP
Year
1950

1951
1952
1953

1954

1955
1956
1957
1958

1959
1960
1961
1963
1964
1965
1968

1974
1975
1976
1977

Member
George Oliver May*
Robert Hiester Montgomery*
William Andrew Paton*
Arthur Lowes Dickinson*
Henry Rand Hatfield*
Elijah Watt Sells*
Victor Hermann Stempf*
Arthur Edward Andersen*
Thomas Coleman Andrews*
Charles Ezra Sprague*
Joseph Edmund Sterett*
Carman George Blough*
Samuel John Broad*
Thomas Henry Sanders*
Hiram Thompson Scovill*
Percival Flack Brundage*
Ananias Charles Littleton*
Roy Bernard Kester*
Hermann Clinton Miller*
Harry Anson Finney*
Arthur Bevins Foye*
Donald Putman Perry*
Marquis George Eaton*
Maurice Hubert Stans
Eric Louis Kohler*
Andrew Barr
Lloyd Morey*
Paul Franklin Grady*
Perry Empey Mason*
James Loring Peirce
George Davis Bailey*
John Lansing Carey*
William Welling Werntz*
Robert Martin Trueblood*
Leonard Paul Spacek
John William Queenan*
Howard Irwin Ross*

*Deceased
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1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
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Induction

115

Maurice Moonitz
Marshall Smith Armstrong
Elmer Boyd Staats
Herbert Elmer Miller
Sidney Davidson
Henry Alexander Benson
Oscar Strand Gellein
Robert Newton Anthony
Philip Leroy Defliese
Norton Moore Bedford
Yuri Ijiri
Charles Thomas Horngren
Raymond John Chambers
David Solomons
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REVIEWS
PATH A. MILLS, EDITOR
Indiana State University
REVIEWS OF BOOKS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Peter Boys and John Freear (Eds.), Accounting History 19761986: An Anthology (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1992,
402 pp., $70).
Reviewed by
Sudarwan
Case Western Reserve University
This book is an anthology of papers from Accounting History, the former journal of the Accounting History Society of
England and Wales, published during the years 1976-1986. Boys
and Freear selected 26 of 56 articles published in the journal.
The anthology covers several eras and topics in accounting history from the 15th century to the 20th century. It is divided into
eight classifications: General, Methodology, Auditing, Firm/Industry Studies, Corporate Accounting, Education, Bibliographies/Biographies, and Miscellaneous.
Three articles in the "General" section emphasize the importance of accounting history to the accounting profession and
to the entire economic community. The subjects of this section
are that: 1) accounting history ("was") has a relationship with
the present ("is") and the future ("ought"); 2) present problems
may be rooted in past solutions; 3) history provides parallels
from which we can obtain lessons; and 4) the study of accounting history should be useful in solving current problems.
The "Methodology" section discusses methods and techniques available to researchers and provides a taxonomy for
accounting history to satisfy requirements of historical research, 1) factographic (what was), 2) explanatory (why was
that so), and 3) theoretical (what follows from the study of the
past). Readers are exposed to the relationship between the concept of capitalism and the emergence of bookkeeping, and to
the ways accounting history research establishes historical facts.
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However, the discussion falls short of giving readers clues as to
the circumstances in which a certain methodology is most appropriate. There is also no discussion about the advantages and
disadvantages of each method. There is only a vague suggestion
that a combination of methods can be used in the study of
accounting history.
These first two sections seem to be intended to provide a
basis for selecting from articles included in the next sections.
One expects that the rest of the book will reveal a link between
the past, present, and future development of accounting. On the
contrary, most of the subsequent readings are confined to a
description or discussion of accounting practice in specific periods. With the exception of the paper by Freear in the "Firm/
Industry Studies" section, there is little provided to relate historical facts to current and future matters.
The "Auditing" section analyzes audit practices in the railway and marine insurance industries during 1840s-1860s. The
matters considered include conflicts between managers, shareholders, and government commissioners in the enactment of the
1845 Companies Clause Consolidation Act and the 1867 Railways
Companies Act as to who had the authority to appoint auditors
for railway companies and what were appropriate auditor qualifications.
The audit requirement for marine insurance companies was
established under the provisions of the 1844 Joint Stock Companies Act and under the 1845 Act mentioned above. What is important to recall about this period is that an auditor was required to own at least one share in the audited company; that
auditors were not necessarily public accountants; and that audit
reports had various forms, but were stated as a "true and correct" balance sheet.
The focus of the "Firm/Industry Studies" section is the relationship between cost accounting systems and pricing policy in
a monopoly or free market system and the related profit measurement systems implemented during the period from the 16th
to 19th century.
During this period both acquisition and repair of fixed assets were considered expenses and charged as incurred; business and personal expenses were not separated; accrued expenses were embedded in reserve and provision accounts; inventories were valued at c u r r e n t estimated price; income
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smoothing was a common, practice; and accounting information was available and used for managerial purposes.
This section also gives examples of how cost accounting
systems can be misused through the use and abuse of excessive
profits from government contracts. The authors enrich the
analysis by providing documents as examples of balance sheets
and income statements of companies in the late 19th century.
However, neither the illustrated financial statements nor the authors' analysis mentions "how" revenues were measured but
only the measurement of expense. This omission prevents readers from obtaining a complete picture of income determination
as commonly practiced in the period.
The remainder of the book indeed could be classified as
"Miscellaneous". It contains historical facts and short descriptions about the development of accounting thought, accounting
education, profiles of notable individuals in the U.K. accounting
profession, and other short analyses of early accounting practices.
A critical p a p e r a b o u t early 20th century a c c o u n t i n g
thought by Godfrey is the most interesting reading in this section. He argues that accounting thought before 1960 was: 1)
developed by a piecemeal approach rather than by development
of a single theoretical framework; 2) sought apologetics rather
than appraised; 3) classified rather than analyzed; 4) particularized rather than synthesized. With the exception of Paton, Canning, Sweeney, and McNeal, who were major accounting scholars in this period, he argues, others reflected inherited deficiencies. However, Godfrey fails to elaborate on the impact of such
alleged deficiencies on current problems or how such deficiencies might have been resolved. Further, he does not compare
early accounting thought with current issues or assess relative
advantages and disadvantages as such.
In general, this book of readings falls short of fully explaining selected elements in the development of accounting thought
and practice. If explaining the progress is an essential part of
historical study, this book does not fulfill one of its purposes.
However, this book does supply reading material to discuss accounting practice and problems in the past. Willing readers will
find the historical description a good starting point for further
analysis and for undertaking their own agenda.
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Junichi Chiba, A History of British Financial Accounting
Japanese] (Tokyo: Chuo Keizai, 1992, 407 pp., 7,000 Yen).

[in

Reviewed by
Yozo Sakaguchi
Case Western Reserve University
When Japan reopened its commerce to the United States of
America in 1854, its doors had been closed to foreign countries
for more than two hundred years. Needless to say, at that time,
there was no bookkeeping or accounting system in Japan that
was similar to those used today. But during the Meiji era (18761911), Japan's economy developed, expanded and encompassed
almost every type of industry. Under these circumstances, Japanese financial systems that were primarily influenced by British
financial accounting followed a European-style commercial
code. Thus, until the early 20th century, the British system was
the major influence on Japanese accounting.
This was the situation in Japan until after World War II,
w h e n a Japanese securities and exchange law was enacted
which was strongly influenced by the U.S. Securities Acts. As a
result, Japan's accounting system rapidly changed under the influence of the U.S. financial accounting system and the Securities Acts. Thus, two major external influences affected the basic
framework of Japanese financial accounting.
From these two influences, Professor Chiba considers issues about social and historical problems in modern Japanese
financial accounting, focusing on the influences of British financial accounting, the need to earn public trust, and the impact of political issues, which Chiba analyzes from a social science approach. He focuses primarily on the important period
from the beginning of the 19th century through the 20th century.
The book contains ten sections. Sections 1 and 2 seek to
define a basic structure for the British financial accounting approach using a social science methodology. The effects of passage of the modern Companies Act and of related accounts
based on British processes is examined in sections 3 and 4; the
"Lee Rule" is examined in sections 5 and 6. The accounting
system under the British Companies Acts during a period of
interventionism is the focus of sections 7, 8, and 9. Finally, the
"true and fair" view is considered in the last section. Each of the
sections is effectively related with others by the author's use of
social science and economic historical perspectives.
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Chiba's primary objective is to establish a basic structure of
financial accounting by means of a social science methodology,
relating the expected structure of a company's accounting to the
Companies Act. He examines original documents, but he does
not get distracted by legal form. Instead, he considers the social
and economic functions of these acts. He uses the social science
methodology of both Weber and Habermas to identify the public sphere.
This book identifies several contributions of the British financial system. First, there is a study of the Compulsory System
from 1844 to 1855. Second, the "true" meaning of the 1879
Companies Act and its voluntary rule is considered. Third, the
orthodoxy of a classified system of accounts defined by English
rules is pointed out. Fourth, in judicial cases, both the doctrine
of fiduciary trust and the duties of a corporate director as a
"commercial trustee" are noted. Fifth, the social and historical
meaning of the concept of a "true and fair view" is considered.
Finally, the process of preparing a distinct form for both the
"balance sheet" and the "profit and loss" statements is examined.
The author employs the title A History of British Financial
Accounting to a characterize this project, a major focus of his
scholarly career. The book, which is the summary of his many
studies about British financial accounting, took more t h a n
twelve years to complete. The use of original sources and references such as accounts, judicial cases, British parliamentary papers, copies of the original acts, and related bibliographies involved nearly five hundred sources. The author found most of
them in Guildhall Library in London while studying at the London School of Economics and Political Science in 1985 and
1986.
The book is published in Japanese and is not otherwise
available to readers of other languages. References listed in the
book alone are worth the effort of any scholars who have an
interest in the origins of financial accounting in Britain, as well
as "the accounts" during the period from the middle of 19th
century through the middle of the 20th century.
As a side note, readers might also have an interest in Professor Chiba's next project, which will extend his study about
the history of British financial accounting to contemporary
times.
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Louis Galambos and Joseph Pratt, The Rise of The Corporate
Commonwealth, (New York: Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, 1988,
286 pp., $19.95).
Reviewed by
Nandini Chandar
Case Western Reserve University
Galambos and Pratt provide an insightful and fast-paced
account of the growth and development of the American corporate economy over the past century. At a time when American
business is yet again in the midst of a crisis, the book is a timely
reminder of the value of history in analyzing contemporary
problems. Free enterprise and the government have had various
relationships over the years: friendly, adversarial, and sometimes both. The authors present in their book a dynamic picture
of U.S. business and public policy in the twentieth century,
which portrays the flexibility of the American business system
and its tradition of successfully adapting to change.
The reader is led from the world of J. P. Morgan at the turn
of the century, where a few powerful private investment bankers
could control an economy dominated by the entrepreneurial
firm to the world of Iacocca in the 1980s, where the power of
any individual is subordinate to that of the government. The
authors make effective use of these powerful symbols of the
American way of doing business during their times.
The framework for analyzing the development of institutions over time is their ability to strike a balance between innovations, efficiency, and environmental control. The authors also
portray the changing role of the government in three major areas over the century: single industry regulation, cross-industry
regulation, and government-directed activities.
J. P. Morgan's era saw the rise of the combine from the
entrepreneurial firm of the nineteenth century. The entrepreneurial firm, with its flexibility to innovate, played a vital role in
the nation's rapid economic expansion during that period. Out
of its inability to take advantage of economies of scale and its
lack of capital, came the centralized corporate combine. The
authors suggest that Morgan and investment bankers, because
of their unique role of selling securities to finance the combines,
became the chief architects of the system. The authors describe
the outstanding record of technical and organizational change
and economic growth that characterized the Morgan era on the
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one hand, and the abuses of power and natural resources and
growing tensions between the corporations and society on the
other.
The period 1901-1930 was characterized by an expanding
public presence, generally intended to limit the power of private
interests to manipulate the economy. The development of independent regulatory commissions, the passage of the antitrust
laws, and the creation of the Federal Reserve System marked
significant turning points in business-government relations. The
authors characterize the process of change in these relations as
"piecemeal, uneven, and at times, haphazard." These measures
were, the authors claim, "a curious innovation," and "a political
and intellectual compromise." It was also a "distinctively American approach to balancing public and private interests," a way
to have more government without more politics. The coming of
the Federal Reserve signalled the demise of the world of J. P.
Morgan.
This was also an era when business consolidated its controls. Managers had to learn to balance the firm's need for innovation against the need for control of its environment, and the
need to achieve high efficiency in mass production and distribution. Most of the large firms of this era were created through
mergers of competitors. There was a need for administrative
controls using more active and systematic forms of management. The results were organizations structured along functional lines, with increased specialization, a changed workplace
in response to mechanization, more formalized labor relations,
and vertical integration to achieve better control of the environment. The need for innovation and the great expansion of science and engineering at the turn of the century saw the beginnings of research and development and the modern industrial
laboratory. Companies took a long-term view. Small business
still had its role, transferring/generating innovations, and providing services where economies of scale or system could not be
achieved. A new type of political system evolved, where local
influence was becoming less important than effective lobbying
on the state and national levels. It was an era of "the associative
state," where cooperative forms of capitalism were practiced by
trade associations. The general prosperity of the firms and the
growing weakness of the labor unions lent support to the idea
that a new "corporate-liberal commonwealth" under business
control was here to stay.
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The first crisis of the new corporate commonwealth was the
Great Depression. The SEC was set up to regulate the performance of securities traders, and to provide for disclosure of
financial information. Business was afraid t h a t President
Roosevelt was driving toward socialism. The authors feel, however, that "what evolved was a set of new public institutions that
created a more stable capital economy and a more predictable
and profitable environment for business." Banking reform measures were introduced under the New Deal in the from of the
Banking Acts and the creation of the FDIC. One result of this
was functional segmentation along commercial and investment
banking lines. The authors state that no other nation chose this
form of segmentation, but "no other nation's banking system
had become so enmeshed in stock speculation."
The National Recovery Administration, the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation and the Federal Jobs Program were attempts to combat the effects of the Depression. The labor policies of the New Deal hastened the emergence of "Big Labor" in
the U.S. As a result of the impact of the Great Depression and
the New Deal, the life of the CEO changed dramatically: it was
increasingly difficult to strike a balance between efficiency, innovation, and control.
The American Era (1940-1969) saw "a process of reconciliation between business and American society." The war-induced
prosperity eased political tensions and focused on the need for
efficiency in mass production. The Federal Government's responsibility for the overall performance of the economy was
recognized. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson embraced "new
economics," which consisted of designing packages of monetary
and fiscal policies capable of stabilizing and sustaining business
growth while maintaining politically acceptable levels of unemployment and inflation.
Government spending for national security added to the potent economic impact of war. The authors suggest that it was
the war expenditure and not the New Deal that pulled the country out of recession. There was, however, concern over the
growth of this "military-industrial complex." Defense took over
significant portions of the nation's resources and creativity, and
affected two other areas of government investments: highway
building and space programs. The American Era also witnessed
a spectacular growth in science and technology, largely as a
result of federal support.
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The performance of regulated industries in this era was
generally favorable. There were lower pressures from cross-industry regulation.
The American Era saw "the modern firm in triumph." To
take advantage of favorable conditions, diversification, together
with decentralization, became important. By the end of the
1960s, there were large numbers of "conglomerates" and the
rationale of "synergy" began to appear. Decentralization enabled
quick postwar expansion into overseas markets with devastated
economics. In this scenario, "strategy flowed out of structure."
The multinational firm accompanied America's political involvement abroad. "Business normally followed the flag."
The authors suggest that this era saw "the corporate commonwealth at its peak." With federal and monetary policies stabilizing aggregate demand, they felt that "by that time, America
seemed to have discovered the proper way to harness corporate
capitalism without seriously injuring the market-oriented process at heart".
By the late 1960s, there were increasing tensions at home
and abroad, "as the fundamental conditions under the American
Era started to shift." As the U.S. was preoccupied in containing
Communism, new competition emerged from Europe and Japan. Governments of raw materials-producing nations asserted
national interests. America and its competitors ignored growing
evidence of the need for change and "were victims of their own
success." Regulatory agencies became inflexible when the economic setting began to change and when there was mounting
inflation.
U.S. business faced internal problems due to lack of creativity, taking a short-term view, being conservative about innovations and overly concerned about stability. Government policies
toward business did not work as well in the shifting international economy. Not until international competition began to
intensify in the 1970s did "the foundations of the corporate
commonwealth visibility begin to crack."
The authors suggest that the period 1970 to the present
marks "the second crisis of the corporate commonwealth." The
nation had grown accustomed to international economic success and could not easily make adjustments. "The American Era
was certain to end." Suggestions made in panic that America
should borrow ideas from other nations to solve its problems,
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"slighted the inherent strengths of the corporate commonwealth
and ignored the barriers to rapid, basic change."
There were "new misdirections in the public sector" as the
government tried to grapple with the change. The problems of
the weak domestic economy were compounded by rising energy
prices. "Something was wrong, but the experts could not agree
on the diagnosis or the cure." The government could not control
spending for defense and welfare. New areas of government
regulation provided added pressures on businesses' ability to
compete. Expenditures for R&D dropped off sharply, as corporations began to take a short-term view.
In this new era of international competition, reconstruction
began. The authors state that the late 1970s saw "the beginning
of a process of reconstruction that demonstrated convincingly
the single most important strength of the U.S. corporate commonwealth: its responsiveness over the long-term to the forces
of change." The authors claim that the most obvious shortcoming of the corporate order "was the lack of effective integrative
institutions that would enable the United States to recognize the
interrelated nature of its problems and to implement intelligent,
system-wide solutions."
Strategies in the private sector to cope with this new era
included de-conglomeration and scaling down, in an effort to
improve efficiency and innovativeness in the markets they still
served. There was a belief that small is innovative. New concepts of labor relations emerged in response to the challenges
posed by labor-management relations. Yet, according to the authors, "in no area does the historian's search for useful precedents in our past produce less evidence for optimism." There
has been a strong surge in deregulation in the face of increased
international competition. Deregulation fostered competition,
and, to some degree, innovation.
The Reagan programs attempted to reduce social security
spending and cross-industry regulation "to give U.S. companies
a breathing space in which to adapt to increased international
competition." Reagan's supply-side economics did not produce
"the miracle cure" and the budget deficit kept mounting. Deregulation increased takeovers and the unanticipated results
were crises in the financial and airline industries, accompanied
by a rash of bankruptcies.
The authors present their personal analysis of the current
crisis and suggest measures for speeding up reconstruction.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9

134

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1993, Vol. 20, no. 1
Mills: Reviews

127

Some of their suggestions include significant changes in the
public sector, reducing the deficit through reduced defense
spending, the judicious use of protectionist measures either
through tariffs or quotas, and direct aid to strategic firms by
setting up narrowly focused independent agencies.
Galambos and Pratt have provided a well-researched, wellwritten analytical perspective of the growth of American capitalism, and the interaction of American business and public policy.
The book is invaluable to students and leaders in business, and
those who wonder how and why "the American Century" lasted
only 25 years.

Yuji Ijiri and Rona A. Watts, (Eds.), Bill and Ruth Cooper and
Their Friends (Pittsburg: Carnegie Mellon University Press, 1990,
138 pp., Not Priced).
Reviewed by
Rodney K. Rogers
Case Western Reserve University
This book provides an introduction to the life of William W.
(Bill) Cooper. Bill has served several disciplines as a prolific
researcher, teacher and area administrator. He is a member of
the Accounting Hall of Fame. This volume is a collection of
speeches and essays in his honor written by former students
and colleagues, expressing appreciation for Bill's professional
and personal influence on them. As such, this volume does not
provide a critical perspective as to the significance of Bill
Cooper's contributions; it is clearly appreciative in tone. However, it does provide the reader with a personal insight into the
career of Bill Cooper.
The former students and colleagues who participated in this
activity came from all eras of Bill Cooper's career including the
u n d e r g r a d u a t e days at the University of Chicago, graduate
school experiences at Columbia University, and faculty and administrative positions at Carnegie Mellon, as well as his current
faculty and administrative responsibilities at the University of
Texas at Austin. Through these speeches and essays one begins
to understand events that have shaped Bill Cooper's approach to
problems. Herbert Simon discussed their time together at the
University of Chicago. This was during the Great Depression
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and such world events as the Spanish Civil War. These events
caused people to question the status quo and discuss alternatives. Simon posited that the "real education at Chicago was the
education of revolution" [p. 10]. Many of the speeches and essays describe Bill Cooper as a "revolutionary" because he looked
at problems in new and different ways.
In Cooper's response to the various remarks, he provides an
insight about those factors which influenced his approach to
problem solving. He received his formal academic training prior
to World War II in an era of "subject matter development."
During this time, Freud, Einstein and Keynes were all proposing
new theories. However, his academic career was after World
War II, during an "age of great methodological change." Thus,
he was forced to struggle with this new era and apply new
methods and approaches to various problems. Cooper's continuing interest in change is shown by his discussion of the need for
research in the area of bureaucracies and how organizations
deal with social problems. He proposes development of "flexible" bureaucracies and the need to consider ways to "inject
creativity and innovation into large bureaucratic organizations"
[p.97].
On the personal side of the subject, the volume contains
several "stories" regarding Cooper, such as his early career as a
professional fighter.
Several persons present aspects about Bill Cooper's years at
Carnegie Mellon University. During this time he was extremely
involved in the development of the Graduate School of Industrial Administration and the creation of the School of Urban
and Public Affairs. The approach that Cooper used in these activities sheds light upon his creative approach in shaping and
creating new organizations.
Bill Cooper has had an impact upon the accounting profession and this book provides the reader with interesting background information regarding his life and career. One should
read the book for what it is, a collection of speeches expressing
appreciation of Bill Cooper.
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R. H. Jones, The History of the Financial Control Function of
Local Government Accounting in the United Kingdom (New York:
Garland Publishing, Inc., 1992, 187 pp., $62).
Reviewed by
Leon Hay
University of Arkansas
The author, Rowan Jones, notes that this book is a "slightly
modified version of the author's Ph.D. thesis, submitted to the
University of Lancaster in 1986" [p. 3]. In the "Preface to the
Original Thesis" Jones wrote:
We do not know what local government accounting is,
or was: what has been written during its long history
has the abiding characteristic of being atheoretical and
ahistorical. It remains essentially a practice, borne out
of past practice [p. 5].
Jones' thesis, of course, relates to local government accounting
in the United Kingdom, but a similar comment could have been
made in relation to state and local governmental accounting in
the United States until the late 1970s.
The main purpose of the book, according to the "Preface to
the Original Thesis," is to answer the following questions:
Why do local authorities account the way they do? Why
is this accounting, in crucial respects, so different from
commercial accounting (fund accounting, capital accounting, budgetary accounting)? Why in other aspects
is it so like it (double entry, accruals)? Why did these
differences and similarities emerge [p. 7]?
Jones' research led him to conclude that the answers to the
above questions lie in the past; "indeed, they lie pre-1914" [p.7].
Evidence that the book is derived from Jones' Ph.D. thesis is
given by the title of Chapter One: "What is Local Government
Accounting? A review of the literature." The stated purpose of
the chapter "is to discover what is already known about local
government accounting and to explain why we need to know
more" [p. 9]. Readers who are familiar with the structure of
local government in the U.K., and the accounting model used by
those local governments, may feel that the chapter accomplishes
its stated purpose. Other readers are advised to skip Chapter
One and read Chapters Two, Three, and Four, which present
J o n e s ' synthesis of local government accounting from the
Published by eGrove, 1993
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Middle Ages through the first decade of the twentieth century.
Chapter Five, "Local Government Accounting as Statutory Financial Control," follows logically after the three historical
chapters. These four chapters provide the reader with the background needed to appreciate Chapter Six, "Implications for
Theory and Policy Making."
In Chapter Six, Jones discusses the following implications
for accounting theory as it relates to local government accounting in the United Kingdom: (1) budgeting and finance are inextricably bound up with local government accounting—therefore;
the matching concept is irrelevant; (2) statistics of annual net
expenditure drawn from the "revenue accounts" [revenue accounts in Great Britain are apparently equivalent to governmental fund types in the United States] are not costs, so cannot be
used as measures of economy or efficiency and are not useful
for comparative financial analysis; (3) the present accounting
model ignores holding gains and, also, ignores cost savings on
debt outstanding resulting from liabilities being fixed in monetary terms; (4) the recording of depreciation expense is irrelevant, and it would be inappropriate because it would affect the
(tax) rates collected; and (5) fund accounting is important in
distinguishing non-rate funds from rate funds (non-rate funds
appear to be equivalent to proprietary fund types in the United
States, and rate funds seem to be what Jones called revenue
accounts in earlier pages and what are called governmental fund
types in the United States). Jones' implications (1), (2), (4), and
(5) are equally valid in regard to state and local government
accounting in the United States; his implication (3) is also true
in the U.S., but it is not clear how it relates to the other four
implications for governmental accounting theory, or even to the
rest of the book.
Under the heading "Implications for Policy-making," Jones
observes that "the only unequivocal, intended users of local government accounting we have identified are the auditors" [p.
152]. In the United Kingdom, "the audit certificate has traditionally been a statement to the effect that the accounts are in
conformance with the law" [p. 152]. The law, Jones indicates, is
the financial control system established by the Treasury.
The implications for policy-making drawn by Jones from
his historical study of the financial control function of local
government accounting in the United Kingdom contrast markedly with the evaluation of governmental accounting in the
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United States. Here, the objective of financial reporting is to
enable governments to fulfill their duty to be publicly accountable in a democratic society. The independent auditor's report
attests to the conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles (defined as financial reporting standards set by the
Governmental Accounting Standards Board, a body in the private sector).

Richard Mattessich, (Ed.), Modern Accounting Research: History,
Survey, and Guide (Vancouver: Canadian Certified General Accountants' Research Foundation, 1984, 487 pp., C$30.00)
Reviewed by
Stephen J. Young
Case Western Reserve University
The book, Modem Accounting Research: History, Survey and
Guide, by Richard Mattessich, contains a broad survey of academic accounting literature. Thus, it provides a valuable collection of material for those wishing to review the development of
recent accounting thought.
The book is divided into six major parts. Each contains an
introduction by Mattessich and several articles addressing a major field of accounting research. The work also includes an index of the names of accounting academics.
The first two sections of the book deal with the development of theories and methodology in accounting research. The
first part is a general introduction to the field of accounting
research. It consists of an article discussing the "Scientific Approach to Accounting" written by Mattessich himself.
The second section considers concepts of theory construction and the roots of accounting thought. It addresses the concepts of Thomas Kuhn 1 on scientific revolutions and the period
in which his thought influenced social sciences, including accountancy. The section also looks at the relationships of accountancy to economics and finance, and the socioeconomic
consequences of standard setting.
After these Introductory sections, the last four sections each
address a major field of continuing research in accountancy.
1
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, 2nd enlarged edition (University of Chicago
Press), 1970.

Published by eGrove, 1993

139

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 20 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 9
132

The Accounting Historians Journal, June 1993

The third section deals with the controversy between positive
and normative research and contains several papers discussing
or using the positive accounting methodology. The section is
closed with two papers addressing public choice and economic
interest in the standard-setting process.
The fourth section deals with the subjects of agency and
information economics. In order to assist the reader in understanding the influence of this literature, there are several survey-type papers that cover the fundamentals of this subject area.
The fifth part of the book deals with the empirical/statistical
literature in accounting. It is composed of four papers dealing
with a broad array of topics ranging from market studies to
behavioral accounting research.
The final section deals with "other" issues. This omnibus
section contains papers on managerial accounting, auditing,
a n d non-business (e.g., a survey p a p e r written by William
Vatter) accounting.
Appended to the book is a comprehensive index of North
American accounting academics (as of 1984). This is an invaluable, although somewhat dated, addition to the book.
There are at least two principal concerns about the monograph. First, one can argue that "depth" has been sacrificed for
"breadth." The work does attempt to cover a wide range of research topics at the cost of "depth." Many of the papers are
surveys, and therefore brush over major contributions. For example, seminal articles such as Jenson and Meckling [1976] in
agency research and Ball and Brown [1969] in market studies
are not included. Much of the spirit of subsequent research in
these areas cannot be fully appreciated without reading such
works.
The second principal concern, not inherent in the work but
caused by the timing of this review, is the date of the monograph. A great deal of work has been done in academic accounting since 1984. Empirical studies have developed into two massive branches: market studies and behavioral research. These
fields were far less developed eight years ago. Agency research
and the application of information economics to accounting has
also blossomed beyond any level conceived of in 1984.
Fortunately, a second monograph by Mattessich, intended
to be a supplement to this comprehensive 1984 effort, is now
available [Mattessich, 1991].
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Tradeoffs in content are necessary, but no major issue in
accountancy is unattended. Regarding the second criticism, all
books become outdated. Time is never particularly kind to authors, but the 1984 monograph has aged remarkably well. Many
of its topics form the foundations of accounting research today,
and therefore this work remains a useful item in a scholar's
library.
This publication's greatest value is as a "survey and guide"
to contemporary academic accountancy research. It therefore
meets its promised "mission". It also provides a base for further
inquiry, and the index of authors is most helpful. I recommend
the work both as a reader for an advanced accountancy theory
course or for practitioners who want to understanding the academic side of accounting.

REFERENCES
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John T. S. Melzer, Bastion of Commerce in the City of Kings: The
Consulado de Commercio de Lima 1593-1877 (Lima, Peru: Editorial Concytec Peru, 1991, 208 pp., Not priced).
Reviewed by
Stephen F. Laribee
Eastern Illinois University
This book is a history of the Consulado de Lima, the mercantile regulatory body for Spanish South America. It follows
the course of events (1593-1877) for this institution and makes
references to numerous Peruvian documents and other sources.
The author states that very little has been written about this
exceptionally powerful Crown institution that controlled trade
from the City of Kings. For that reason, the book contains an
English, German and Spanish version of the text.
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The Spanish government had made use of the consulado
several centuries before introducing it to Peru. In time, "the new
consulado in Lima was to dominate the trade of the viceroyalty
of Peru in much the same way as the Seville consulado dominated that between Spain and the colonies" [p. 6]. This was
because it was given royal jurisdiction for all of Spanish South
America. The author includes a discussion of the role that the
consulado played in terms of the Council of the Indies and the
Casa de Contratación that preceded it.
In addition to the history of the Consulado de Lima, Melzer
describes the basic operation of the institution as a court and as
a major financial contributor to the Crown. He also gives general background information on the Spanish empire while narrating how the consulado responded to various economic and
political pressures. The Crown needed the Lima Consulado's judicial power and the taxes it collected for them. It was the tax
collecting function that gave the consulado its major source of
power during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
During the mid and late eighteenth century, changes occurred in the imperial bureaucracy that abolished the Casa de
Contratación and took away the power of the Council of the
Indies. By the nineteenth century "the institution's prime concern was the financing of the vice royal government against the
encroachment of the forces for Independence" [p. 34].
With the Republic of Peru winning independence, its survival was dependent on collecting taxes. To that end, a new
constitution in 1828 reestablished the consulado in its full preindependence institutional form, except for some changes in the
court structure. The consulado continued to serve as "the financial palace guard for the kingdom of Peru" [p. 37] until 1887
when it was legislated out of existence.
The consulado's existence was very important to the financing of the Crown and later to the Republic of Peru. Because
detailed records of its collections have been maintained, it is
now also important to historians. This information is valuable
to researchers investigating the economic conditions that prevailed during this period and the trade that took place in South
America and overseas.
Melzer is to be commended for his research on this little
known, but important financial institution in the Spanish colonization of South America.
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Lee D. Parker and O. Finley Graves, (Eds.), Methodology and
Method in History, A Bibliography (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1989, 247 pp., $75).
Reviewed by
Michael J. R. Gaffikin
University of Wollongong, Australia
It is difficult to know how to review a bibliography, but
presumably it must be relevant (and useful) and complete. In
the Introduction, it is stated that
The objective of this bibliography is to provide the accounting history research community with a comprehensive reference tool that will ultimately enhance their
(sic) understanding of methodological issues and enable them to employ research methods appropriate to
their subject of study [xiii].
It is tempting to ask whether this is an aim which is as
noble and romantic as the setting for the origins of the project
("a curbside cafe on a balmy summer's night in Pisa" [ix]). It is
difficult to believe that merely presenting a list of titles will
enhance the reader's awareness of methodological issues. The
editors obviously are aware of this and have designed a taxonomic grouping of the titles. It would seem that they have given
this matter some considerable attention and there are thirteen
such groups. Even so, they are not likely to please everyone and
it would be easy to take issue with the rationale for the taxonomic divisions. In selecting their categories, the editors have
indicated their vision of history; for example, why are there
separate groups for historiography, philosophy of history and
the historical rationale? Can evidence and sources be separated
from interpretation and social dimensions? The editors, it
would seem, are not convinced of either: some titles included
under one heading in one section of the book are included in a
different group in the another section.
The book is divided into four parts. The first introduces the
taxonomic groups with summary reference lists. That is, the
works, numbered for cross reference, are listed under a particular group. The next section forms the main part of the book,
with the full reference (and numbered) citation being given. The
third section contains an annotated selected bibliography. The
final, very brief section lists accounting history review and
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method papers. It is unfortunate that this last section is so brief
and any charges of incompleteness may justifiably be laid here.
The broader question concerns the extent to which readers
can be made aware of the methodological issues in undertaking
historical research: the editors have certainly led the horses to
the water, but will (or can) they drink? If they do not, the editors cannot be blamed for they have made every effort to
present the material in a manner they believe will help the
would-be accounting history researcher come to terms with
most of the types of historical research that have become accepted over the years. This is especially true of the annotated
bibliography section, and the editors are to be applauded for the
admirable way they have tackled this immense task. The question, then, is do researchers learn from what others claim is the
way to proceed with research, or is it better for them to see
actual examples of (accounting) historical research and decide
for themselves what is "good" and what is "bad" accounting
history, what is an appropriate approach to their research and
what not? That is, are there universal standards by which accounting history can be judged? If so, who will do the judging accountants or historians?
This work was conceived and completed before the recent
debates on the "new accounting history." Thus, there is no section that deals specifically with this issue. It can be claimed
(unfairly) that the work, therefore, is incomplete. Those with a
predilection for the so-called new accounting history are bound
to find many sections unsatisfactory and even unnecessary, for
example, the references to quantitative methods of historical
research (cliometrics). However, this section would seem to be
one of the most complete: and there are a substantial number of
references for anyone interested in learning how to undertake
research that warrants sophisticated statistical support.
As stated earlier, it is difficult to review a bibliography and
it is easy to find fault with various parts of it. In this work, the
editors have set out to provide a list of references for those
interested in knowing the sorts of standards by which works
purporting to be historical are judged. If the readers of these
historical works are also aware of these standards, accounting
history can only become more rigorous and intellectually demanding. The editors wish to see works on accounting history
become more than mere chronological descriptions, more than
anecdotal curiosities. Thus, they have tried to present a tool for
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accounting history researchers, and they have completed a work
for which they can be proud; one that contains a wealth of
material and which should be in every accounting historian's
collection let alone every institutional library.

Denise Schmandt-Besserat, Before Writing, Volume 1, From
Counting to Cuneiform (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992,
304 pp., $60).
Reviewed by
Cigdem Solas
Concordia University
Before Writing is a fascinating book on the evolution of
communication in the Near East between 8000-3000 B.C. Much
more than that, it is a book on accounting history itself. It argues that, writing was not, as previously thought, a sudden and
spontaneous invention; the alphabet was not of divine origin as
was believed until 1700s; nor did scripts start with picture writing as was p u t forward during the enlightenment period.
Rather, writing emerged from manipulation of counting symbols.
Denise Schmandt-Besserat presents a unique hypothesis:
Mesopottamian writing emerged from a counting device which
existed at least two hundred years earlier than pictographics.
She argues that tallies, tokens and pictographic tablets represent three distinct phases in the evolution of data processing [p.
166]. The emergence of tallies and plain and complex tokens
reflects the needs of different societies and their specific lifestyles, economics and social organizations. The development of
these societies and their economies and social needs influenced
each phase of prehistoric counting and accounting devices or
reckoning technology.
The first chapter of the book introduces us to previous
theories and arguments about the evolution of writing as well as
introducing its argument on the subject. The following chapters
introduce the token system chronologically and geographically,
tracing its evolution in prehistory. Two of these chapters distinguish between plain and complex tokens and depict their evolution with beautifully photographed illustrations.
The fourth and fifth chapters provide insight into the domestic and public uses of tokens, including their purpose and
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storage as related to the economic and social changes occuring
in the particular society under examination. The analysis establishes that storage of tokens created a need for marking signs on
clay envelopes, which was a new trend in communication and
an immediate step preceding writing itself.
While Chapter Six introduces us to the routine documentation of the impressed tablets (classifying and making available
knowledge as a procedure), the strengths of the book are to be
found in the remaining chapters. Those chapters introduce us to
the author's revolutionary findings and, in particular, the fascinating interpretation of her findings on accounting.
Chapter Seven presents the author's classification system of
the tokens. In this chapter, the author shows that tokens were
concept symbols and, as such, conveyed quantitative as well as
qualitative information. There were various types of tokens each
of which carried discrete meaning. For example, the cone represented a small measure of grain and the sphere represented a
large measure of grain. On the other hand, the number of tokens represented quantitative information about the goods, like
two spheres or three cones. However, they always represented
economic data of some kind, whether agricultural or manufactured goods. Even the repertory of shapes was systematized.
Always cones signified a particular measure of grain. However,
it should be stressed that this was an open classification system
because new signs were added whenever needed. As well, it was
flexible enough to manipulate economic information by facilitating the functions of addition and subtraction. The entire system was based on one-to-one correspondence.
In Chapter Eight, the author argues that the development of
token systems and accounting was not commerce-related, but
emerged as an outcome of the changes in the social structure
and economies of respective societies. For example, in egalitarian societies, individuals had an equal share of resources and
tokens were used to measure and count units for farming and
grain hoarding. Plain tokens satisfied these needs and basically
represented products of the farm. Later the emergence of
ranked societies fundamentally changed the relationship between tokens and the needs of particular social groups in the
society. Suddenly, tokens became devices of rudimentary accounting rather than counting, and complex tokens came to
represent goods manufactured in the city. In ranked societies,
temples acted as a sort of central location where individuals
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made offerings and where collections were redistributed. At this
stage, the function of writing served the purpose of keeping
account of the resources collected at the temple or the palace
and redistribution of this collection. Further, writing as a form
of social control came into practice. Record keeping became
imperative to provide information about the community's
pooled surpluses and their redistribution. Unquestionably, the
temple needed to control both functions, and therefore used
tablets to record receipts. Tablet records contained all the necessary information of a receipt. The change from ranked society to
the formation of the state brought about new social and economic
needs. The state needed a system of continual resource collection
(such as taxes) and needed to calculate the cost of the monuments
which were built. Both kinds of tokens met those needs very well.
After rationalizing the social and economic functions of tokens and the development of communication, the author explains three major phases in the evolution of counting: one-toone correspondence, concrete counting, and abstract counting.
She postulates that writing was the direct outcome of abstract
counting, and suggests that accountants of Uruk IVa themselves
can be credited for devising the two types of signs: numerals
(symbols encoding abstract numbers) and pictographs (expressing commodities) [p. 192].
The book concludes by showing how tokens and tablets illustrated and proved the interconnections between social structure, cognitive skills, economy, technology, mathematics and
communication during 8000-3000 B.C.
Before Writing is indeed a very interesting and valuable
book which makes a major contribution to the field and is of
particular interest to those in the history of accounting. Before
Writing deserves considerable success.

Richard Vangermeersch, (Ed.), Relevance Rediscovered, Volume
III (Montvale, New Jersey: Institute of Management Accountants, 1992, 351 pp., $29.95).
Reviewed by
Lamont F. Steedle
Towson State University
The third and last volume of Relevance Rediscovered, the
anthology compiled by Richard Vangermeersch for the Institute
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of Management Accountants (IMA), enlightens the reader with
yet another sampling of the cost accounting writings of a particular decade in our past. At the same time, we are disappointed knowing that this IMA Classic Series will end with its
publication. It would have been interesting to learn about the
ideas post-1949, a time which is still well before many current
cost accounting academics and practitioners began their study
of the discipline. Why this series was not extended another decade is puzzling.
The current volume, which focuses on the National Association of Cost Accountants (NACA, original name of the IMA)
bulletins and yearbooks from 1939-1949, does not disappoint
the reader. While the initial volume covering the 1919-1929 decade remains this writer's favorite, Volume III is a close second
choice. Clearly choosing a favorite volume reflects more on the
issues of the times rather than the individual choices of the
editor. Professor Vangermeersch always seems to select a mix of
25 significant articles that provide a broad area of topics, and
he continues to provide stimulating and interesting introductory
comments that relate the works to modern everyday problems.
What is most significant, however, is that each of the volumes in the trilogy contains a handful of gems among its 25
collected works. In this volume, these articles are: (54) "The
Nature of Cost and Its Uses" by Wyman P. Fiske, which reviews
four different cost concepts and relates them to five different
costing applications; (55) "Accounting for Materials and Related
Procedures" by the Systems and Methods Study Group of the
New York City Chapter of NACA, which is a summary of existing procedures and methods in use in accounting for materials;
and, (57) "Accounting by Causes Vs. Accounting by Accounts"
by Joseph B. Copper, which proposes a different approach to
variance analysis that looks similar to some of the newer activity management systems being proposed today.
When one first encounters the initial volume of this series,
there is both anticipation and skepticism because of the claim
that this volume will contain "the great accounting ideas of the
past, to help you solve today's and tomorrow's problems." Not
every work in the trilogy fulfilled this, but perhaps two out of
every three did. Management accountants, academics and practitioners alike, should avail themselves of this resource. The reason to do so is well defined by Professor Vangermeersch:
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Our profession has to be more concerned with past literature, especially in light of our national quest to become competitive again and our reexamination of our
m a n a g e m e n t a c c o u n t i n g r o o t s b r o u g h t a b o u t by
today's completely automated factory. Let this past literature light our way to the future [Vol. III, p.7].

S. A. Zeff, F. VanderWel, and C. Camfferman, Company Financial Reporting: A Historical and Comparative Study of the Dutch
Regulatory Process, (New York: Elsevier Science Publishing Co.,
1992, 450 pp., $85).
Reviewed by
Kathleen E. Sinning
Western Michigan University
Although the Dutch have a keen awareness of developments
in financial accounting outside their country, few non-Dutch
accounting scholars know much about the evolution of Dutch
financial reporting because little concerning it has been written
in English. Company Financial Reporting: A Historical and Comparative Study of the Dutch Regulatory Process closes that gap.
The authors have done a masterful job of analyzing the events
leading to the current state of financial reporting in the Netherlands and providing the reader with a concise but thorough
review of the economic, legal, political, and cultural environment in which the Dutch regulatory process has developed.
In the first chapter, the organizations, individuals, attitudes,
and traditions that have shaped the Dutch regulatory process
are introduced. The Dutch capital markets, the principal employer and employee federations, company law, and the evolution of the auditing profession are also examined.
Freedom in financial reporting has been a hallmark of
Dutch accounting since the passage of the first company law.
Over time, as changes occurred in the Dutch business climate,
in the regulation of the Dutch auditing profession, and in the
international accounting arena, attitudes toward financial reporting were modified. Chapters Two through Six of Company
Financial Reporting analyze the events leading to the current
state of financial reporting, in chronological order, beginning
with the first attempts to regulate limited companies in the late
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nineteenth century. The chapters are organized around major
initiatives to improve financial accounting.
Since there is very little literature on Dutch accounting history, the authors relied extensively on original source material
including parliamentary proceedings, court decisions, confidential minutes of committee meetings, committee reports, comment letters to exposure drafts, newspaper and magazine articles and editorials, speeches, and 90 interviews with key
people involved in the regulatory process. The chapters contain
a wealth of detail including the names and backgrounds of committee members, contents of exposure drafts and final guidelines, and reactions by businesses, the financial press, and the
auditing profession to proposals and reports. The result is a
lively account that does not merely outline the events that occurred, but reflects on the personalities, motives, and power
struggles behind the actions.
Despite more than a century of activity aimed at improving
financial reporting, Dutch companies still enjoy great flexibility
in accounting practice. Compliance with recommended standards beyond the legal requirements is still not enforced. In
Chapter Seven, the regulatory process in the Netherlands is
compared with that in the United Kingdom and the United
States. Differences in the legal systems, national cultures, and
capital markets are examined to help explain the differences in
the development of financial reporting requirements in each
country.
The Netherlands is a country in which "progress is made
through consensus and compromise" [p. 3]. The authors feel
that an unfortunate consequence of the consensus approach in
financial reporting regulation is that the guidance it produces is
characterized by "ambivalence and the lack of clear direction"
[p. 373]. In the final chapter of the book, they make specific
recommendations for policy and procedural changes including
strengthening the political process for promoting improvement
in financial reporting and having the Dutch auditing profession
and members of academe take a leadership role in setting
norms of financial reporting.
Although Company Financial Reporting is a richly detailed
study of the efforts to advance and reform financial reporting in
the Netherlands, its analysis of the factors influencing the regulatory process makes it a valuable resource for any accounting
scholar interested in financial accounting.
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